PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

MARCH
APRIL | 1964

SPECIAL ISSUE

International Communism and the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Peking vs. Moscow

Factionalism Past and Present

New Marxisms?

Underdeveloped Areas

Eastern Europe

Italian Communism

The Soviet Public

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

MARCH-APRIL 1964
VOL. XIII
2

PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained free of charge by writing to the nearest office of the U.S. Information Service. Residents of the United States may purchase the journal by writing to the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D.C. Price per copy: $.50. Subscription price: $2.50. Editorial office: U.S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W., Washington 25, D.C.

Editor: *Abraham Brumberg*
Managing Editor: *Marie Thompson House*
Associate Editors: *Clarke H. Kawakami, Cary O. Fisher*
Editorial Assistant: *Patricia Leisner*

1 International Communism and The Sino-Soviet Dispute

THE PRESENT AND THE PAST

3 The Conflict: A Survey, *by Harry Gelman*

16 A World in Disarray, *by Wolfgang Leonhard*

27 Boring from Within, *by Kevin Devlin*

40 How Monolithic Was the Monolith?, *by Robert V. Daniels*

48 Marxisms—How Many?, *by Lewis S. Feuer*

58 The Soviet Citizen and the Threat from the East, *by Victor S. Frank*

64 Rivalry in Underdeveloped Areas, *by Herbert Dinerstein*

73 Perspectives for Eastern Europe, *by Richard V. Burks*

82 The New Face of Italian Communism, *by John Ducoli*

BOOKS

91 Peking Versus Moscow, *by Eric Willenz*

94 Communism in Western Europe, *by William C. Gausmann*

98 Struggle in the Himalayas, *by Rhea C. Blue*

NOTES AND VIEWS

102 The Polemics Seen by a Non-Polemicist, *by Benjamin Schwartz*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International Communism and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

TO OUR READERS

Our new format is designed to accommodate a larger amount of printed matter and to make *Problems of Communism* more readable and attractive. While the number of pages this time exceeds our usual total, we hope in the future to make our regular issues considerably longer—and more variegated—than in the past.

Of all the upheavals that have rocked the Communist world in the past decade or so, none has been of more vital importance than the burgeoning dispute between Peking and Moscow. On the causes, nature and history of the dispute so much ink has already been spilled that little new remains to be said. Therefore—with the exception of Mr. Gelman's article—it is not to the dispute as such but to its impact on contemporary communism that this issue is devoted.

Disagreements and splits, such as described in Mr. Devlin's article, are not new to communism, of course, nor to the entire history of left-wing politics in Europe (see Mr. Daniel's article). Neither are the ideological differences, which figure so prominently in the voluminous writings emanating from the party presses throughout the world, unique or especially profound. In fact, as pointed out by Mr. Schwartz, the Chinese could be accused of having been "revisionists" no less than they now accuse the Soviets of being, and both sides indulge in distortions of each other's positions with a gusto that had hitherto been reserved, by and large, only for the most despicable enemies, renegades, and apostates.

The importance of the Sino-Soviet conflict lies, rather, in the fact that it has, once and forever, put to rest the myth of Marxist infallibility and invincibility. The myth, of course, had been subjected to a fairly steady barrage ever since Khrushchev's "secret speech" on Stalin in February 1956. Yet it is only now that the image (to take the Communist version) of a

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

united international army of proletarians marching forward to an illustrious dawn or (to take one Western variant) a sinister, superbly synchronized "international conspiracy," ready to plunge the world into totalitarian darkness, can finally, let us hope, be disposed of.

With the destruction of the myth comes disarray, ferment, and conflict. No matter how gallant the Soviet attempts to convince the world (and themselves?) that there can be one and only one Marxism (see Mr. Feuer's article), parties will take side with either Peking or Moscow or may form alliances independent of either of the two power centers (see article by Mr. Leonhard), each coterie, of course, defending its own claim to ideological virginity.

In a commentary written shortly after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising (see issue No. 6 November-December 1956), we ventured to predict that despite the resurgence of Soviet brutality, the basic trends characteristic of the post-Stalin era were bound to "reassert themselves . . . At that time we may see the further disintegration of the Stalinist Monolith and the emergence of a new *genre* of communism—in the ultimate sense no less abhorrent to the goals and ideals of a democratic society, but certainly *different from the type the world has known until now.*"

This passage would have to be slightly altered at this time, for quite obviously we are now seeing the rise not only of *one* but of numerous *genres* of communism. As to whether these new offspring of Marxism will indeed be no less inimical to democracy than their predecessor, there is much that can be said on either side. To be sure, just as life in the Soviet Union has become more bearable than it had been under Stalin, so has international communism shed many of its most odious features. But why assume — as some do—that polycentrism is necessarily a "good" thing? To the extent that we may now safely discard the definition of a Communist as one who unflinchingly supports the USSR whatever the circumstances—to the extent, that is, that there no longer exists one country powerful enough to enforce its line upon all Communist parties throughout the world—the recent changes are surely all to the better. Yet those who stop right there seem to forget that the most reprehensible thing about communism has not been so much its uniformity and irrational subservience to the Soviet Union as its profoundly authoritarian character. What assurances do we have, then, that a party more capable of identifying itself with local grievances and aspirations would desist from manipulating them for its own undemocratic ends? One need not be loyal to Moscow, after all, to seize power by force, to establish a one-party state, to institute a regime of political repression and totalitarian regimentation. Certainly no one could claim that the Bolsheviks in 1917 were unresponsive to the needs and demands of the Russian population!

But the events of the past few years, some will say, have shown precisely the opposite: Hasn't the evolution of the Italian CP, for example (see article by Mr. Ducoli), shown that there *has* been a liberalization of the international Communist movement? So it has—but what of the French CP? And what, for that matter, of those parties that have cast their lot with the Chinese party in the latter's dispute with the CPSU—are *they* likely to undergo a democratization in the foreseeable future? Perhaps so. Yet it is much more likely that we are about to witness a number of contradictory processes, with some parties gradually losing their revolutionary *elan* or their authoritarian mold and others remaining or becoming even more revolutionary and/or authoritarian (the two terms, after all, are not synonymous). This is not to say that the latter will become blind followers of Peking. One can hardly imagine, say, the Australian CP voluntarily emasculating itself for the sake of a new, Peking-directed "proletarian internationalism." Yet is is equally difficult to see Maurice Thorez tolerating a free exchange of opinion within the French CP. Or, for that matter, Khrushchev tolerating the same in *his* party . . .

If the new situation in international communism yields a single lesson, it is surely that the old categories, Marxist, Communist, as well as those employed in analyzing communism, are no longer as firm and dependable as in the past. The purpose of this issue is to underscore this very proposition. If the effect is to compound the confusion by raising more questions than can be answered—so much the better. **A.B.**

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Conflict: A Survey

By Harry Gelman

Mr. Gelman is an American specialist and writer on Communist affairs. His recent contributions to Problems of Communism *include "Indian Communism in Turmoil" (May-June 1963) and "The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking" (November-December 1962).*

Eight years have now gone by since the 20th Congress of the CPSU touched off the momentous struggle between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties, and nearly four since the conflict passed—in the spring of 1960—from the stage of concealed behind-the-scenes argumentation and veiled public criticism to that of open vituperation. Looking back over the whole course of events, particularly in the light of what both sides revealed during 1963 of their past confidential dealings, one is struck above all by the continuity and steady growth of the conflict. Despite periodic lulls in the intensity of its public expression, the Sino-Soviet struggle has gone on unceasingly since 1956, and each successive year has brought important new developments—some publicly known at the time, others not—which progressively expanded and exacerbated it.

From the beginning, the struggle has been fundamentally a dispute over authority: since 1956, over the authority to define (and redefine) the proper relationships betwen the CPSU and other bloc Communist parties; since 1957, over the authority to fix unified policy lines for the bloc and the international Communist movement; and, since 1958 particularly, over the authority to determine whose national interests—Moscow's or Peking's—should be accorded greater weight in the formulation of Communist policy. Conflicts of national interest between the disputants have involved such questions as whether the Soviet Union should assist Communist China to attain a nuclear capability; what risks the USSR should be willing to take in order to support Chinese Communist ambitions regarding Taiwan; the desirability of moves to reduce tensions with the United States; how far the Communist bloc should go in encouraging and backing revolutionary armed struggles in underdeveloped areas; and what attitude should be taken towards "national-bourgeois" regimes in these areas, especially where—as in India—the regime appears hostile to Chinese Communist but not to Soviet interests.

Beginning of the Chinese Challenge

While it is appropriate to trace the Sino-Soviet struggle from the 20th CPSU Congress, which Peking now claims to have been its starting point, it should be noted that the CCP had already had

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

important policy disagreements with Stalin before, during and after its advent to power in 1949. The point, however, is that not until Stalin's death did the Chinese party dare to make such conflicts the occasion for challenging the authority and prerogatives of the CPSU—and eventually denying them altogether. It so happened that the first new policy divergence of importance following Stalin's death arose with the 20th Congress and the positions it took regarding the Stalin cult and the possibility of "peaceful transitions" to socialism. Confronted once again, as it had been in the past, with Soviet decisions of policy with which it strongly disagreed, the CCP leadership now for the first time felt itself in a position to press for their modification and, in so doing, to contest the paramount authority of the Soviet party.

In its major statement on the dispute last September, the CCP referred back to its April 1956 pronouncement "On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat" (*Jen-min Jih-pao*, April 5, 1956) as having "tactfully but unequivocally criticized the erroneous propositions of the 20th Congress."[1] This pronouncement did, in fact, seek to defend Mao's own position in the Chinese party by revising what the CCP regarded as the one-sided appraisal of Stalin at the congress, at the same time presenting a Marxist "explanation" of how Stalin's "mistakes" had occurred and how they could be prevented from recurring in the future. In brief, the CCP held that Stalin had indeed committed "serious mistakes," but that his merits were more important; that his errors had reflected contradictions "between the individual and the collective in a socialist society"; and that such contradictions, although they might recur, could be minimized, and mistakes averted, if the "leaders of Communist parties and socialist states" exercised sufficient prudence.

This document, representing the first in a long series of Chinese efforts to correct the errant CPSU and provide guidance for all those who had heretofore looked to Moscow for direction, made an immediate and widespread impression in the international Communist movement.[2] Moreover, the Chinese disclosed last September that they had followed up the April 1956 pronouncement with a series of private protests conveyed by Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, and Chou En-lai in conversations with Soviet leaders in Moscow and Peking in April, October and November 1956, and January 1957. In these talks, according to the Chinese, they maintained that "the basic policy and line during the period when Stalin was in power were correct," and that the CPSU leadership had shown a "total lack of overall analysis" of Stalin, a "lack of self-criticism," and (apparently most serious of all in Peking's view) a "failure to consult with the fraternal parties in advance."

The East European Crises

Besides questioning the propriety of the Soviet repudiation of Stalin, the CCP apparently undertook to intervene directly in Moscow's relations with its East European satellites before and during the crises of late 1956. Chinese statements and credible press reports at the time indicated that the Peking leadership gave support to the Polish Communist demands for greater autonomy from Moscow; and the Chinese have charged in their more recent statements on the dispute that the Soviet Union "committed the error of great power chauvinism . . . by moving up troops in an attempt to subdue the Polish comrades by armed force," initimating that the CCP had then stepped in to warn Moscow against using force.[3] At the same time, the Chinese claim that it was also they who pressured the CPSU into abandoning an altogether different sort of "grave error" in the handling of the Hungarian revolt. The Peking statement of last September says:

At the critical moment when the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries had occupied Budapest, it [the CPSU] intended for a time to adopt a policy of capitulation and to abandon socialist Hungary to counterrevolution . . . We insisted on the taking of all necessary measures to smash the

[1] Editorial article simultaneously published in central CCP daily *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily) and monthly *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), Sept. 6, 1963. (Hereafter cited as JMJP-HC joint editorial.)

[2] For example, such a usually loyal CPSU supporter as the late Ajoy Ghosh, then Secretary-General of Indian CP, told the Fourth CPI Congress that the Chinese statement was the most satisfactory one he had seen on the question, and urged all Indian Communists to study it. See "Report of Ajoy Ghosh to the Fourth CPI Congress," in Democratic Research Service brochure *Communist Double Talk at Palghat*, Bombay, 1956, pp. 117-26.

[3] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963, states: "We insisted that in the handling of problems between fraternal parties and countries, correct principles should be followed so as to strengthen the unity of the Socialist camp, and *we firmly opposed the erroneous methods of great power chauvinism*" (Emphasis added.) Such Chinese action in support of Poland was reported by Sidney Gruson in the *New York Times*, January 11, 1957.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

counterrevolutionary rebellion in Hungary and firmly opposed the abandonment of . . . Hungary[4]

Although it is quite likely that the Chinese have greatly exaggerated their part in determining the course ultimately taken by the Soviet Union in both the Polish and Hungarian crises, the essential point is that Peking apparently did intervene in an attempt to influence decisions that hitherto had been accepted as Moscow's sole prerogative. Further, the Chinese now claim (since last year) that it was likewise at their suggestion that the Soviet government issued its declaration of October 30, 1956, in which—as the Chinese put it—the Soviet leaders re-examined "some of their own past mistakes in handling their relations with fraternal countries" and recognized the need for "mutual respect," "equality" and "independence" in intra-bloc relations. On November 1, 1956, Peking published a statement supporting the Soviet declaration, but also voicing direct approval of the Polish Communist position and warning against further manifestations of "great power chauvinism."

In their statements last year, the Chinese piously professed to be saddened by the fact that the actions they took in 1956 in the best interests of communism had caused the Soviet leadership to "nurse rancor against us" and to regard the CCP as its "biggest obstacle." That such rancor arose was hardly surprising, however, in view of the fact that Peking was now asserting its independent right to provide doctrinal guidance to the Communist world, to judge the propriety of Soviet policy innovations, and even to prescribe the correct framework of relationships between the USSR and other members of the Communist bloc.

Mao at Moscow, 1957

At the conference of Communist leaders held in Moscow in November 1957, with Mao himself attending as chief spokesman for the CCP, the Chinese vigorously renewed their efforts to shape overall Communist policy, although with a perceptible shift in direction. Whereas in 1956 Peking had stressed autonomy and inveighed against "great power chauvinism," its representatives now urged unity and deference to the leading role of the Soviet Union. Speaking publicly at Moscow University on November 17, Mao declared that "the socialist camp must have a head and this head is the USSR," and that "the Communist parties of all countries must have a head and this head is the CPSU."

It is now clear from the information made public by Peking last year that Mao's attendance at the Moscow parley followed less than a month after the signature of an agreement providing for Soviet assistance to China in the area of "new technology for national defense." Hence, the Chinese leader's insistence upon a special status for the CPSU, together with the strong Chinese stand taken in the conference against revisionism and emphasizing the value of Soviet experience for all members of the bloc, may well have been partly intended as a repayment by Peking for the military aid agreement. However, it seems equally likely that the Chinese position on bloc unity and doctrinal orthodoxy was, in any case, a necessary complement to the CCP's effort at the Moscow meeting to force acceptance of a more vigorous and aggressive Communist strategy towards the West in the light of Soviet weapons developments. In 1963 Moscow and Peking published differing versions of portions of Mao's conference speech dealing with this point, but both versions indicated that the Chinese leader had sought to impress upon the delegates that nuclear war was neither so likely, nor its consequences—if it came—so unacceptable, as to justify Communist hesitancy to adopt a more militant international policy.[5]

Thus, the Chinese line at the 1957 conference by no means signified Peking's submission to CPSU discipline or Soviet policy dictates. On the contrary, Mao apparently insisted upon the prerogatives of a king-maker. While publicly proclaiming the USSR and CPSU to be the "center" and "head" of world communism, he met privately with Soviet party leaders and—so the Chinese claim—"where necessary and appropriate, waged struggle against them in order to help them correct their errors." Prominent among the errors which Mao "struggled" to correct, according to the Chinese, was the CPSU's draft of the passage in the conference resolution relating to the modes of acquiring power. The Chinese claim that this

[4] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963. This statement indicates elsewhere that Liu Shao-ch'i had "conversations" with Soviet Communist party leaders sometime during October 1956.

[5] See CPR government statement of Sept. 1, 1963, released by New China News Agency (NCNA), Aug. 31, 1963; and Soviet government statement of Sept. 20, 1963, released by TASS same date.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

draft "said not a word about non-peaceful transition [to power], mentioning only peaceful transition" and emphasizing the "parliamentary road." They admit that they did not obtain everything they wished, but claim to have forced the Soviets to accept counterbalancing phrases on the possibility of "non-peaceful transition" which were embodied in a joint CPSU-CCP draft declaration and later incorporated in the published conference resolution.

The CCP also claims that it succeeded in wresting other concessions from the CPSU at the 1957 meeting, and certain of these testify to Peking's desire at the time for a harsher bloc foreign policy. Notably, Peking asserts that its representatives secured additions to the conference resolution embodying the notions that "US imperialism is the center of world reaction and the sworn enemy of the people," and that "if imperialism should unleash a world war, it would doom itself to destruction."[6]

New Areas of Friction

In 1958 the Sino-Soviet struggle took on broader dimensions as new conflicts of national interest arose on several fronts. The three most important matters at issue were the military relationship between the two powers, the related question of Soviet conduct during the Taiwan Straits crisis, and Peking's radical new economic programs and the claims associated with them.

On the military issue, Peking's statement of last September, though not saying so explicitly, seeks to convey the impression that the Soviet Union, in the October 1957 defense assistance agreement, gave a firm commitment to help China attain an atomic weapons capability. This appears doubtful, however, particularly in view of the campaign launched by the CCP in the summer of 1958 against Chinese military leaders charged with overemphasizing the importance of both atomic weapons and outside aid. The same Chinese statement further alleges that sometime (unspecified) in 1958 "the CPSU put forward unreasonable demands designed to bring China under Soviet military control," and that these demands were "firmly rejected by the Chinese government." It is conceivable that the demands were linked by the Soviets to the question of atomic assistance to China, and that they were advanced by Khrushchev when he visited Peking in early August, at which time Soviet military assistance was reportedly discussed in the context of China's requirements for the impending Taiwan Straits venture.[7] In any event, the absence of any Soviet agreement to supply nuclear weapons to China was suggested shortly after Khrushchev's departure by an article in the CCP organ *Hung Ch'i* (August 16) prominently reasserting Mao's dictum that "the atomic bomb is a paper tiger."

If the Chinese were embittered by the evident Soviet reluctance to satisfy them in regard to the sharing of the USSR's nuclear might, that bitterness was further intensified by the hesitant backing China received from Moscow in the ensuing crisis in the Taiwan Straits. Confronted by American nuclear power, Peking apparently sought to obtain an early public commitment by the Soviet Union that would enable it to face down the United States and thus would make feasible Chinese military action to "liberate" the offshore islands. The Chinese government statement of September 1, 1963, charged that the Soviet Union had perfidiously withheld such a commitment until Moscow was sure that it could be given without risk—in other words, until it was too late to be of any assistance to the original Chinese goal.

The slow and deliberate course taken by Moscow in the Taiwan Straits crisis does, indeed, suggest that the Soviet leadership feared the possibility of being dragged into a nuclear conflict with the United States as a result of precipitate Chinese action taken in pursuit of interests not shared by the USSR. This interpretation would appear to derive support from the Chinese claim made last September (denied, unconvincingly, by Moscow) that Khrushchev, in his talks with Mao at Peking in October 1959, sought to remove Taiwan as "an incendiary factor in the international situation" by hinting that Peking ought to accept a "two-Chinas" solution.[8] At the same time, it seems likely that the Chinese Communist challenge to the United States in 1958 further reinforced Soviet reluctance to assist China in acquiring nuclear weapons.

A third new area of friction developed in connection with the radical turn in Chinese domestic policy during 1958, manifested in the

[6] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

[7] See Raymond L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 349, Sept. 1963, p. 89.

[8] CPR government statement, Sept. 1, 1963. The same claim is made in JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

launching of the communes program and the economic "Great Leap Forward." Chinese spokesmen exuberantly claimed that the communes, with their system of partial distribution according to need, contained "shoots" of communism, signifying that the final attainment of communism in China was no longer far off; that they represented an unprecedented achievement as well as a useful model for other countries. In these claims and the policies of the "Great Leap" as a whole, the CPSU saw a new and dangerous Chinese challenge to its leadership of the Communist world. As a Soviet comment stated in 1963, "things were depicted as though only they (the Chinese) were really engaged in communist construction, leaving other countries behind," and the Chinese leaders tried to present their "totally unsound and harmful policy . . . as an objective law" and "as a prescription or recipe for other countries."[9]

According to one of the official Soviet statements issued last fall, Khrushchev personally protested these "innovations" in his talks with Mao in early August 1958.[10] For some time afterwards, however, the Soviet leaders continued to ignore the communes publicly, although their attitude was reflected in Soviet press comments criticizing the lack of material incentives characteristic of the commune system and emphasizing that the attainment of full communism required a level of production which was much closer to realization in the Soviet Union than in Communist China. Later, as the Sino-Soviet rift widened and as deteriorating economic conditions in China forced abandonment of the communes in all but name, Khrushchev repeatedly gibed at the Chinese with thinly-veiled references to Communist leaders who had become "estranged from the masses," disobedient "children" who had "burned their fingers," and to the fatuity of those who desired "pantless communism."

Widening of the Breach

The year 1959 saw the deterioration of Sino-Soviet relations proceed at a markedly faster pace as dissensions over Soviet moves toward an easing of tensions with the United States and over Communist China's involvement in a border conflict with India still further widened the gap between the two Communist powers.

Moscow's intent to pursue more vigorously the "peaceful coexistence" strategy towards the West was signalled in January by Soviet Deputy Premier Anastas Mikoyan's exploratory visit to the United States, and was underlined later the same month by the ruling handed down by the 21st CPSU Congress that war between the capitalist and socialist states not only was not inevitable but might even be permanently avoided while capitalism still remained. Khrushchev's visit to the United States and his meeting with President Eisenhower followed in the fall, while Soviet propaganda during and after the visit took the softest line towards the West that it had displayed since World War II—or has taken since.

WHO TOLD WHOM SO?

In the United States I was asked many questions about the relations between the Soviet Union and China. I must assume that these questions derived from the revisionist anti-Chinese propaganda in the Yugoslav press which recently . . . published insinuations about incipient disagreements, if you please, between the Soviet Union and China. . . .

I replied that the gentlemen questioners were evidently dreaming sweet dreams in which, lo and behold, magic could cause disagreements to appear in the socialist camp between the Soviet Union and China. But I said that . . . the dream was unrealizable. Soviet-Chinese friendship rests on the unshakable foundation of Marxist-Leninist ideology, on the common goals of communism, on the fraternal and mutual support of the peoples of our countries, on joint struggles against imperialism and for peace and socialism. (Applause)

The greetings of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee to our Congress, signed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung, . . . are a reaffirmation of the eternal, indissoluble friendship between our parties and between our countries. (Applause) We shall cherish this friendship as the apple of our eye. Our friendship is a sacred thing, and let not those who would seek to defile it reach out with unclean hands for this purpose. (Applause)

—From speech by Deputy Premier A. I. Mikoyan to the 21st CPSU Congress, Pravda, Feb. 1, 1959.

[9] *Ekonomicheskaia gazeta* (Moscow), Sept. 28, 1963.
[10] Soviet government statement, Sept. 20, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

All this was naturally anathema to Peking, which considered the United States the principal obstacle to its ambitions in Asia and viewed the exertion of maximum Communist revolutionary pressure against the US in all parts of world as essential to China's national interests.[11] Accordingly, Chinese Communist propaganda in the fall of 1959, while paying lip service to the principle of "peaceful coexistence," became more and more shrill in its warnings against perfidious American intentions to use negotiations and a relaxation of international tensions as a "smokescreen" to lull the peoples of the world into a false sense of security and thus facilitate US "aggression" against the national liberation movements in underdeveloped areas.

Other Soviet actions during the year aggravated old Chinese grievances or created new ones. Speaking publicly on July 18 at Poznan, Poland, Khrushchev—without referring to China by name—recalled the failure of the Soviet experiment with communes during the period of "war communism" and remarked that those who had wished to set them up "had a poor understanding of what communism is and how it is to be built."[12] Inasmuch as the CCP Central Committee was at that very moment meeting at Lushan to re-examine the communes program, Khrushchev's comment was regarded by the Chinese as a gratuitous attempt to intervene in Chinese internal affairs. There is also reason to suspect that the Soviets tried to intervene more directly by encouraging Chinese Communist Defense Minister Marshal P'eng Te-huai, during his visit to Eastern Europe in the spring of 1959, to oppose Maoist policies. It is believed that P'eng did challenge Mao's program at the Lushan meeting, and that this was responsible for his dismissal shortly thereafter, in September 1959.[13]

Meanwhile, Moscow continued to turn a deaf ear to Chinese appeals for assistance in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. According to the CCP, the Soviet Union in June 1959 finally rejected Peking's request that China be provided with "a sample of an atomic bomb" and thereby "unilaterally tore up" the 1957 Sino-Soviet agreement concerning "new technology for national defense."

On top of all this, the refusal of the Soviet leadership to stand beside Communist China in her border conflict with non-socialist, bourgeois India was viewed in Peking as an outright betrayal of the obligations of "proletarian internationalism." Following the outbreak of hostilities in late August, the Soviet government on September 9 issued a public statement taking a neutral stand towards the conflict—this, the Chinese have since claimed, in spite of frantic last-minute efforts by themselves to dissuade Moscow from such action.[14] Not only did Moscow refuse to heed this appeal, but it later accused the Chinese of having deliberately timed their military action against India so as to embarrass Khrushchev on the eve of his trip to the United States.[15]

Khrushchev's visit to Peking at the end of September, on the heels of his US trip, apparently did more to accentuate than to assuage the grievances on both sides. Regarding the Sino-Indian conflict, Peking claims that the Chinese leaders "personally gave Comrade Khrushchev an explanation of the true situation" but that he "did not wish to know the true situation"; on the other hand, according to Moscow, the Soviet leader took the occasion to warn the Chinese that their course of action was "fraught with negative consequences not only for Sino-Indian relations, but also for the entire international situation." It was also at this time, as noted earlier, that Khrushchev allegedly suggested to Mao the desirability of accepting a two-Chinas solution of the Taiwan problem. Moreover, the Soviet leader further outraged his hosts by warning them, in a public address on September 30, against "testing by force the stability of the capitalist system."

The War of Words

As the Chinese saw it, Khrushchev's actions during 1959 had set virtually a new record of error and betrayal: he had rebuffed them on the question of atomic military assistance, sought to

[11] In 1963, statements by Chilean and Costa Rican Communists alleged that CCP leaders had once told Latin American Communists visiting China that international tension was useful for the furtherance of revolutionary struggles. According to the Chileans, this statement was made early in 1959.

[12] Khrushchev's speech was simultaneously reported in *Pravda* (Moscow), *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw), and by the Soviet radio on July 21, after an unusual three-day delay.

[13] See David A. Charles, "The Dismissal of Marshal P'eng Te-huai," *The China Quarterly* (London), October-December 1961.

[14] Editorial article in *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Nov. 1, 1963.

[15] Article just cited claims that the Soviet charge was made in February 1960 in a private "verbal notification" to the CCP Central Committee. The Soviet government statement of Sept. 20, 1963, and other Soviet statements last year repeated the charge publicly.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

interfere in Chinese internal affairs, hobnobbed with the leaders of "US imperialism," betrayed them in the Sino-Indian conflict, intimated that they should renounce their claim to Taiwan, and upbraided them publicly for their domestic and foreign policies. It is little wonder, therefore, that in April 1960 the CCP unleashed a massive propaganda assault aimed at the policies—and, implicitly, the authority—of the Soviet Communist Party.

Central to the many indirect but unmistakable indictments of Khrushchev's policies published in the leading organs of the CCP was the contention that the peaceful coexistence line as applied by the Soviet party was eroding the militancy of revolutionaries throughout the world. Now, for the first time, the Chinese systematically elaborated their objections to the arguments that the advent of nuclear weapons necessitated a change in Communist revolutionary strategy, that local wars involving the great powers would inevitably lead to world war, and that revolutionary armed struggles should not be so vigorously cultivated as to create a danger of nuclear conflict. While it was possible that world war could be averted, the Chinese contended, local anti-colonial or anti-imperialist wars of liberation could not, and the Communist policy should be to encourage and support such struggles without being inhibited by exaggerated fears of nuclear destruction or by a misguided desire to facilitate negotiations with the capitalist West.

Soon after the CCP campaign began, the position of the CPSU to defend its policies against the Chinese criticisms was measurably weakened as a result of the Soviet decision to publicly exploit the U-2 incident of May 1 whereas previous overflights had been ignored.[16] This decision set in motion a train of events which apparently led the Soviet leadership to conclude, after anguished debate,[17] that it would be politically harmful, in view of the Chinese offensive, to allow the scheduled summit conference with the Western leaders at Paris to take place. There is now substantive evidence that the CPSU leaders had the Chinese very much on their minds during the 16-day interval between the U-2 incident and Khrushchev's dynamiting of the summit parley. The Soviet party disclosed in April last year that on May 12, 1960—four days before the Paris meeting was to open—Mao had been urgently invited to come to Moscow, but had refused.[18] Instead, on May 14, he made his first officially reported statement in two years, in which he professed to support a summit meeting but simultaneously gloated over the U-2 incident and implicitly taunted Khrushchev for having displayed "illusions" about imperialism.[19]

In early June the Chinese party carried its fight against the CPSU a step farther by utilizing the opportunity afforded by a meeting of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions in Peking to conduct a campaign against the Soviet line among both Communist and non-Communist delegates. Shortly thereafter, according to the Chinese, the CPSU privately proposed to the CCP that steps be taken to organize a conference of all Communist parties for the purpose of ironing out differences, suggesting that a preparatory exchange of views take place in closed multi-party meetings during the impending Rumanian party congress.

When the CCP representatives went to Bucharest in the latter part of June, they were shocked to find themselves the target of a "surprise assault" allegedly concocted by the CPSU in order to browbeat them into submission. Khrushchev, according to the Chinese, first circulated a CPSU letter to the CCP, dated June 21, which attacked the Chinese party "all along the line." Then, in their speeches to the congress, Khrushchev and his supporters among the East European party leaders denounced the Chinese as Trotskyites and "madmen" seeking war, and further accused them of pursuing a selfishly "nationalistic" course in the Sino-Indian border conflict.[20] The Soviet leader is also alleged to have belittled Chinese military knowledge and the militia system, and to have criticized the purge of Marshal P'eng Te-huai. The CCP delegation, according to Peking, responded to the attacks with a "tit-for-tat struggle" and distributed a written statement of defiance at the close of the congress proceedings.

[16] See Allen Dulles, *The Craft of Intelligence*, Harper & Row, New York, 1963, p. 196, on Soviet reaction to previous overflights.

[17] *Ibid.* Mr. Dulles writes that "there is evidence of long debate in the Presidium during the first two weeks of May" over "whether to push the U-2 issue under the rug or use it to destroy the conference."

[18] CPSU Central Committee letter to the CCP, March 30, 1963, published in *Pravda*, April 3, 1963.

[19] Mao's statement was made in an interview with Latin American and Japanese visitors at Wuhan on May 14 and released the same day by NCNA. It was also quoted two days later in a *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial.

[20] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

New Soviet acts of retaliation followed soon afterwards. According to the Chinese statements of last September, it was in July 1960 that Moscow "suddenly took a unilateral decision recalling all Soviet experts in China within one month." In addition, the Soviet government unilaterally cancelled the reciprocal publication of friendship magazines in both countries and demanded the recall of a member of the Chinese Embassy in Moscow.[21] It also appears from last year's statements by both sides that incidents began occurring on the Sino-Soviet border about this time, each side charging the other with having provoked them.

Meanwhile, the war of words continued with mounting intensity. In early August, Soviet party journals began claiming for the first time that peaceful coexistence represented the general foreign policy line of the *entire* Communist bloc, thus implicitly asserting the authority of the CPSU to define bloc foreign policy and the obligation of bloc members to accept such definition as a matter of Communist discipline. This was to be a recurrent Soviet motif in the Sino-Soviet polemic of subsequent years, receding in periods of Soviet retreat but reappearing when Moscow returned to the attack.

On September 10, the CCP replied to the CPSU letter of June 21 with a letter of rebuttal which called upon Moscow to restore bloc unity by abandoning not only its "erroneous" policy line but all efforts to exert its authority over Peking. That same month a Chinese delegation went to Moscow for fruitless private talks with CPSU leaders, and in Hanoi Soviet and Chinese party representatives again vied for support among the delegates to the Vietnamese party congress.

The 1960 Communist Conference

In October 1960 there was another skirmish between the two antagonists in the 26-party committee which met in Moscow to prepare a draft declaration for submission to the scheduled November conference of Communist parties. Agreement was eventually reached on the bulk of a draft text, but not on certain key issues. In connection with this meeting, the Chinese claimed last September that Khrushchev, upon returning from the United Nations session in New York, "even scrapped agreements that had already been reached on some questions"—suggesting that some of the CPSU leaders were more willing than Khrushchev to make concessions to the Chinese for the sake of unity.[22]

When the conference proper convened, according to Peking, the Soviets again started things off, as at Bucharest, by distributing among the delegates a new 60,000-word CPSU "letter" attacking the CCP (and the Albanian party) "more savagely than ever." In the conference debate also, the Chinese claim, the CPSU mustered its adherents and "engineered converging assaults on the CCP" in an attempt to force it to yield. In the end, an ambiguous document was produced and signed, embodying the mutually contradictory positions of the two parties on many issues. While the CPSU perhaps succeeded in getting more of its points included than did the Chinese, it nevertheless suffered a major defeat on the central issue of authority in that it failed to obtain either a condemnation of (Chinese-Albanian) "factional activities" or an endorsement of the Soviet thesis that peaceful coexistence was the "general line" of bloc foreign policy. The Chinese have since boasted that this was "an event of great historical significance" because it "changed the previous highly abnormal situation in which not even the slightest criticism of the errors of the CPSU leadership was tolerated and its word was final."[23]

The signature of the conference declaration was accompanied by the customary public pledges of undying solidarity and mutual affection, but privately neither Moscow nor Peking regarded the compromise as anything but a temporary makeshift, nor did either intend to abandon the struggle.[24] Right after the conference, in fact, Khru-

[21] *Ibid.* (This statement does not indicate what reason was given for the Soviet recall demand, but it seems quite possible that the expelled diplomatic official may have been guilty of disseminating Chinese anti-Soviet propaganda material in Moscow. This was the charge later made in connection with the expulsion of CPR officials from the USSR in 1963.)

[22] *Ibid.* Further evidence of disagreement within the CPSU over tactics towards the Chinese was provided by the handling of the much-discussed Titarenko article of August 1960, which for the first time named and threatened China with isolation from the Communist bloc. This article appeared in identical form throughout the Soviet provincial press with the single exception of the Leningrad party organization organ, *Leningradskaia pravda*, which omitted the passage identifying China.

[23] *Ibid.*

[24] The Albanian party organ *Zeri i Popullit* (Dec. 6, 1961) claimed that Khrushchev had called the declaration "a compromise document of short duration." Similarly, according to a TASS report of October 12, 1963, Australian Communist sources quoted Mao as having said on the eve of the Moscow conference that "a temporary agreement" might possibly be reached, "but not durable unity."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shchev renewed his attack on the Chinese position at what he evidently regarded as its weakest point —Albania. The Albanians, who had been the most vociferous supporters of the Chinese at Bucharest and the November Moscow conference, were now subjected to an extension of the Soviet economic pressures that had been initiated in the summer of 1960. These reprisals culminated in the withdrawal of all Soviet technicians and the complete termination of Soviet economic aid to Albania in April 1961, followed by the withdrawal of Soviet naval units from Vlore in May. An acrimonious exchange of messages between Moscow and Tirana was climaxed by a violent letter addressed to the Albanian party by the CPSU Central Committee on August 24, 1961. The Chinese, fully conscious of the fact that the Soviet pressures against Albania were aimed as much against themselves, countered by providing their East European ally with economic aid and technicians to replace those withdrawn by Moscow. Peking has since revealed that the CCP urged the Soviet party early in 1961 to take steps to improve Soviet-Albanian relations, and that it repeated this advice on the eve of the 22nd CPSU Congress in October,[25] apparently in an effort to head off the all-out Soviet attack on Albania that seemed foreshadowed by the August 24 CPSU letter to Tirana.

The 22nd Congress and After

As events soon proved, however, the Soviet leadership was determined to force the Albanian issue into the open, evidently hoping thereby to recoup the damage done to its authority by the Chinese at the November 1960 conference of Communist parties. Thus, the 22nd Congress witnessed an unprecedented torrent of abuse hurled publicly at the Albanians by CPSU spokesmen, most of all by Khrushchev, who in his speech of October 27 went so far as to call explicitly for the overthrow of Albanian party leaders Hoxha and Shehu.

Besides the assault on the Albanians, there were other moves at the congress which appeared aimed, at least implicitly, at various aspects of the Chinese position. The first was the renewed attack on Stalin, which flouted the position taken by the CCP ever since the 20th Congress. The second was the new, intensified offensive unleashed against the "anti-party group," and particularly against Molotov, who—it was repeatedly intimated by congress speakers—had been encouraged by the Chinese to attack Khrushchev's policies on two occasions, once in April 1960 (when Molotov was still ambassador to Outer Mongolia) and again just before the 22nd Congress.[26] The third was the effort to present the new CPSU Program, which the congress was to ratify, as a "new Communist Manifesto" justifying the claim of the Soviet party to world Communist leadership. On top of all this, the Chinese claim that Khrushchev, in his private meetings with Premier Chou En-lai during the congress, "expressed undisguised support for anti-party [*i.e.*, revisionist] elements in the CCP."[27]

As leader of the Chinese delegation, Chou responded to the Soviet moves by reproving Khrushchev before the congress for his open attack on the Albanian party, by demonstratively laying a wreath on Stalin's tomb, and by suddenly leaving for Peking before the conclusion of the congress. According to Chinese statements, he also "frankly criticized the errors of the CPSU leadership" in private conversations with Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders.

Following the congress, the CPSU stepped up its campaign to mobilize the bulk of the world's Communist parties in a solid front against the Albanians—and hence, implicity, against the Chinese. Although all the East European parties and some of the non-bloc parties had backed the Soviet attack on Albania at the congress, many of the latter—as well as the North Korean and North Vietnamese parties—had failed to do so. During the next three months, however, in response to evident Soviet pressures, the great majority of the non-Asian Communist parties went on record with some form of rebuke to the Albanians. The Soviet press avidly republished these statements, as it did the statements (after mid-November) of some of the foreign parties mildly but explicitly criticizing the Chinese for opposing criticism of the Albanians. In December, diplomatic relations between Moscow and Tirana were, in effect, ruptured.

Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist press maintained a spurious Olympian attitude, reprinting both the attacks on Albania and the ferocious Albanian replies—but of course giving greater prominence to the latter. Ample publicity was also

[25] *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Feb. 27, 1963.

[26] Among the speakers who attacked Molotov were Ilichev, who cited Molotov's submission of a "dogmatic" article to *Kommunist* in April 1960; Satyukov and Pospelov, who told of a letter sent by Molotov to the Central Committee on the eve of the 22nd Congress attacking the draft CPSU program in terms similar to those later made explicit by the Chinese; and by Kuusinen, who accused Molotov of fishing in "foreign waters."

[27] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

given to statements by various Asian parties which declined to follow the Soviet lead. The North Vietnamese party, alarmed at the drift of events, took the initiative in January 1962 in privately urging the combatants to agree to the holding of a new world Communist conference "to settle the discord" and in proposing that "pending such a meeting the parties cease attacking one another in the press and over the radio."[28] Similar proposals were put forward, apparently also privately, by the Indonesian party, and publicly by the New Zealand CP.

Jockeying for Position

By February 1962 it was evident to the CPSU that its campaign not only had failed to isolate the Albanians and Chinese but even had resulted in setbacks to its position, primarily among the Asian parties but also to some extent elsewhere. On February 21, the Soviet party climaxed its drive with an imposing two-page spread in *Pravda* summarizing the support it had received, citing Lenin on the necessity of subordination "to the international discipline of the revolutionary proletariat," and insisting that "only open, uncompromising criticism of the anti-socialist, nationalist actions of the Hoxha-Shehu group can secure the unity of our movement."

The very next day, February 22, the CPSU dispatched a secret letter to Peking which—as discreetly summarized by the Russians last July[29]—"drew the attention of the CCP" to the dangerous consequences of disunity and urged "more effective measures" for coordinating the positions of the two parties in the various world front organizations and elsewhere. According to the more outspoken Chinese summary, the CPSU letter accused the Chinese of taking "a special stand of their own" in opposition to the world movement, "even made a crime" of the CCP's support for the Albanians, and demanded that Peking abandon its position and embrace Moscow's "erroneous line" as "preconditions" for an improvement of Sino-Soviet relations.[30]

In April the CCP replied with a letter favoring a new general conference of Communist parties, concurring with the North Vietnamese proposal for a truce in polemics, and calling for bilateral or multilateral talks to prepare for a world meeting. The Chinese also blandly advised the Soviet party to "take the initiative" in seeking a settlement of its differences with the Albanians.[31] Late in May, the CPSU again returned the ball to Peking with a note which, according to Moscow, reiterated the main points of the February 22 letter. The Soviet party also claimed last year that it had agreed in May 1962 to the convocation of a new Communist conference;[32] but the Chinese assert that the CPSU made an Albanian surrender the "precondition" for such a conference.[33]

Meanwhile, Moscow and Peking seemed to have agreed, at least for the time being, to heed the North Vietnamese appeal and apply the brake to public polemics against each other. Mutual recriminations were, in fact, greatly toned down during the spring of 1962—although never quite eliminated. Public pronouncements on both sides sought to convey to the West an impression of restored harmony and unity—an effort which, as an American scholar of Communist affairs has noted, was assisted by Communist news correspondents in Moscow,[34] and which was rather naively taken at face value by some sections of the Western press.

Again, the reality was very different. According to the Chinese statement of last September 6, it was precisely during this period of seeming calm (April-May 1962) that "the leaders of the CPSU used their organs and personnel in Sinkiang, China, to carry out large-scale subversive activities in the Ili region, and enticed and coerced several tens of thousands of Chinese citizens into going into the Soviet Union," subsequently refusing to return them to Chinese territory despite Peking's protests.[35] These events were presumably related to the subsequently reported action of the CPR government closing Soviet consulates in China. Soviet press reports last September confirmed that a mass flight of Chinese across the Sino-Soviet border had in fact taken place, adding further lurid details which contradicted the Peking version.[36]

[28] Statement of the Political Bureau of the Vietnamese Workers' Party, Feb. 10, 1963, reported by Hanoi Radio, same date.

[29] CPSU Open Letter of July 13, 1963: in *Pravda* same date.

[30] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

[31] CCP letter to the CPSU of March 9, 1963: in *Peking Review*, March 22, 1963.

[32] CPSU letter to the CCP of Feb. 21, 1963: in *Pravda*, March 13, 1963.

[33] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

[34] William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1963, pp. 143-44.

[35] JMJP-HC joint editorial, Sept. 6, 1963.

[36] *E.g.*, see *Kazakhstanskaia Pravda*, Sept. 29, 1963. The Soviet government statement of Sept. 20, 1963, claimed that there had been 5,000 Chinese violations of the Soviet border in 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Renewal of Hostilities

At the end of the summer of 1962, the Chinese fired the opening salvos in a renewed anti-Soviet campaign which has gone on continuously ever since. On three separate occasions, at the Rumanian (August 23), Vietnamese (September 1), and Bulgarian (September 8) national anniversary receptions held in Peking, Foreign Minister Chen Yi alluded to socialist countries which attempted to forcibly impose . . . [their] views on others" and "replaced comradelike discussions . . . with interference in [others'] internal affairs." Soon afterwards, in mid-September, the Chinese and Albanian press launched an obviously coordinated and violent assault on "modern revisionism," timed to coincide with the visit of Leonid Brezhnev, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, to Yugoslavia.

Curiously, Soviet propaganda displayed remarkable restraint as the Chinese attacks continued, and there was even an attempt to appease Peking. In meetings with the departing Chinese Ambassador Liu Hsiao on October 13 and 14, Khrushchev, according to Soviet statements last year, asked that Mao forget the past and "start our relations with a clear page."[37] Moreover, according to the Chinese, the Soviet leader expressed complete sympathy for Peking's stand on the border conflict with India, implicitly endorsed the Chinese intention to use force in that conflict, and promised to stand by Peking if hostilities again arose.[38] These private statements by Khrushchev were followed on October 25 by an equally remarkable editorial in *Pravda* which, for the first and last time in the three years of the Sino-Indian border controversy, sided with Peking. One can only speculate that the adoption by Moscow of a conciliatory posture was motivated by the approach of the Cuban crisis, which erupted into the open on October 22—that is, by Soviet desire to assure bloc solidarity at a time of military crisis and also, perhaps, to buy Chinese forbearance if it should become necessary to back down over the issue of Cuba.

As it turned out, the Soviets did have to back down, but the Chinese did not forbear and instead proceeded to belabor Khrushchev unmercifully for his "betrayal" of Castro. Placed on the defensive, Moscow edged back toward its previous neutral position vis-à-vis the Sino-Indian border conflict and then organized a thoroughgoing counterattack against the Chinese party.

The counterattack was pressed with mounting intensity throughout November and the first week of December at the successive congresses of the Bulgarian, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian and Italian Communist parties, each of these meetings witnessing the dragooning of a still larger number of the CPSU's foreign adherents into joining a chorus of denunciation first against the Albanians and later against the Chinese as well. The climax was reached in early December with the extremely violent anti-Albanian-and-Chinese speeches delivered by the Czechoslovak and Italian party secretaries, Koucky and Pajetta. There followed the elaborate state visit of Tito to the Soviet Union, where on December 12 the Yugoslav leader heard Khrushchev deliver an angry speech before the Supreme Soviet impugning Chinese motives and policies.

Mao's response was to open the sluice gates. In a succession of articles published between mid-December 1962 and March 1963, the CCP completed the process it had begun in 1956, gradually making explicit its past grievances and present ambitions. The Chinese party called on the Communists of the world to revolt against the "baton" of the CPSU; it derided the Soviet "temporary majority"; and it challenged Moscow to convene a meeting of the world movement, thus repeating publicly the demand made privately early in 1962. At last, Peking attacked, by name, the CPSU and its leading adherents in the West as betrayers of the revolution, simultaneously elaborating its 1960 thesis that the real focus of revolutionary struggle against "imperialism" was now in the underdeveloped areas of the world and that the real leader of this struggle was the Chinese Communist Party.

In response, Moscow began in February 1963 to intimate that its adversary was seeking to divide the revolutionary movement along geographical and racial lines—a complaint which was eventually expanded into thunderous denunciations of Chinese "racism," coupled with charges that Peking was attempting to isolate the European "socialist" states from the "national liberation movement"

[37] CPSU Open Letter of July 13, 1963, *Pravda*, July 14, 1963. It is interesting to note that this document obscures the date of the conversations, referring to them merely as having occurred "in the autumn" of 1962. The JMJP-HC joint editorial identifies them as having taken place in October 1962, thus pinning them down to the Khrushchev-Liu interviews of October 13 and 14.

[38] *Jen-min Jih-pao* editorial, Nov. 1, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and to distort reality by claiming that imperialism's main conflict was now with the underdeveloped world (led by Peking's rhetoric) rather than with the bloc (led by Soviet military might).

In the meantime, however, it became clear early in 1963 that the Chinese public demand for a world Communist meeting had embarrassed the CPSU. In his January address to the East German party congress, Khrushchev not only proposed—as if it were his own idea—a suspension of polemics between the two factions, but also acknowledged the existence of pressure on him from "some comrades" to convene a world conference. He insisted, however, that the time was not ripe for such a meeting. The Soviet leader then went on to declare that he had no desire to excommunicate the Albanians from the bloc and challenged the Chinese to treat the Yugoslavs similarly. But even while extending this olive branch to Mao, Khrushchev could not forbear striking him with it: the East German congress was made the occasion for new attacks on the Albanians and the Chinese, and the CCP delegate was interrupted and subjected to apparently well-organized booing and hissing, an unprecedented insult to the Chinese party. Nevertheless, in February, the CPSU retreated a step further and sent Peking a fairly mild letter agreeing in principle to a world meeting and proposing bilateral talks to prepare for it.

The Chinese, however, were in no conciliatory mood and—as the Soviets later said—took Moscow's offer as a sign of weakness. They were by then in the midst of a vast new offensive against the CPSU and were vigorously proselytising in every part of the world. To this end, the various CCP statements and editorials were being assembled in brochures and distributed in many languages. In February, the Chinese openly attacked Soviet influence at a Tanganyika meeting of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization (using racial arguments, the Soviets said), and at the same time they began setting up counterparts to the existing world front organizations, excluding the Soviets from participation in the new bodies.

After receiving the CPSU letter of late February, the Chinese party responded with new public attacks of still greater violence. It was at this time that the CCP initiated the practice of publishing its current communications to the CPSU (forcing the Soviet party to do likewise), so that even the exchanges between the two Central Committees, hitherto kept in the form of confidential letters, now became a part of the open polemic. Thus, in spite of a promise given on March 9 that it would desist from further public attacks, Peking clearly had no intention of doing so.

Moving Toward Schism

This was dramatically demonstrated on the eve of a CPSU Central Committee plenum and three weeks before the scheduled opening of bilateral Sino-Soviet talks in Moscow, when the Chinese distributed in the Soviet capital—and subsequently throughout the rest of the world—the CCP letter of June 14, 1963, explicitly indicting Soviet domestic policies for the first time and announcing Peking's intention to split every Communist party whose leadership continued to support Moscow. In this proclamation of Peking's "general line" for the Communists of the world, the Chinese also promised to anoint as honorary Marxists-Leninists all revolutionaries now *outside* the Communist movement who would carry their banner.

The Soviet leadership now reacted forcefully. The Chinese officials who had distributed the CCP letter in the Soviet Union were formally expelled, and after the Central Committee had pondered its course at the mid-June plenum, the Soviet case against the CCP was placed before the world in the form of a CPSU "Open Letter" released on July 13. A highly emotional speech delivered by Khrushchev six days later, on July 19, made it clear that he regarded the Chinese action as nothing less than an attempt to subvert his position at home and abroad.

Meanwhile, CPSU and CCP representatives opened their scheduled bilateral talks in Moscow, but even as the talks ground on toward eventual fruitless suspension, the Soviet government concluded a partial nuclear test-ban agreement with the United States on terms which it had previously rejected. Throughout the summer and autumn Soviet propaganda heavily exploited this agreement in an effort to isolate the Chinese, who were placed in the vulnerable position of having to defend before world opinion their determination to acquire nuclear weapons and their refusal to adhere to the test-ban treaty.

Sino-Soviet relations had now reached a point where both sides were caricaturing and attacking each other's leaders by name, and where both proceeded to publish statements revealing hitherto secret aspects of their dealings with each other since the beginning of the dispute. The Soviets spoke of Mao as a senile "Trotskyite" tyrant and racist who sought world war, who had made monumental blunders in domestic policy, and whose government maintained "concentration camps" and massacred minority peoples, forcing them to seek haven in the USSR. The Chinese, in turn, char-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

acterized Khrushchev as a cowardly traitor allied with "imperialism" who was striving to restore capitalism in the Soviet Union and to undermine Marxism-Leninism throughout the world.

In September-October 1963 there were reports in the Western press, supported circumstantially by hints in Soviet propaganda, which suggested that the CPSU was almost reconciled to the consequences of a schism and was now considering the convocation of a world Communist meeting at which the Chinese and their supporters would be called upon to recant their factional activity or depart. In late October, however, the CPSU—apparently again under pressure from members of its own camp—temporarily abandoned this intention and instead began calling once again for an end to public polemics.

The CCP, however, would not relent, and by late January 1964 Peking had begun to announce formal recognition of pro-Chinese factions which had rebelled and seceded from the established Communist parties of such countries as Ceylon, Peru, Belgium, and Switzerland as *the* official Communist parties in those countries. These ominous organizational measures were followed in early February by a new Chinese pronouncement—the most outspoken to date—which proclaimed Peking's intention to recognize and support such "revolutionary" Communist parties everywhere.[39]

The formalization of the worldwide Communist schism had now begun.

[39] Editorial article jointly published in *Jen-min Jih-pao* and *Hung-Ch'i*, Feb. 4, 1964.

WHO AT THE HEAD?

Peking's Position

First, we would like to ask the leaders of the CPSU: You say we want to seize the leadership. From whom? Who now holds the leadership? In the international Communist movement is there such a thing as leadership which lords it over all the fraternal parties? And is this leadership in your hands?

Apparently the leaders of the CPSU consider themselves the natural leaders, who can lord it over all the fraternal parties. According to their logic, their programs, resolutions, and statements are all infallible laws. Every remark and every word of Khrushchev's are imperial edicts, however wrong or absurd they may be. All the fraternal parties must submissively hear and obey and are absolutely forbidden to criticize or oppose them. This is outright tyranny. It is the ideology of feudal autocrats, pure and simple.

However, we must tell the CPSU leaders that the international Communist movement is not some feudal clique . . . The history of the international proletarian revolutionary movement shows that, owing to the uneven development of the revolution, at a particular historical stage the proletariat and its party in one country or another marched in the van of the movement . . . [But] even the vanguard position . . . does not remain unchanged for a long time, but shifts according to changing conditions. This shift is decided not by the subjective wishes of any individual or party, but by conditions shaped by history. If conditions change, other parties may come to the van of the movement. When a party which formerly held the position of vanguard takes the path of revisionism, it is bound to forfeit this position despite the fact that it has been the largest party and has exerted the greatest influance. . . .

By embarking on the path of revisionism and splittism, the CPSU leaders automatically forfeited the position of "head" in the international Communist movement. If the word "head" is now to be applied to them, it can only mean that they are at the head of the revisionists and splitters.

From Jen-min Jih-pao and Hung Ch'i joint editorial article, Feb. 4, 1964.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

A World in Disarray

By Wolfgang Leonhard

One of Germany's foremost Soviet affairs experts, Mr. Leonhard spent many years in the USSR as a refugee from Hitler's Reich, later serving as a Communist official in East Germany before defecting to Yugoslavia and then West Germany. The latest of his published works is Soviet-Ideologie Heute *(Frankfurt, S. Fischer Verlag, 1962).*

For almost a quarter century, from 1929 until 1953, international communism was characterized first and foremost by monolithic unity. All the Communist parties of the world (with the exception, since 1948, of the Yugoslav one) were subordinated to Stalin's leadership in Moscow. Every political shift of the Kremlin was obeyed by Communist parties from Germany to Indonesia. One nod from Moscow was all that was needed to remove a displeasing leader and to appoint a desirable one; one phrase in a Soviet article was enough to alter overnight the line of any party. The uniform monotony went so far that Communist Party resolutions of Sweden, Ceylon or Venezuela could hardly be distinguished one from the other. To be sure, during this period there existed, probably more than has been generally assumed until now, serious opposition to Soviet domination, criticism of the line handed down from Moscow, oppositionist currents and different concepts and controversies, but these could not be aired openly in the conditions prevailing at that time. In that quarter century the international Communist movement seemed—not only to the outside world, but even to many of its own members—like an instrument uniformly directed and led from Moscow, without any independence whatsoever.

All this now belongs to the past. Within a few years the Communist world movement has departed from its earlier monolithic structure to an astonishing extent and with startling swiftness. This development has led to the formation within the international Communist movement of several political groupings which take entirely different attitudes toward decisive political questions; it has led to open controversies between these different groupings and, consequently to new relations within the movement as a whole. The purpose of this article is to describe and assess this process, especially with regard to the Sino-Soviet dispute, which may be said to have been one of its major catalysts. It is of course impossible within the scope of a single article to describe this process in full, but some of the main stages and "focal points" can be mentioned so as to give us an idea of the extent and limits of the changes and perhaps some clues to the future evolution of the international Communist movement.

The basic causes for the "decentralization" of world communism lie chiefly, in this author's opinion, in the fact that the function and type of organization of the movement as created and

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

fashioned by Stalin had increasingly come into conflict with changing realities. Just as internal changes in the Soviet Union became necessary because many characteristics and methods of the Stalinist system proved unsuitable to the conditions of a rising, modern industrial society, so in the international sphere the imposition of monolithic uniformity under Moscow's leadership proved incompatible with the development of Communist countries which had been formed under different conditions, and which faced different social, economic, and political problems. The dogmatic ideology of Stalinism could no longer serve as an exclusive model, nor could the Soviet system serve as the only blueprint for countries and parties undergoing a transformation. Once this process of change was set in motion, it could no longer be halted; one controversy led logically to another.

The "Revisionist" Phase

The Moscow-Peking conflict would hardly have produced such a great impact on the Communist world movement if the ground had not already been prepared for it by other events. April 12, 1948, can be designated with some justification as the starting-point for the crumbling of the monolithic structure; this was the day on which the Yugoslav Central Committee, meeting at the library of the former castle of King Alexander in Belgrade's suburb of Dedinje, passed a resolution rejecting the Soviet accusations against its party. Not only was this proof that a Communist party could resist the seemingly omnipotent leadership of Stalin, but it also laid the cornerstone for the evolution of communism in Yugoslavia. The independence achieved by the Yugoslav Communists may thus be said to have been the first chapter of destalinization—a chapter that began to unfold, of course, while Stalin was still alive. For the first time Stalin's policy was challenged successfully by different alternatives coming from *within* the Communist movement.

To be sure, in 1948-1949 Stalin was still powerful enough to prevent an alliance of other Communist parties with the "renegades in Belgrade," but undoubtedly the independent policy of the Yugoslav Communists and their open Marxist polemics against Stalinism had a lasting influence on many oppositionist circles in other Communist parties. This influence intensified quickly after Stalin's death. With the suspension of the anti-Yugoslav campaign, Khrushchev's "trip of apology" to Belgrade in May, 1955, and the Belgrade communique, which for the first time officially proclaimed "different paths to socialism,"[1] the Titoist deviation was in effect declared to be legitimate. However, the reformist Communist circles were offered new hopes and new impetus above all by the 20th CPSU Congress in Moscow (February 14-25, 1956), which openly broke with Stalin's heritage and produced new theses concerning the avoidability of war, coexistence, and the possibility of a peaceful path to socialism. The organizational rivet was also removed in the middle of April, 1956, with the dissolution of the Cominform and with official summons to Communist parties that they "should more than ever" take into account the peculiarities of their countries and develop a policy "which will most correspond to the special circumstances and traditions of each people."[2]

It soon became evident—more quickly than the Soviet leadership had anticipated—that some Communist parties (above all those of Poland and Italy) knew how to use the new possibilities. The interview with Togliatti, in which the Italian CP leader urged that the discussion of the "errors" of Stalin be capped by a thorough analysis of Stalinism and of the degeneration of the Soviet system, and in which he opted for polycentrism in the world movement,[3] as well as similar declarations and tendencies in other Communist parties, showed clearly in which direction the winds were blowing.[4]

From that time on, reform-Communist ("revisionist") tendencies, which heretofore had been limited to Yugoslavia, began to play an increasingly important role in the entire world movement. The "revisionist" groups did not want to confine themselves merely to condemning a few "errors" of Stalin: their purpose was, and still is, to eradicate Stalinism as an ideology and as a system. Any central control of the world Communist movement is to be rejected. Communist parties of all countries should operate independently of one another; their collaboration is to be secured on a bilateral basis, by an exchange of practical knowledge, without restrictions on individual autonomy. The path to socialism depends on the conditions and potentialities of one's own country. Every

[1] *Pravda*, June 2, 1955.

[2] *Pravda*, April 18, 1956.

[3] *Nuovi Argumenti* (Rome), June 16, and *L'Unita* (Rome) June 24, 1956. English in Henry Roberts (Editor) *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, Columbia University Press, New York, 1956, pp. 97-140, 193-267.

[4] Declaration of the French CP of June 18, British CP of June 21, and the CPUSA of June 24, 1956. *Anti-Stalin Campaign, op. cit.*, pp. 147, 180, 209-274.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist party should therefore develop its policy in conformity with the historical traditions and the political, economic and cultural peculiarities of its country. In case of victory, the transition to communism should be effected in the most humane ways possible. Once power is secured, the Communist parties should not interfere in everything, but offer guidance and leadership only in crucial areas. In the economic sphere, they should strive for industrial self-management instead of a centralized, state-planned structure; in agriculture, rather than collectivize by force, they should initiate a long-term evolutionary cooperative development; and cultural and scientific development should not be constrained and hindered under the pretext of *partiinost* (party-mindedness) and "socialist realism."

These reformist tendencies were condemned and sharply combatted by Moscow as early as the end of June, 1956, almost four months before the Hungarian uprising. The resolution of the CPSU Central Committee,[5] a series of articles sounding the alarm,[6] and the internal directive of August 23, 1956, against "Titoist" tendencies were clear indications that the Soviet leaders were striving for a new Moscow-directed centralization. It was after the Hungarian revolution that the Soviet leadership made its most strenuous efforts to halt the revisionist tendencies, instituting various bilateral talks with the CP leaders of other countries as well as issuing imploring appeals for the unity of the world movement.[7]

At the International Communist Conference that took place in Moscow between November 12 and 14, 1957, the Soviet leadership finally succeeded—first, in committing the twelve ruling parties to a common political declaration, and second, in publishing a peace manifesto in the name of sixty-four Communist parties. In addition, unity was to be strengthened by a combined international Communist magazine, entitled *Problems of Peace and Socialism* (the English edition is called *World Marxist Review*), which made its first appearance in September 1958. Even though the Yugoslav Communists did not sign the political declaration as Khrushchev had originally hoped they would, and although several concessions had to be made during the November conference, particularly to the Polish and Hungarian CP delegations,[8] the Soviet leadership believed that it had now found a new formula for guaranteeing the unity of the international Communist movement—a hope which, however, soon proved an illusion.

The Soviet leadership was so spellbound by the events of 1956-57 that it kept singling out "revisionism" as the main target of its criticism for almost the entire year of 1958—especially after the Yugoslav Communists adopted their new party program at the Seventh Party Congress in Ljubljana—and failed to see the full extent of a danger which now threatened Moscow's claim to leadership from an entirely new quarter.

The Formation of the "Dogmatist" Wing

The same 20th Party Congress of February, 1956, which had encouraged the reform-Communist ("revisionist") forces by condemning Stalin's crimes and promulgating new ideological theses, was also instrumental in arousing the first resistance of the Chinese CP, thus bringing about the formation of the "dogmatist" wing. The more the Soviet leadership departed from Stalinist methods in its domestic policy (although with delays and backsliding), and the more it adapted its foreign policy to the conditions of the atomic age, the more possible it became to criticize Soviet policy from the "left." In the view of the Chinese Communists, the development of Soviet rocket technology and the growth of national revolutionary movements in former colonial territories opened new revolutionary perspectives. Peking began openly propagating its new revolutionary line in a series of articles entitled "Long Live Leninism!," the first appearing on Lenin's 90th birthday anniversary in April 1960.[9] This, no doubt, marked the beginning of the schism in the Communist world movement, once solidly united against revisionism. Now there were two new opposing concepts, those of Moscow and Peking, which reflected differences in the degree of development, tradition, political power and the international position of the two Communist countries. The differences between them were bound to accelerate the further disintegration of international communism.

[5] "The Cult of Personality and Its Consequences," *Pravda*, July 2, 1956.

[6] *Pravda*, July 5 and 24, 1956.

[7] *Neues Deutschland*, East Berlin, November 28, 1956. *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, No. 11, 1956, *Rude Pravo*, June 19, 1957, Boris Ponomarev in *Kommunist*, No. 12, 1957.

[8] Mentioned indirectly in *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) November 29, 1957 and in *Neues Deutschland*, November 30, 1957.

[9] *Hung Ch'i* No. 9, April 1960. English in G. F. Hudson, Richard Loewenthal and Roderick MacFarquhar, *The Sino-Soviet Dispute*, New York, Praeger, 1961, pp. 82-112.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet concept (insofar as it concerns the Communist world movement) places the socialist countries in the center. It envisions a long period of co-existence (in the diplomatic but not in the ideological sphere), which Communist countries should utilize for the purpose of achieving economic superiority over the West, and eventually, of course, political domination as well.

Communist parties of capitalist countries should support this process, strengthen their political power and influence, and make use of all revolutionary opportunities, whenever possible, to seize power in a peaceful and "parliamentary" manner. Although the seizure of power by force and violence is by no means eschewed, Soviet theoreticians have emphasized the desirability of strengthening political influence, as a method which carries with it lesser risks. The struggle for "peace"—in other words, the support of Soviet policies—takes precedence over revolutionary experiments. Similarly, Communists in the emerging countries should not, as a rule, assume power hastily, but instead they should try to influence the dominant political forces of their countries, and to exert pressure in the direction of a "non-capitalist path."

Moscow's Version of
"The Road to Paris Leads through Peking"

Caption:

Duet of the Gallic Rooster and the Pekinese Duck.

—From *Krokodil* (Moscow), September 10, 1963.

The Peking thesis, on the other hand—if we confine ourselves here again to outlining the basic guidelines for the Communist world movement—proceeds from the assumption that the revolutionary center of the world has shifted to the emerging countries. The main task of the Communist countries must be to further the revolutionary movement in the underdeveloped countries and to support it by an uncompromising attitude toward the West ("imperialism"). The "mass organizations" (peace movement, trade unions, women and youth organizations) should become firmly integrated into the revolutionary struggle; the Communist parties in Western countries should prepare themselves for the imminent revolutionary struggles. Coexistence, economic competition, disarmament and the peaceful path to socialism are either to be rejected as "revisionist" or can at best be used as tactical slogans.

The formation of both these international Communist concepts, which was inextricably interwoven with the struggle for leadership of the world movement, has directly affected all other Communist parties and organizations. Now it was up to them to adopt one or the other thesis, (and to ally themselves with one or the other center), or to maneuver between both. From this time on, international Communist meetings, congresses and conferences lost the image of unity and monotony which had been customary in the past, and became transformed into scenes of acrimonious struggles and debates.

At the Conference of World Trade Unions in Peking (June 5-9, 1960) the Chinese line was supported by the delegates of Albania and of some Asiatic and African countries (North Vietnam, Burma, Ceylon, Somalia, Sudan, Indonesia and Zanzibar)[10] and a factional conference was held behind Moscow's back.[11] The Bucharest Conference of Communist party leaders which followed (June 21-26, 1960) made clear that the differences were not confined to the mass organizations, but that a Chinese-Albanian alliance had arisen in the Communist movement as such.[12] The controversies between the two factions (which were much deeper

[10] *Peking Review*, No. 24, June 1960. *The Sino-Soviet Dispute, op. cit.* pp. 123-126, and Donald Zagoria *The Sino-Soviet Conflict*, Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1962, pp. 320-323.

[11] At least Moscow asserts this in "Open Letter of the CC of the CPSU," July 14, 1963.

[12] William E. Griffith, *Albania and the Sino-Soviet Rift*, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1963, pp. 41-45.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

and sharper than seemed evident at the time) were also noticeable at the Vietnam Party Congress (at the beginning of September 1960). Above all they came to the fore in the meetings of the commission of twenty-six party delegates who were supposed to prepare the ground for the new Communist world conference.

Another new step in the growing schism was reached at the World Conference of 81 Communist Parties which began in Moscow on November 10, and which, instead of continuing for only a few days as planned, lasted until December 2.[13] At this gathering the Chinese and Albanian Communists found themselves supported by the CP delegations of North Korea, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia and Australia. The "dogmatists" demanded the elimination of the references to the 20th Party Congress, the doctrines of coexistence, destalinization and disarmament, all of which were contained in the proposed draft of the declaration; in addition, they demanded that the criticism of the Yugoslav Communists be sharpened. Coexistence could be used, according to the "dogmatists," only as a tactical slogan, and disarmament would be possible only after the complete victory of communism throughout the world. Bitter controversies arose between both factions over this question, and Soviet policy was criticized for being revisionist and opportunistic by the Chinese Communist Party and even more strongly by the Albanian Communist Party.

There was also a fierce fight over relations within the Communist world movement. The Soviet draft had contained a ban on the formation of factions. In the preliminary sessions, the Peking faction had already refused to accept this. At the conference itself this passage was again inserted at the request of the Brazilian and Cuban Communist parties, but again it was removed under the pressure of the "dogmatists," so that in the final text only the unity of the Communist world movement was emphasized. The proposal to form a permanent secretariat of the world movement, made by several delegations, was rejected by the French and, even more strongly, by the Italian CP delegation which moreover requested that the anti-Yugoslav remarks be toned down and complained (rightly so) that the declaration was too long-winded and that it contained many repetitions.

The "Albanian Controversy"

Actually, the declaration of the 81 Communist parties, made public on December 5, 1960, was not only a compromise but an elastic conglomeration of various contradictory theses. The different factions could now base themselves on the formulations agreed upon at the time and always claim to be acting "in the spirit of the declaration of 1960." The Fourth Party Congress of the Albanian CP (February 13-20, 1961), which had twice been postponed, demonstrated how superficially the differences had actually been resolved. At this congress the supporters of the Soviet faction polemicized against their Albanian hosts, albeit in carefully phrased ideological language; the Greek CP delegation left the Congress in protest, while the Chinese-Albanian line was supported (although in varying degrees) by the CP delegations of North Korea, North Vietnam, Indonesia, Burma and Ceylon.[14] The exacerbation of Soviet-Albanian relations in the ensuing months (the departure of Soviet submarines, the closing off of Albania for East European tourists, the entry of Chinese technicians and the demonstrative recall of the Soviet ambassador) led to an alienation of such far-reaching proportions that the Albanian Communists were no longer invited to the Soviet Party Congress.

The 22nd Congress of the CPSU, which met from October 14 to 30, 1961, had originally been convoked to propagandize the new Party Program, but instead it was made the forum for a renewed onslaught on Stalin and the Stalinist past, for new accusations against the "anti-party group," and above all, for a vehement Soviet attack on the Albanian Communists, who were branded as "splitters" and "renegades."[15] The Soviet attempt to isolate the Albanian Communists from Peking—or indeed, to overthrow the Albanian leaders entirely—was a complete failure. The Chinese CP, represented at the Congress by Chou En-lai, held steadfast to their Albanian alliance,[16] and the CP leaders in Tirana not only rejected the Soviet accusations, but took the offensive and even threatened to come out with revelations about internal Soviet events.[17] Of the 66 foreign CP delegates at the

[13] From materials of the Italian CP: *Interventi della delegazione del PCI alla Conferenza degli 81 Partiti comunisti e operai*, Rome, January 1962. From the French CP: *Contribution de la delegation francaise a la conference des partis communistes et ouvriers*, Paris, November 1961. From the Belgian CP: Article by Jean Terfre in *Le Drapeau Rouge*, January 5-17, 1962. English translation in Alexander Dallin, (Ed.) *Diversity in International Communism*, Columbia University Press, 1963, pp. 829-867.

[14] William E. Griffith, *op. cit*, 68-76.

[15] *Pravda*, October 18, 22 and 23, 1961.

[16] *Pravda*, Oct. 20, 1961.

[17] *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), Nov. 8, 1961.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet Party Congress, 22 refrained from supporting Moscow's anti-Albanian attack—some because they themselves shared or sympathized with the views of the outlaws, others because they wanted to remain neutral, while still others simply had not worked out their own positions.

The result of the 22nd Party Congress was an even deeper split within international communism. The Yugoslav, Polish and particularly the Italian Communists made use of the anti-dogmatist character of the Congress to re-emphasize their condemnation of Stalinism and their support of "polycentrism." [18] The Peking group was now encouraged by North Korea's demonstrative greetings to the Albanian Communists who had been cast out by Moscow; similar greetings were sent by the Communist parties of China, North Vietnam, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and New Zealand (the Australian Communists had in the meantime drawn closer to the Moscow line). Controversies flared up again at the subsequent congresses of the World Peace Council in Stockholm (December 4-15, 1961) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (December 16-19, 1961). The supporters of the Moscow faction maintained that the struggle for peace and the Soviet disarmament proposals should be given priority, while the Peking faction (supported in this question by some African and Latin American delegations) tried to rally these organizations in support of national revolutionary movements. At the same time an additional controversy took place at the Trade Union congress between the Italian delegation (supported by Yugoslav and Polish representatives), which advocated greater autonomy and independence, and the adherents of the Moscow faction who sought to prevent this.[19]

The "Communist Neutrals"

Meanwhile, the situation had become so confused that some Communist parties—although for varying reasons—began to urge that a new world Communist conference be convened to resolve the differences. The North Vietnamese reconciliation proposal in January 1961 (not made public at that time), was soon supported by the Communist parties of Sweden, Great Britain, New Zealand and Indonesia.[20] The fact that two of these parties—the Indonesian and New Zealand—were close to the Peking faction, while the parties of Sweden and Great Britain were sympathetic to Moscow, indicated that this proposal, however well-intended, would only serve to complicate matters further. This was bound to happen because, in the first place, to the previous disputes a new one was added, dealing with the question of how and in what way the differences of opinion in the Communist world movement were to be settled; and secondly, because the attitude of various Communist parties toward this question (and in a broader context toward relations within the world movement as a whole) did not at all correspond to the former groupings, with the result that new "fronts" were being created. The reconciliation proposal of the "neutral five" for an early convocation of a world conference was supported by the Chinese CP in an internal letter of April 7, 1962, but Peking's support was combined with a demand (unacceptable to Moscow at that time) that the Soviet leadership first normalize its relations with the Albanian CP.

The Sino-Soviet conflict temporarily subsided during the spring and early summer of 1962 and was restricted, for the time being, to carefully worded ideological argument: the Peking faction made indirect allusions to Soviet policy as resembling that of Kautsky and Bernstein,[21] while in Moscow appropriate documents by Lenin were found and made public which made Soviet policy appear to be the consistent realization of Lenin's ideas. However, the end of this interval was marked by the acceptance of Mongolia into the Comecon at the beginning of June (China, North Korea and North Vietnam had been invited more than once to participate as observers), and by the trip of Soviet President Brezhnev to Yugoslavia (September, 1962). The conflict was more than ever intensified by the Chinese-Indian border dispute at the end of October as well as by the Cuban crisis, erupting into the open with stormy scenes at the CP Congresses in Bulgaria (November 5-14), Hungary (November 20-24), Italy (December 2-8) and Czechoslovakia (December 4-8).

The "dogmatist" wing (which at that time consisted of the Communist parties of China, Albania, North Korea, Burma, Thailand, Malaya and New Zealand, with the sympathizing parties of

[18] *Diversity in International Communism, op. cit.*, Polish statement pp. 318-332; Italian, pp. 408-475; Yugoslav, pp. 584-604.

[19] *L'Unita*, Dec. 7, 1961; Borba, Dec. 12, 1961. English in William Griffith, *op. cit.*, pp. 122-129. See also "Workers Disunite," by G. E. Lynd, *Problems of Communism*, March-April, 1962.

[20] First mentioned in a letter of the Chinese CP Central Committee to Moscow, March 9, 1963.

[21] "On Bernsteinian Revisionism," *Hung Ch'i*, Peking, Feb. 10, 1962. "On Kautskyism," *Hung Ch'i*, Peking, Apr. 25, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Indonesia and Japan, and which had some support in the mass organizations of some emerging countries) urged in December, 1962, that there be an early convocation of a Communist world conference. This insistence was impelled, of course, by the "dogmatists'" hope of winning over new supporters.[22] Sensing the growing anti-Moscow sentiments, the Soviet leaders were hardly enthusiastic about this idea, and strove to postpone the convocation of the conference. The East German Communist Party Congress (January 15-21, 1963, in East Berlin) was used by Khrushchev as a kind of "summit meeting" with the leaders of the ruling Communist parties—Gomulka, Ulbricht, Novotny, Zhivkov, Tsedenbal—with the conspicuous absence of Rumanian party leader Gheorghiu-Dej indicating new complications. There were stormy and riotous scenes at the East German Party Congress. On several occasions, organized claques prevented the leader of the Chinese delegation, Wu Hsiu-Chuan, from addressing the gathering, while the Yugoslav Communists (participating for the first time since 1948 in an East European CP congress) were received with wild applause. Other delegates of the Peking faction could not speak at all, and the fact that the 17 Latin American parties were "represented" by only one speaker, Morando of the Chilean CP, again offered evidence of Moscow's difficulties with the Communist movement of that continent.

However, especially significant from the long-range point of view was the fact that Khrushchev in his speech of January 16, 1963, for the first time sanctioned *ideologically* what had been taking place in *practice* over recent years. Hitherto it had been considered sacrosanct that there could be no difference of opinion among the Communist parties of various countries since they all stood "on the foundation of Marxism-Leninism." Khrushchev now declared, however, that such differences were completely possible and natural: "It goes without saying that it is not excluded from Communist parties of different countries to present different views on even very important questions." The early convocation of a world conference, which Peking had demanded, was rejected by Khrushchev who argued that such a conference would not bring about "any peaceful and reasonable settlement of differences, but would bring them to a head and cause the danger of a split." It would be far better "to suspend the polemics between Communist parties and to allow a certain amount of time to elapse so that, as they say, tempers may cool off." [23]

Under these circumstances it seemed wise for Moscow to accept the new, now official reconciliation proposal of the North Korean CP, presented on February 12, 1963, and couched in lucid and non-inflammatory diplomatic language. It urged the contending parties to get together for the purpose of airing their differences—to which the Soviet leadership agreed, declaring, in a letter of February 21 to Peking, that they were ready for direct Sino-Soviet talks.[24]

Reconciliation or Break?

The CPSU's letter was the first in a grotesque exchange of correspondence between Moscow and Peking which lasted almost three months. The point at issue was merely when and where to hold the meeting and what should be discussed. It was not until the middle of May that both sides agreed to meet in Moscow on July 5. During these protracted negotiations, however, the divergence in world communism was intensified by two new important events.

The first of these was the "Rumanian affair." Back in the late autumn of 1962 there had been a sharp controversy between Soviet and Rumanian historians over the question of whether the Antonescu regime had been overthrown in the autumn of 1944 mainly by Soviet troops or by Rumanian Communists. The demonstrative absence of the Rumanian party leader, Gheorghi-Dej, from the party congress in East Berlin clearly indicated that this had by no means been a dispute about history only. The Rumanian Communists wanted, rather, to pursue their industrialization program and to resist the broader integration within Comecon proposed at the February session of that organization. In March the Bucharest leadership called a special meeting of its central committee, subsequently informing party members at closed meetings about the differences with Moscow. At the April Comecon session, the Rumanians again refused to accept the prepared resolutions. Rumania's increasing economic contact with the West and the simultaneous resumption of diplomatic relations with Albania (in the middle of April), as well as the publication of the Chinese declarations on June 20 in Bucharest, were clear signs that the Rumanian CP, which had been one of Moscow's most loyal satellites in the past, was also going its own way.

[22] *Pravda*, Jan. 7, 1963.
[23] *Pravda*, Jan. 17, 1963.
[24] First published in *Pravda*, Mar. 4, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The second and more significant sharpening of the conflict came about as a result of the actions of the Chinese who, instead of refraining from further polemics pending the Sino-Soviet talks, kept publishing new attacks against the French CP,[25] the Italian CP,[26] the CPUSA,[27] and the Indian CP.[28] In addition, at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Moshi, Tanganyika (February, 1963)[29] and the international meeting of Communist journalists in Djakarta[30] (April 1963) there were clashes between the delegations of both factions. Finally, at the beginning of July the North Korean edition of *Problems of Peace and Socialism* was suspended (the Albanian edition had already been suspended in March 1962 and the Chinese edition in December 1962). At the World Congress of Women in Moscow (June 24-29), the women delegates of both factions literally got into each other's hair. The program proposed by the Moscow wing was rejected by the delegates of China, North Korea, Albania and Indonesia (the delegations of North and South Vietnam, Laos and Japan abstained), and Yang Yung-yu, the leader of the Chinese delegation, indignantly cried out, "You not only don't want to make any more revolutions yourselves, but you don't permit anybody else to make them."[31]

Peking's intransigence hardly created a favorable atmosphere for the Sino-Soviet talks. Indeed, reconciliation was completely out of the question, what with Peking's publication, in the middle of June, of a detailed 25-point program which systematically and clearly enumerated the political concepts of the dogmatist faction,[32] all this under the pretext of offering an "agenda" for the Sino-Soviet negotiations.

The appearance of the 25-point program and its immediate (and illegal) dissemination within the Soviet Union and several other Communist countries led not only to a renewed aggravation of state relations, but also forced Moscow to issue a sharp reply. In its "open letter" of July 14, the Soviet Central Committee not only refuted Peking's accusations but also expounded its own views on every single point.[33] Under these circumstances, the Sino-Soviet negotiations, which had begun on July 5, broke off inconclusively on July 20. Soon thereafter, more bad blood was created by the Soviet signing of the atomic test-ban agreement, with Communist China openly attacking it and with China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Cuba refusing to sign it. At subsequent meetings—of the Anti-Atom Congress in Hiroshima (August 2-7, 1963), the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference in Nicosia (September 10-12, 1963[34])—and at conferences of steering committees of the Communist-run World Youth Organization, Student Federation and the International Organization of Journalists there were open clashes between both factions.[35]

Controversy about the World Conference

The dispute had now reached a new high point. One after another, sharp anti-Soviet "commentaries"[36] issued from Peking openly supporting the pro-Peking fractions and opposition groups in the Communist parties of Western countries, while the Moscow leaders used every means to persuade CP leaders of other countries to come out for the Soviet line and to condemn the "Peking splitters." By September, 1963, more than 60 out of 90 CP leaderships had come out for the Soviet line (although in varying degrees).

[25] "Whence the Differences?—A reply to Comrade Thorez and Other Comrades," *Peking Review*, No. 9. March 1, 1963.

[26] "More on the Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us," *Peking Review*, No. 10-11, March 15, 1963.

[27] "A Comment on the Statement of the CP of the USA," *Peking Review*, No. 10-11, March 15, 1963.

[28] "Mirror for Revisionists," *Peking Review*, No. 10-11, Mar. 15, 1963.

[29] *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.

[30] *Neues Deutschland*, East Berlin, Sept. 12, 1963.

[31] Speech in Peking on July 18, 1963. *Struggle Between Two Lines at the World Congress of Women in Moscow*, brochure issued by Peking, 1963; German edition of the brochure, p. 59.

[32] "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," *Peking Review*, No. 25, June 21, 1963.

[33] "Open Letter from CC of CPSU to Party Organizations and All Communists in the Soviet Union," *Pravda*, June 14, 1963.

[34] *Pravda*, Sept. 12, 13, 16, and 19, 1963.

[35] *Neues Deutschland*, East Berlin, Sept. 5, 12, 1963.

[36] "The Origin and the Development of the Differences Between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," *Peking Review*, No. 37, Sept. 13, 1963. "On the Question of Stalin," *Peking Review*, No. 38, Sept. 20, 1963. "Is Yugoslavia a Socialist Country?" *Peking Review*, No. 39, Sept. 27, 1963. "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," *Peking Review*, No. 43, Oct. 25, 1963. "The Different Lines on the Question of War and Peace," *Peking Review*, No. 47, Nov. 23, 1963. "Peaceful Coexistence, Two Diametrically Opposed Policies," *Peking Review*, No. 51, Dec. 20, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Thus, it appeared to the Soviet leadership that the time had indeed arrived to call a Communist world conference to condemn the "splitters" once and for all and thereby restore discipline among the remaining Communist parties. Accordingly, the Portuguese party issued a statement, clearly inspired by Moscow, calling for a Communist world conference, and urging that the conference pass a unanimous resolution (quite obviously directed against the Peking wing) prohibiting any interference by any Communist party in the affairs of another. No party, said the Portuguese Communists, should have the right to enter into political alliances with members of another country's party without the consent of the party leadership concerned.[37] There followed a declaration of the Paraguay CP, likewise inspired by Moscow, which proposed that at the Communist world conference —planned for November or at the latest, December, 1963—the declaration of the 81 CP's of December, 1960, be altered in one important respect: The principal target of criticism should no longer be "revisionism" but rather the "dogmatist deviation" which "has become the chief threat to the international Communist movement."[38] The French CP also spoke out in favor of "taking into account" at the planned world conference "the changes which have taken place" and making decisions "which are required to strengthen the unity of the world movement."[39] With the publication in mid-October of the 34-page Soviet article "For the General Line of the Communist World Movement—Against Left Opportunism, Dogmatism and Adventurism"[40] the most detailed exposition of the Soviet line to date—everything appeared ready for the decisive blow against the "dogmatists."

Nevertheless, no more than a few days later the campaign for the planned anti-Peking world conference suddenly came to a halt. The reason for it was obvious; Moscow was faced with mounting opposition on this score. Not only had the Communist parties of North Korea, Indonesia, New Zealand and Japan, which sympathized with Peking, spoken out against the projected conference, but even quite a number of parties generally sympathetic to Moscow proved rather cool to the idea. The neutralist Norwegian CP came out with a new offer of reconciliation which it sent to both Moscow and Peking: it proposed that committees for the various Communist parties in question be set up in an attempt to settle the conflict through private discussions (!)[41] Much more serious for Moscow, however, was the fact that the Italian CP also issued an official declaration stating its "reservations" about the world conference. "In the present circumstances such a conference could in fact find itself faced with a choice between two solutions, both prejudicial to the Communist movement—either a further worsening of the present divergencies, even going so far as an open break, or else a completely formal and unsatisfactory compromise."[42] The Polish CP also endeavored to restrain the Soviet leaders and to stop them before they made too precipitous a move—no doubt fearing a strengthening of Moscow's control over Eastern Europe should the growing conflict result in a complete rupture of relations between the CPSU and the CCP. Finally, the Rumanian prime minister, Ion Gheorge Maurer, declared that instead of a world conference, first "open polemics should end" and then "negotiations [should be] resumed between the CPSU and the CPC," the more so since "other parties" had also expressed themselves to be "of the same opinion."[43]

Faced with this resistance, the Soviet leadership had to abandon the planned anti-Peking world conference, and to adopt again a "softer" line. As of the beginning of 1964, the CPSU as well as parties allied with it, have drastically cut down on their polemics against Peking; yet there is little doubt that this restraint will not be of a long duration. In fact, the latest blast from Peking (February 4, 1964), issued just as this article was about to go to press, augurs an intensification of the feud—if not, indeed, a complete and formal break.

Future Perspectives

It seems to this author that the principal stages in the recent history of international communism, which have been mentioned but cursorily in this article, nevertheless offer material for several conclusions.

First of all, one is struck by the fact that the process of divergence has affected all the member organizations of the Communist world movement:

[37] *Pravda*, Sept. 24, 1963.
[38] *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1963.
[39] *L'Humanite*, Paris, Oct. 10; *Pravda*, Oct. 19. 1963.
[40] *Kommunist*, No. 15, Oct. 1963.
[41] *Friheten*, Oslo, Oct. 7, 1963.
[42] *L'Unita*, Rome, Oct. 26, 1963.
[43] *World Marxist Review*, No. 11, Nov. 1963, p. 21.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist states as well as Communist parties in the industrially developed nations of the West and in the emerging nations, and finally, in a particularly dramatic form, the Communist-controlled mass organizations (*e.g.*, the World Peace Council, the World Federation of Trade Unions, the World Federation of Democratic Youth, International Women's Democratic Federation, and so on).

The process of divergence has, however, not led to a clearcut alignment of *all* 90 Communist parties of the world and all national sections of mass organizations into pro-Peking and pro-Moscow factions—though a growing number of parties, to be sure, have been subjected to factional splits. By and large, the former monolith has given way to many groupings and currents in which several parties (by no means all) are more or less loosely grouped around the two important centers, Moscow and Peking.

A NEW ALLIANCE?*

Pyongyang (North Korea), Feb. 6, 1964: *Minju Choson* today heartily hails the big achievements made by the Rumanian people in the fulfillment of the 1963 economic plan. Commenting on the report of the Central Statistical Board of the Rumanian People's Republic on the results of the economic plan, the paper stresses: the successes of the Rumanian people are the fruition of the correct economic policy of the Rumanian Workers Party and the creative endeavors made by the Rumanian people, upholding the party policy.

—Pyongyang Radio (in English), Feb. 6, 1964.

In the name of the "international division of labor," the leaders of the CPSU oppose the adoption by fraternal countries of the policy of building socialism by their own efforts and developing their economies on an independent basis, and attempt to turn them into economic appendages. They have tried to force those fraternal countries which are comparatively backward economically to abandon industrialization and become their sources of raw materials and markets for surplus products.

—People's Daily (Peking), Feb. 4, 1964.

** For a discussion of the conflict between Rumania and the Soviet Union, see R. V. Burks' article "Perspectives for Eastern Europe" in this issue, p. 73.—Ed.*

The decision of a given Communist party or organization to opt "for Peking" does not presuppose a unanimous approval by that party of either, say, the people's communes or of Peking's position with regard to Stalin; rather, the principal motivating factor seems to be the party's indigenous interests which, for one reason or another, brings it into affinity with Peking's ideological and strategic theses. Similarly, many Communist parties and organizations are favorable to Moscow because the Soviet concepts more closely express their own conditions and interests. In addition, other factors can play a part, such as the existence of previous ties between the parties concerned and one or the other center, or different kinds of organizational or financial dependence (including the training of officials). Above all, one should not underestimate the importance of those Communist parties which maneuver between both centers, as well as of the "neutrals," some of which want to keep out of the conflict altogether, while others strive to settle the differences through new offers of reconciliation. In this way, not just two wings have been formed in the Communist world movement but also a great number of intermediate groupings and factions.

There are additional points to be taken into account in judging potential future perspectives. One possibility might be a reconciliation between Moscow and Peking and an accompanying attempt to return to the erstwhile monolithic unity of the Communist world movement, perhaps in somewhat more "up-to-date" form. Certainly there are many forces in the international Communist movement that desire and strive for unity, and there is little doubt that repeated attempts will be made in that direction in the future. Nevertheless, the conflict in world communism has reached such an acute stage that the possibility of a complete reconciliation and a return to a monolithic structure appears to be very slim indeed. Even a change in the leadership of both Communist centers—Mao reached 70 in November, 1963, and Khrushchev will reach the same age in April, 1964—would hardly suffice to restore the unity that existed before 1953. Too much has taken place in recent years; the disagreements are too profound, the personal slights too rankling for unity to be achieved by a meeting of the leaders, by a joint communiqué or by an apology by either one or both disputants.

The second possibility might be an open organizational rupture in world communism resulting in a Moscow and a Peking faction. This could occur, for example, with the Peking faction first

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

establishing its own official international Communist journal, then calling "anti-imperialist" conference, and congresses, and finally forming its own "international". If this were to happen, Peking would gather around it, in addition to the above-mentioned Communist parties, the militant, activist national revolutionary forces of various developing countries which have sometimes sided with Communist parties, creating a movement differing in several essential respects from any previous international Communist organizations. The beginnings of such a development can undoubtedly be discerned already, but one should bear in mind that many important forces of the Communist world movement will resist a final organizational split with all their might.

The evolution of world communism to date has, however, avoided both of these extreme solutions. On the one hand, all attempts at a reconciliation and return to unity have foundered, and on the other hand while both centers have certainly made adequate preparations for an open split, they seem to have been reluctant to take the final, irrevocable step in that direction. It is entirely conceivable that the process of divergence will continue along the same lines for quite a long time. In such a case it is probable that the Communist countries (despite many mutual interests) will differ more and more from one another in their practical policies, and gradually a new relationship will also be formed between the leading Communist centers and the active Communist parties and organizations in the other Western industrial states and emerging countries. Both centers, Moscow and Peking, can no longer attain immediate, unconditional and unqualified support for their political line merely by fiat.

The longer the process of divergence goes on, the more Communist parties and Communist-dominated organizations will change from obedient vassals to courted allies, and the greater will be their ability to differ, to disagree, to strike out on their own.

What this means is that Communist parties and organizations will be able to concentrate more and more on domestic problems and will no longer consider it their main task to act as propagandists for Moscow (or Peking). It also means that there will be more debates, discussions and controversies and that various Communist parties may well gain a greater power of attraction and—concomitantly—greater political influence.

Thus the changes we have been witnessing in recent years should not be viewed merely as harbingers of a split, but rather as proof of the emergence of a greater heterogeneity in the international Communist movement, not merely as manifestations of a continuing struggle between two centers, but also as indications of the formation of new, more varied, and more complex relations between parties, organizations and states all calling themselves "Communist"—in short, as the first steps in a profound transformation of the Communist movement throughout the world.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Boring from Within

By Kevin Devlin

Mr. Devlin is an Irish journalist, formerly with the Foreign Desk of the Manchester Guardian, *who since 1960 has worked as a political analyst for Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany. He has published a number of articles in European journals on the subject of Communist movements outside the Soviet bloc.*

Revolutionary people and parties everywhere are more and more placing their hopes on the genuine Marxist-Leninist parties, including the Communist Party of China, and the genuine Marxist-Leninist groups and individuals whose thinking increasingly represents the banner of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism, the banner of world revolution . . . Where there is revisionism, there will be Marxism-Leninism fighting against it; and where the expulsion of Marxist-Leninists from the party and other measures are taken to create splits, new and outstanding Marxists-Leninists and strong revolutionary parties are bound to emerge.

—Chou Yang, Deputy Director of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the CPC, in a report to the Committee of the Department of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the Chinese Academy of Science, Peking, Oct. 26, 1963; *People's Daily*, Dec. 27, 1963.

In the long speech cited above Comrade Chou Yang expounded for his elite audience the philosophical basis of the ideological dispute which has transformed the world Communist movement in recent years, explaining it—from the Chinese viewpoint—in terms of the Marxist dialectic and Mao Tse-tung's doctrine of contradictions. This has more than theoretical importance. While conflicting national interests may lie at the bottom of the Sino-Soviet quarrel,[1] the ideological differences not only make it much more difficult to settle that conflict: they also involve, necessarily, the extension of the struggle to the whole world movement. Communism is more than a political system; it is a doctrine with absolute claims and global pretensions. For that reason, each of the two major protagonists must assert the right to speak for and to the entire international movement. The consequent struggle has been waged within individual parties, at inter-party meetings and international and regional organizations, at every level and in every field of activity.

The Chinese have themselves emphasized the part that the "three-continents strategy" plays in their challenge to Soviet leadership of the world movement. This strategy concentrates on the "storm-centers of world revolution" in the underdeveloped countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, shrewdly exploiting the resentment of the "have-nots" against the "haves," of the non-whites against the whites. Ideologically, it rests on the thesis that the main "contradiction" of our time is not that between socialism and capitalism, but that

[1] Luigi Longo, Togliatti's deputy, seems to have been the first Communist to refer publicly to this basic clash of national interests, in a speech to the Italian CP Central Committee reported in *L'Unita*, Dec. 23, 1961.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between the national liberation movement and imperialism.

Unable to make much headway in the original international front organizations, largely controlled by European Communists, the Chinese moved during 1963 toward the creation of separate, rival Afro-Asian bodies, from which the Russians could be excluded on racial grounds.[2] At a conference held in Djakarta in April to set up a new Afro-Asian journalists' association, the Soviet delegates—on the insistence of the Chinese—were restricted to observer status and were refused membership in the new body (five months later the Chinese boycotted a Mediterranean conference-cruise organized by the Prague-based International Organization of Journalists). In September a Peking branch of the World Federation of Scientific Workers was established, and it was announced that the new "Peking Center" was planning a symposium of Asian, African and Latin American scientists for August 1964. On October 3 a Peking communique on the occasion of a visit by African students announced that a conference would be convened (no date was given) to consider the creation of a "three-continents" student organization, an obvious rival to the Prague-based International Union of Students. Another Djakarta meeting at the end of October prepared for an "Asian-African workers' conference," to be held in the Indonesian capital by "the early part of the middle of 1964" (this move, however, faces not only Soviet and Indian Communist opposition but the indifference or cautious distrust of most African labor organizations).

The Sino-Soviet struggle is, of course, not merely continental or tri-continental, but world-wide; and it is a struggle not merely for the control of front organizations but for the allegiance of individual Communist parties—or of factions within those parties. A recent *Kommunist* editorial put the Soviet view with crude vigor:

The people in Peking are obviously trying to knock together an international bloc out of such factional groups and coteries, mostly consisting of people who were expelled from Communist parties—all sorts of unprincipled and corrupt elements.[3]

Within the past two years this disease of factionalism has affected parties all over the world outside the bloc (inside it, in both the Soviet and Chinese camps, totalitarian regimes offer factions very stony ground, and can suppress any evidence of their existence). From America to Australasia, from Norway to Nepal, from San Marino to Sydney the diligent observer can trace the outlines of the conflict. One of its manifestations has been the rise of anti-party publications, from the Brazilian *A Classe Operaria* through the Belgian *La Voix du Peuple* and the Israeli *Mezpen* (Conscience) to the Australian *Vanguard*. Since most party leaderships are loyal (more or less) to Moscow, the story is generally one of rebellion by pro-Chinese groups; on the other hand, some pro-Chinese parties, notably those of Japan and New Zealand, have to cope with revisionist factions.

A RIGHT AND A DUTY

Communists who have been expelled [by revisionist leaders] are naturally entitled to propagate their ideas outside the party, to organize circles and issue newspapers and magazines, and they are also entitled to establish a new Communist Party . . . If these circles, newspapers and new Communist parties are really a correction of the old, revisionist party . . . then they must be given all support by the Marxists-Leninists of all countries.

—Chairman Aidit's report to the 2nd Plenum of the Indonesian CP Central Committee, Dec. 23-26, 1963.

The pattern of factionalism varies considerably from country to country. In many instances Sino-Soviet rivalry has had a catalytic effect, releasing centrifugal forces already in existence. A brief consideration of a number of "case-histories" will give some idea of this world-wide ideological ferment and the forms it has taken in various countries.

The Latin American Scene

Because of its geographical position and, especially, its revolutionary potential, Latin America is a crucially important arena of factionalism. As one observer put it:

Today the Communist movement of Latin America is deeply split between the Castroite advocates

[2] For vehement French Communist denunciation of these moves, see J. E. Vidal, "Les dirigeants chinois organisent la scission," *L'Humanite*, Oct. 5, 1963.

[3] *Kommunist*, Moscow, No. 15, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of violence and the Old Guard leaders who stand for a policy of collaboration and infiltration. In some countries the Communist movement is on the brink of an open rift, and in others this rift has already occurred.[4]

The factional conflicts in Latin America cannot be explained merely in terms of Sino-Soviet polarization, because of the emergence on the continent of Castroism as a virtual third force. Castroism is an attitude rather than a doctrine (with due respect to the theoretical implications of Guevara's *La Guerra de Guerrillas*[5]); as compared with Maoism and its ideological infrastructure, it can perhaps be best described as revolutionary voluntariasm. As expressed in organizations like the Venezuelan Armed Forces for National Liberation (FALN) or the Peruvian Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), it attracts a mixture of Communists, Trotskyites, left-wing malcontents and assorted revolutionaries. There is direct and often considerable Chinese influence in some areas,[6] but generally speaking the struggle is one of Castroism *vs.* Old Guard.

Nevertheless, there is one Latin American factional conflict which can be explained in Sino-Soviet terms, and which has become something of a *locus classicus* for the whole world movement. This is the struggle in Brazil.

For about the past two years the pro-Soviet Brazilian Communist Party has been facing the pro-Chinese challenge of a rival Communist Party of Brazil (both confusingly, going under the initials PCB). The interesting feature of this split is that the breakaway party can claim not only fidelity to revolutionary principles but institutional legitimacy. This is an important question for Communists, and anti-revisionist factions in some other countries (notably Belgium and Ceylon) have adopted the Brazilian technique of the "extraordinary congress." Moreover, this insistence on legitimacy was strengthened by the fact that the secessionists were able to take over the title, "Communist Party of Brazil," which the official leadership of Luis Carlos Prestes exchanged for that of "Brazilian Communist Party" in August 1961. For good measure, they were also able (like the Belgian rebels) to revive the name of a famous party paper for their fortnightly organ, *A Classe Operaria*, in shrill opposition to the Prestes party's weekly *Novos Rumos*.

Following the 20th CPSU Congress a revisionist, "peaceful-way" tendency gained strength in the PCB, as in several other Latin-American parties. It gained control of the party in 1957, when Secretary-General Prestes gave it his full and formidable support.[7] In August 1957 four anti-revisionist militants were expelled from the Central Committee, and in March 1958 a policy declaration laid down the line of parliamentary struggle and left-wing alliances—"a repudiation of the militant tradition of the party," according to *A Classe Operaria* (August 1-15, 1963).

The increasingly bitter factional struggle reached a decisive stage at the party's Fifth Congress in 1960. This was preceded by an organizational fight in which the rebels had little chance against the party machine. The minority of anti-revisionists elected as congress delegates were outvoted; later, after the break, they were to sum up bitterly: "The Fifth Congress attained the real purpose for which it was convened—the expulsion of 12 full members of the Central Committee out of a total of 25, and of several alternate members." [8]

The rebels claimed that, because of these "machinations," the congress "did not reflect the will of the party." Their charges of betrayal gained strength when the Prestes leadership decided in August 1961 to change the party's name. This was, in fact, merely a legal maneuver which, it was hoped, would help to get the party made fully legal; but it gave the anti-revisionists a chance to represent the change as the creation of "a new party that would no longer be governed by the principles of Marxism-Leninism." When their demand for a special party congress to vote on the change was rejected, the way was open for secession in the name of legitimacy.

---

[4] Ernst Halperin, "Castroism—Challenge to the Latin American Communists, *Problems of Communism*, September-October 1963.

[5] For a discussion, see *ibid.*, pp. 11ff.

[6] *E.g.*, the bulletin of an Italian Communist splinter group reported "news of the formation within the Chilean Communist Party of a revolutionary faction under the name of Movimiento Revolucionario Communista, which . . . supports the position of the Chinese CP," and connected this with "the further fact that the review *Pekin Informa* has 6,000 subscribers in Chile." *Ritorniamo a Lenin!* No. 6, Rome, September 30, 1963.

[7] Prestes himself has had rich experience of both the violent and peaceful ways to socialism. As a young rebel officer he led his "Prestes column" on a Mao-like "long march," fighting more than 50 engagements. After the Communist Party was legalized in 1945 he built it up with remarkable speed, achieving a membership of around 200,000 and a voting strength of 800,000 before it was again outlawed in 1947 (at present, it can carry on political activities, but cannot put forward its own candidates for public office).

[8] Resolution of the Central Committee, Communist Party of Brazil, July 27, 1963, in reply to the CPSU's Open Letter of July 14: *A Classe Operaria* (Rio de Janeiro), Aug. 1-15, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Led by Mauricio Grabois, João Amazonas and Pedro Pomar, they convened their own "Extraordinary National Congress" at Sao Paolo in February 1962. The claim to continuity and legitimacy was of central importance—so much so that the decisive resolution to "reorganize the party" was explicitly based on by-laws adopted at the revisionist Fifth Congress. But in fact they were forming a new party, with its own revolutionary program, under the now-abandoned name of the old. From then on, as their organ *A Classe Operaria* put it a year later:

We have two conceptions, two political orientations and two parties which now confront each other within the [national] Communist movement. On the one hand, we have the Communist Party of Brazil, which is faithful to the best traditions of the working class, to Marxism-Leninism and to proletarian internationalism, and which holds high the banner of revolution; on the other hand, we have the Brazilian Communist Party which has renounced revolutionary ideas, preaches reformism and serves the interests of the dominant classes.[9]

Numerically, this is an ill-matched rivalry. The rebels themselves claimed vaguely to have reached a membership of "several thousand" in the first year of the new party's life. Against that, the "parent" party—PCB, Sr., we might call it—has about 30-35 thousand members, and has considerable additional strength in its influence on the labor movement and on fellow-travelers. Yet numbers are not everything. Prestes' contemptuous references to the "disgruntled activities" of "the anti-party group which publishes *A Classe Operaria*" have an unconvincing ring. As long as he can offer no more than the distant prospect of gaining power by legal or semi-legal means, the challenge of the rebels will continue—an encouragement and an example to revolutionary Communists, Castroists and Trotskyites throughout the Latin American continent.

On the other side of the Andes the anti-revisionists have just gained an important victory. On January 29 NCNA reported triumphantly from Lima that the fourth national conference of the Peruvian CP, "convened by the majority of the Central Committee members and representatives from 13 out of 17 regional committees," had reversed the party's pro-Soviet line. The Secretary-General, Raul Acosta Salas, and eight other revisionist leaders were declared expelled from the party "because of their betrayal of Marxism-Leninism, their political degeneration, their misuse of party funds, their recourse to splittism [by] creating parallel organizations in a truly sectarian and divisive manner." A resolution passed at this conference, on January 18-19, "condemned the revisionist theories of Tito and his followers, and laid emphasis on the correct stand of the Chinese Communist Party in the ideological controversy with the revisionists." The new First Secretary of the Central Committee, Saturnino Paredes, announced that the party would "oppose the degenerate revisionist group which had been expelled."

At the time of writing it is not clear how Acosta's pro-Soviet faction will react to this attempt to breach the solid front of Latin American CPs; but the reference to "parallel organizations" suggests that the struggle in Peru may be a mirror-image of that in Brazil.

Infighting in the CPUSA

At the other end of the Americas we find a factional conflict which, if numerically insignificant, is politically important because of the United States' position as the leading anti-Communist power. The CPUSA itself drew attention to dissension in its ranks a year ago with a letter in the March 1963 issue of the *World Marxist Review*, warning foreign comrades against "a publication called *Hammer and Steel* . . . edited by one Homer Chase, who was expelled from the CPUSA two years ago [and who] is a renegade with Trotskyite views" and also against "another such publication called *Progressive Labor*, edited by Milt Rosen, expelled from the CPUSA."

In fact, the differences between the two movements referred to here are more interesting than the resemblances between them. The emergence of *Hammer and Steel* is a straightforward expression of Sino-Soviet polarization in the world movement; it is not so easy to fit *Progressive Labor* into that familiar pattern.[10]

The *Hammer and Steel* faction issues a monthly bulletin of four mimeographed pages, working through a postal box number in Boston. Its polemical tone is unrelieved by subtlety or

[9] *A Classe Operaria*, Feb. 1-15, 1963.

[10] The CPSU's Open Letter of July 14 accused the Chinese of aiding the *Hammer and Steel* group, but said nothing of *Progressive Labor*.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

moderation. Its attacks on Khrushchev are particularly violent. Thus, the August 1963 issue declares that "the CPSU leaders . . . and their US echoes should be treated as agents of the class enemy"; Khrushchev is accused of trying to "impose an end to Premier Castro by installing the UN investigators" and of giving Nehru "a list of Indian Marxist-Leninists [to be arrested, as] . . . part of the Khrushchev 'aid' to India program"; readers are told of "the Khrushchev-Tito line of returning to capitalism via the re-establishment of private property in the countryside." China, on the other hand, is repeatedly praised for its correct revolutionary policies, and is described as heading the socialist world.

Internally, *Hammer and Steel* calls for a "Negro liberation front, as in Vietnam and Algeria," based on the claim that "the South is a Negro nation—an oppressed nation": when the violent struggle is over, "a free Negro nation will decide whether its best interests lie in separation or as an autonomous part of the US." [11] It assails the "renegade" CPUSA leaders as violently as it does the administration, arguing that there is no "possibility of salvaging the organization from the revisionists"—it must be replaced by "a real Marxist-Leninist Party." [12]

Very different from this militant and clandestine faction is the Progressive Labor Movement. The PLM was founded in September 1961 by Milton Rosen and Mort Scheer, who had been expelled from the CPUSA on the ground that they "represented the Chinese and Albanian Communist parties," according to Rosen.[13] By last summer it claimed some 1,000 members in 60 to 70 clubs across the country. The monthly *Progressive Labor* first appeared in January 1962, and within a year and a half was joined by a theoretical magazine, the *Marxist-Leninist Quarterly*. Both publications, and particularly the quarterly, are much more sophisticated and intelligent than the polemical *Hammer and Steel;* but the differences between the two are significant.

There is little doctrine in *Progressive Labor*. The monthly, vigorous and readable, appeals not to Communists but to the discontented and the disinherited, campaigning in the name of justice and freedom for Negroes, Puerto Ricans, slum-dwellers, organized labor and the right to visit Cuba. This base-building strategy is reflected in a relatively high number of students among PLM members, and the fact that about two-thirds of the total (again according to Rosen) have never been Communists. On this level the movement welcomes publicity, including appearances before congressional committees.

SOME FACTIONALIST PUBLICATIONS

Pro-Chinese	*Pro-Soviet*	*Country*
Revolution		**International (French, English and Spanish Editions)**
El Obrero		**Argentina**
Vanguard		**Australia**
The Australian Communist		**Australia**
Die Rote Fahne		**Austria**
La Voix du Peuple		**Belgium**
La Verite		**Belgium**
Documents		**Belgium**
A Classe Operaria		**Brazil**
The Worker (***Kamkaruwa, Tholilai:*** **respectively Sinhalese and Tamil editions**)		**Ceylon**
	Tilanne (**Situation**)	**Finland**
	Unir pour le socialism	**France**
	Le Debat Communiste	**France**
Le Communiste		**France**
La Voie Communiste		**France**
Vanguard		**Great Britain**
Ritorniamo a Lenin!		**Italy**
L'Etincelle		**Switzerland**
Hammer and Steel		**United States**
Marxist-Leninist Quarterly		**United States**

But there is another level on which the movement operates, represented by the *Marxist-Leninist Quarterly*. The editors, Rosen and Scheer, emphasize that they will publish any article which deals "constructively and honestly with questions of im-

[11] *Hammer and Steel* (Boston), June 1963.
[12] *Ibid.*, May 1963.
[13] Interview in the *New York Times*, July 14, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

portance to fighters for socialism"; but in practice the magazine stands for reasoned criticism of Soviet positions and reasoned support for the Chinese theses—a stand rather similar to that of the New York *Monthly Review,* an independent Marxist-Leninist publication whose editor, Paul Sweezy, has provided some of the most persuasive ideological arguments for Chinese positions.[14] A recent article in the *Marxist-Leninist Quarterly* found that "the Chinese position [on war, peace and imperialism] offers an internally consistent approach, class analysis and a firm strategy . . . their estimates of imperialism's program and the way to fight it are every day being proven correct." On the other hand, Soviet policies (reviewed and rejected in some detail) were condemned as leading to "opportunism" and "class capitulation." [15]

The October 1963 issue of the *Hammer and Steel* bulletin was devoted to an interesting criticism of the Progressive Labor Movement, which was described as having "occasionally pretended sympathy to the line of the world Marxist-Leninist movement" and accused of "acting as a roadblock to a Marxist-Leninist Party". The PLM was berated for failures variously to denounce the Moscow test-ban treaty, to "defend the record of Comrade J. V. Stalin against Khrushchev's slander," to attack the Kennedy administration with sufficient vehemence and to take a sufficiently militant line on the racial question. Most important of all:

PL states that they "do not want a fratricidal war with the CPUSA nor with the SWP [Trotskyites]." . . . We ask the PL leadership . . . Are you trying to establish a line of retreat for Gus Hall & Co. Do you now accept the world Marxist-Leninist line on the danger of Trotskyism or are you still in favor of avoiding a "fratricidal war"?

This broadside was followed by the admission that the PLM had repeatedly rebuffed approaches by the Boston militants:

The editorial board of Hammer and Steel *has requested time and again that PL discuss common problems with us and others fighting revisionism and always met excuses or refusal. We again urge joint discussions . . . We urge unity with all those struggling against revisionism and united efforts for a Marxist-Leninist party in the US.*

This sounds like the reluctant tribute of unsuccessful fanaticism to resourceful opportunism. Through the shrewd flexibility of its two-level strategy, the PLM offers a more effective challenge to the inertia of the CPUSA than the purists of *Hammer and Steel* can provide. Moreover, this imaginative departure from the familiar patterns of factionalism may appeal to ambitious dissidents in other Western countries.

The European Scene: Belgium

The most fully developed and most interesting factional struggle in Western Europe is being fought out in Belgium, and offers the clearest example of direct Chinese intervention. More than a year ago the Peking strategists evidently decided to make this a testing-ground on which to try their chances of subverting a small and politically ineffective revisionist party in a Western industrial country.

The roots of this struggle go back at least to the party's 13th Congress in 1960, but they first came to light during the controlled debate which followed the 22nd CPSU Congress, when an anti-revisionist faction emerged, headed by Central Committee member Jacques Grippa. In February 1962 Grippa was allowed to publish his case in *Le Drapeau Rouge,* the party daily (with a rebuttal by the Politburo printed alongside);[16] but a month later, after a heated four-day meeting, the Central Committee condemned his "erroneous views." Yet Grippa had enough support in Brussels and several provincial centers to resist suspension or expulsion, and his answer was to increase his factionalist activity.

The double Cuban-Himalayan crisis in the fall of 1962 brought matters to a head. Grippa got a majority behind him at a meeting of the bureau of the party's Brussels Federation on November 6 and passed an openly anti-Soviet resolution—which he released to the bourgeois press after *Le Drapeau Rouge* had refused to print it. With this, the organizational struggle was on in earnest. The party leadership expelled Grippa from the Central Committee and "invited" the Brussels Federation to disavow his line. At the Brussels Federation congress in March 1963 Grippa's faction was outvoted by about two-to-one and excluded from the Brussels delegation to the national party congress the following month. At that Antwerp congress,

[14] See the *Monthly Review* editorials for May and October 1963.

[15] A. G. Firanz, "The Crisis in the World Communist Move-[illegible]," *Marxist Leninist Quarterly* (New York), Vol I, No. 2.

[16] *Le Drapeau Rouge* (Brussels), Feb. 22, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

with the Pro-Chinese faction unrepresented (some who tried to force their way in were forcibly ejected), docile delegates approved not only the revisionist congress theses but the leadership's demand that Grippa and three other leading rebels be expelled from the party for "factional practices."

Grippa was out, but he was not down; and he made this clear in a communique charging that the expulsions had been improperly arranged without the knowledge of the "militant groups" supporting him. At the end of June his faction convened an "extraordinary congress" of the Brussels Federation of the party. On the basis of its charges against the "revisionist" party leaders, this congress claimed the right to "declare null and void" all the expulsions and disciplinary measures taken against "Marxist-Leninists"; it refused to recognize the authority of the Brussels Federal Committee appointed at the March congress because of its participation in the "revisionist, splitting policy of the Politburo"; it announced the election of a new committee and other federal bodies, headed by Grippa; and—most important—it called on other federations to "demand an Extraordinary National Congress."

ALL IN THE POINT OF VIEW

This captionless cartoon, reproduced from the pro-Chinese international publication *Révolution* (French edition), depicts what the modern "revisionists" have done to the solidarity of the working-class movement. The revisionists could say, of course, that the cartoon applied more aptly to the divisive tactics of the self-styled "true Marxists-Leninists."

—From *Révolution* (Paris), January 1964.

Until such a congress could be arranged, the statutory position of the new "Brussels Federation" would be weak; but from the first it acted as if it was, in fact, a rival party. A delegation led by Grippa promptly left for Tirana while another went to Peking. On August 15 the Federation issued a 27-page reply to the CPSU's Open Letter of July 14, recapitulating the familiar Chinese charges against Khrushchev. In mid-September there appeared the first number of the then fortnightly *La Voix du Peuple*, described not as the organ of the secessionist Brussels Federation but as a "periodical of the Communists of Belgium." An editorial by Grippa in the third number made it clear that the aim was the creation of a rival national party. He predicted that "in a short time the [Belgian] party, which in Brussels has achieved unity in ideology and combat, will be rebuilt on a national level," and went on to speak of "the extension of our action to the whole country and its imminent organizational consolidation." [17]

The next step came in mid-November, with the formation in Charleroi of a break-away "Walloon (French-speaking) Federation of the Belgian CP" under the chairmanship of Henri Glineur, one of the dissidents who had been expelled from the PCB four months earlier. The "more than 40" militants at the founding meeting, each claiming to speak for a cell or section, passed a resolution urging Flemish Communists to form a similar federation, so that Belgian anti-revisionists could be "reunited in a Marxist-Leninist party."

The final split occurred on December 22, when the secessionists held a "national Communist congress" in Brussels, at which it was announced that the Walloon Communist Party (the world "federation" was dropped) would be officially joined in February 1964 by a Flemish Communist Party, to be inaugurated at Antwerp; together with the dissident Brussels Federation they would henceforth form the Communist Party of Belgium, which would hold a national congress "in the spring." As the main resolution put it: "We declare the Communist Party of Belgium reconstituted on the national level, on the basis of Marxism-Leninism." [18]

The progress thus made by the rebels was largely due to direct Chinese intervention. This came into the open in February 1963, when the New China News Agency opened an office is Brussels and put one of Grippa's supporters, Jean-Paul

[17] *La Voix du Peuple* (Brussels), No. 3, Nov. 8-21, 1963. A weekly since January 1964, this paper has a claimed circulation of 10,000—one-fifth of which is distributed in northeastern France.

[18] *Ibid.*, Vol., 2, No. 1, Jan. 3, 1964.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Mineur, in charge of an all-Belgian staff that came to number a dozen persons within five months. From this office came first a weekly and then, from mid-July, a daily service of NCNA news items which, supplemented by a flood of pamphlets, went to some 6,000 recipients, including non-Communist politicians, labor leaders and the bourgeois press. A book shop specializing in Sino-Albanian booklets was opened under the title "Le Livre International." On Septembr 25 a PCB spokesman suggested waspishly to reporters that "it could be the duty of the Belgian fiscal authorities to discover why so much Chinese money can get into Belgium."

For the Chinese, in fact, the Belgian factional conflict has been not only a *banc d'essai,* but a base for Western European operations potentially much more useful than the notorious Bern Embassy.

France

Across the border in France Sino-Soviet polarization has imposed itself on an existing pattern of factionalism, largely representing currents of rebellion on both flanks against bureaucratic discipline, inflexible policies and the personality cult which Maurice Thorez, "Fils du Peuple," has built up over three decades. It is perhaps typical of the French political tradition that the resultant mosaic groups and movements can be most conveniently explained in terms of various publications.

On the revisionist side, the oldest of these is the monthly *Unir Pour le Socialisme,* which a clandestine group within the French Communist Party has been issuing since October 1952. *Unir,* claiming a readership of 15,000, has repeatedly disavowed any intention of organizing a faction as such, let alone a rival party: what it wants is the overthrow of the "neo-Stalinist" Thorez leadership. In December 1961 an "open wing" of the movement was formed by members who had been expelled from or had left the party, under the title of the "Association (Amicale) of Former Members of the PCF." In February 1962 the Amicale began publication of its monthly organ, *Le Débat Communiste,* which now claims a circulation of 7,000 copies. Like *Unir,* it concentrates its main fire on Thorez, while calling for free and informed debate on ideological questions; it is vigorously anti-dogmatist, but has published representative Sino-Albanian text ignored in the party press. More worrying to the party leadership, perhaps, is the revisionist current which dominates the Union of Communist Students (UEC), and which has been quietly but firmly resisting party threats and pressure since the sixth UEC congress in February 1963, when a revisionist program was adopted in open defiance of Thorez. The UEC monthly, *Clarté,* has not abandoned the position attacked by Thorez at the Central Committee meeting last May.

Between the revisionist and dogmatist wings lies the faction which for nearly five years has been publishing *La Voie Communiste,* described as "the monthly organ of the Communist opposition." Anti-Stalinist and anti-Thorez, it stresses the need for free debate; but it is also of a revolutionary temper, and in the ideological dispute sides mainly with the Chinese against the "opportunist" Russians. Last July two months of talks between representatives of *La Voie Communiste, Unir,* and *Le Débat Communiste* ended in a "Joint Declaration for a Renewal of Communism in France." [19] This called in rather vague terms for a national congress which would "correct deviations . . . put an end to the dictatorship of a group [and] reestablish internal democracy." But the statement was a compromise reached only by glossing over the points on which *La Voie Communiste* differed with the other two groups: the details of the prospective transition to socialism and, especially, the ideological issues of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Since then, there has been no word of the continued consultations promised in the statement.

The counterpart of *Unir* on the other flank is *Le Communiste,* the monthly "organ of the revolutionary wing *(tendance)* of the Communist Party," which was founded in 1954 by a group of former Trotskyites. This militant bulletin is strongly pro-Chinese and anti-Soviet. The pro-Chinese wing is also represented by such Trotskyite publications as *La Lutte Communiste,* and by the attempt to form a "French-Chinese People's Association" as rival to the party-sponsored body. The group behind this attempt held an opening rally in Paris in October; by January the second issue of its monthly bulletin was claiming a following of more than a thousand and was listing among its aims the propagation of Chinese ideological views.[20]

Numerically, neither revisionists nor dogmatists present any serious challenge to Thorez and his party machine, but their stinging assaults may help to account for the vehemence of his anti-

[19] Printed in all three publications in September 1963.

[20] See *Le Monde* report of Jan. 29, 1964, and an unsigned article in *L'Humanite* of Feb. 7, which described the Association's Provisional National Committee as "an astonishing collection of revisionists, impenitent Trotskyites and renegades from our party."

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese stand. At a party seminar on July 23 last he attacked the Chinese for "carrying out undermining activities . . . using for this purpose all the oppositional riff-raff, expellees and renegades." Only rarely, as in some comments on the UEC congress, do party statements betray that he is also concerned about the influence of Italian Communist thinking on the revisionist wing of his movement.

Italy

The factional pattern in the Italian Communist movement is as confusing as in France, but in a different way. Across the Alps the rebellion comes not from both flanks but from the left only, from militants resentful of Togliatti's revisionist rhetoric and pragmatic opportunism. However, the effectiveness of this challenge has been limited not only by its numerical weakness but by its lack of organization. There is, in fact, no single anti-revisionist faction, as in other parties, but rather a heterogeneous current of opposition which has taken different forms in different centers—including, for example, the small Paduan group which began the "public" rebellion in August 1962; the Association of Friends of People's China; and local anti-revisionist agitation in such areas as Milan, Genoa, Sardinia and Naples.[21] But within the past half-year one more purposeful voice has emerged among this clamor: that of the Rome-based faction behind the journal *Ritorniamo a Lenin!* (Let Us Return to Lenin), which describes itself as an "internal opposition bulletin."

Domestically, *Ritorniamo a Lenin!* calls for the creation of a new revolutionary front, composed of dissident Communists and socialists, which would eventually become a new Communist Party pledged to seek the dictatorship of the proletariat. Abroad, the group looks to coordination with similar factions and the creation of a new Revolutionary International, headed by the Chinese—but not controlled by them. Yet it is doubtful whether the *Ritorniamo a Lenin!* militants would or could fit comfortably into such a Fifth International. For these rebels are not only anti-revisionists; they are also anti-Stalinists.

They do, indeed, make it clear that they have been inspired and encouraged by the Chinese challenge to the Soviets. Thus their bulletin claims that "pro-Chinese interventions in the local sections of the PCI and the PSI are becoming ever more numerous; pro-Chinese groups are being formed everywhere; pro-Chinese publications are appearing in all the cities of Italy." But this allegiance is far from unconditional. Whereas the Chinese still insist that "to repudiate Stalin completely is in fact to negate Marxism-Leninism" (as Chou Yang put it in the speech quoted earlier), *Ritorniamo a Lenin!* accuses Khrushchev of having perpetuated "Stalinist degeneration" and of having made the dead dictator a scapegoat "in order to preserve the essence of Stalinist policy . . . a reformist and bureaucratic idea of revolution, which has led to the theory of revolution by stages, and hence to the internal suppression of proletarian democracy and the external policy of peaceful coexistence, with the resulting sabotage of revolutionary movements, as in Spain, Greece and China itself." [22]

A PLAGUE ON BOTH HOUSES

The Chinese comrades' struggle against Khrushchev's revisionism has been accompanied by the exaltation of Stalin, and this is self-contradictory, because what they are fighting is the whole Stalinist policy, the Stalinist idea, continued by Khrushchev in a partly different form. . . .

The overcoming of their present theoretical limitations in this respect . . . will stimulate the struggle of revolutionary vanguards for the formation of Marxist-revolutionary movements and eventually of a new Revolutionary Communist International.

—Ritorniamo a Lenin! *(Rome), Sept. 30, 1963.*

This stand leads logically to the complaint in another article that "the Chinese comrades continue to lean on the support of old Stalinists in the USSR and various other Communist parties, to whom they are united by common opposition to Khrushchev, but with whom they have nothing in common as regards their program and the revolutionary struggle." The article suggests that the main reason for such "remnants of opportunism and lack of understanding" lies in "the Stalinist intellectual and political formation" of the Chinese leaders; the latter, it is hoped, will come to

[21] See Giacomo Maugeri, "I nostri Cinesi congiurano per posta," *Epoca* (Milan), July 28, 1963.

[22] *Ritorniamo a Lenin!* (Rome), No. 6, Sept. 30, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

realize that Stalinist bureaucracy can only be overcome by "effective proletarian democracy . . . and the fullest liberty for all tendencies and parties which are unconditionally dedicated to the defense of the Workers State.[23]

The positions of this small Italian faction have symptomatic value. Their formula of revolutionary anti-Stalinism has its own logic, likely to appeal to Western Communists in particular; as we have seen, the *Voie Communiste* faction in France holds somewhat similar views.

In several other European countries the situation is complicated by factions pre-dating the Sino-Soviet split. In Denmark the "Titoist" Socialist People's Party, founded in 1958 by Axel Larsen, is now stronger than the Danish CP (of which Larsen was once chairman) and has a sister party in Norway. In Holland another rival party, the Socialist Workers' Party, also revisionist, was founded in 1959 by the former resistance hero de Wagenaar. In Finland, the revisionist rebels are represented by the magazine *Tilanne* (Situation), published by the "Foundation for the Study of Socialism" and appearing eight times a year since 1961. In Sweden, on the other hand, the rival organization is anti-revisionist—the Swedish Communist Workers' Federation (SKAF), founded in 1956 by Set Persson. Within the Swedish CP itself the pro-Soviet leadership faces a challenge from two sides—the anti-revisionists led by Nils Holmberg and Knut Senander of Gotenburg (who were excluded from the local delegation to the party congress in January 1964), and the "Larsenists" led by Sven Landin who seeks more independence from Moscow.

NUMBERS GAME

Since, of the world's 42 million Communists, the Chinese CP with 18.5 million and the Indonesian CP with 2.5 million alone have half of the total, it follows that already the great majority of all Communists stand on the side of Marxism-Leninism, not of revisionism.

—Die Rote Fahne *(Vienna), Oct. 25, 1963.*

Some other countries in Western Europe have secessionist pro-Chinese movements of little practical significance. The most important of these is the faction under Gérard Bulliard, which broke away from the Swiss Labor (Communist) Party in September 1963 to refound the Communist Party of Switzerland; this splinter-party held a national conference late in November, and is now issuing a monthly organ, *L'Etincelle* (The Spark). In Britain we find the handful of militants who in November challenged the British CP with their anti-Soviet manifesto calling for "the establishment of a genuine Communist Party," and who in February began publishing their monthly *Vanguard*. In Austria there is the clandestine faction which in October brought out the first two numbers of a badly-mimeographed bulletin, *Die Rote Fahne* (Red Flag).

Key Conflicts in Asia: Ceylon

Passing on to Asia, we find in Ceylon a factional struggle as clear-cut as that in Brazil or Belgium, and given special interest by the involvement of the Trotskyite LSSP (Lanka Sama Samja Party). This party is the only one which, by supporting Soviet rather than Chinese positions, opposes the official line of the Fourth International,[24] and it is the only one in formal alliance with Communists. In August 1963 the country's three Marxist parties —the Communists (CCP), the LSSP and the small MEP (an offshoot of the LSSP) publicly abandoned their dreams of a revolutionary take-over by joining together in the United Left Front, pledged to seek power by peaceful parliamentary means as a "third-force" alternative to the left-wing Freedom Party and the right-wing United National Party.

This change of policy was challenged within both the CCP and the LSSP. The Communist rebellion was led by Nagalingan Sanmugathasan, Politburo member, one of the founders of the CCP, and Secretary-General of the 150,000-strong Communist-controlled Ceylon Trade Union Federation (CTUF). Two months before the signing of the United Left Front agreement Sanmugathasan threw down the gauntlet with a demonstrative visit to Peking, where on May 29 he and the secretary

[23] *Ibid.*, "I compagni Cinesi avanzano nella critica a Stalin" (unsigned).

[24] In October a member of the LSSP Secretariat, I. Moonesinghe, visited Rome for talks with Italian Communist leaders, during which he stated that "the majority of the LSSP" backed the revisionist line, but that the party was "in a minority position" within the Fourth International *(L'Unita,* Oct. 23, 1963).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions signed a joint statement expressing the Chinese line on international affairs. Back in Ceylon, as the left-wing New Delhi weekly *Link* reported on July 28, he "started organizing anti-Soviet rallies," appealing particularly to trade unionists and students.

Thus challenged, the party leadership was led to declare its pro-Soviet, anti-Chinese stand more emphatically (in a Central Committee resolution of September 26) and to take measures against the dissidents. Sanmugathasan was rebuked and forbidden to publish pamphlets and distribute "Chinese propaganda material." Two editors of party periodicals, including P. Kumarasiri, a Politburo member, were dismissed—and given new jobs on CTUF papers by Sanmugathasan.

On October 27, with 14 of the 35 members missing, the Central Committee expelled Sanmugathasan and suspended the absent Kumarasiri. Four full and six alternate members of the committee, including these two, promptly issued a statement condemning the party leadership for betraying Marxism-Leninism, and Sanmugathasan announced that his faction would work for "a new and more dynamic revolutionary leadership." On November 17 more than 100 anti-revisionists held a "national conference" at which they decided to convene the Seventh CPC Congress. The point here—legitimacy again—was that under the statutes the seventh congress should have been held by December 1962. In a 12-point indictment of the party leaders the rebels added that their demand for a congress had been improperly rejected, although backed by a majority of district committees and supported in writing by "more than half the membership." [25]

This "Seventh Congress" was held on January 19-21, and made the split final and formal. Some 400 delegates "repudiated" the revisionist policies of the CCP leadership and elected a "new" Central Committee to replace it. The pro-Soviet leaders, who at the beginning of January had been forced to expel eight more members from the Central Committee, were now solemnly commanded to show cause why they should not be expelled.

Sanmugathasan's main strength lay in the CTUF labor federation, and he used it shrewdly in preparing for the 16th CTUF congress on December 19-21. Only a quarter of the 800 delegates supported the pro-Soviet president, M. G. Mendis. Having delivered a presidential speech attacking Sanmugathasan (and after a brawl which sent four men to hospital), Mendis walked out with his followers, leaving the rest to pass anti-revisionist resolutions and elect a new, solidly pro-Chinese CTUF leadership.[26] The next day he held a rival meeting, attended by CPC Secretary-General Keuneman, at which 236 delegates who had "withdrawn in disgust" from the "CTUF sessions organized by the Sanmugathasan clique" resolved to hold "a real workers' conference" in February—presumably to maintain the faction's claim to represent the CTUF. The Communist Youth League had already split into two sections in November; now there would also be rival labor organizations, as well as rival Communist parties, in Ceylon.

The situation in India, if more confused than that in Ceylon, has also been the subject of more analytical attention.[27] We may note briefly that the pro-Chinese faction, many of its leaders still imprisoned, has established in West Bengal "a party (in the words of the party's Provincial Organizing Committee, which since February 1963 has officially controlled the state party unit "under the guidance of the Central Secretariat"). This challenge was made through a "Democratic Convention" which a Secretariat spokesman has denounced as "a permanent body set up in West Bengal . . . with the deliberate object of splitting the party." [28]

The pro-Chinese faction has, however, been weakened by the defection of the anti-revisionist leader Jyoti Basu, former secretary of the West Bengal state party, who in September sent out from prison a letter strongly critical of China, and in November expressed "satisfaction over the decision of the National Council." [29] With many of his opponents still detained, the party chairman, S. A. Dange, had a majority of more than two-to-one at the National Council in October, and was able to pass an anti-Chinese ideological resolution (the "neutral" counter-resolution of E. M. S. Nam-

[25] NCNA dispatch, Dec. 2, 1963.

[26] For conflicting accounts of this incident, see an NCNA dispatch of Dec. 25, 1963, and the Indian CP weekly *New Age* of Jan. 12, 1964.

[27] See, for example, Harry Gelman, "Indian Communism in Turmoil," *Problems of Communism*, May-June 1963, and "The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking," *Problems of Communism*, November-December 1963.

[28] Press statement by M. N. Govindan Nair, *New Age* (Indian CP weekly), New Delhi, Nov. 3, 1963. A resolution on party affairs in West Bengal, passed at the October 14-19 PCI National Council meeting, referred not only to the Democratic Convention but to "an underground center styled as PCZ" (*New Age*, Oct. 27, 1963).

[29] *New Age*, Nov. 17, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

boodiripad, the former Secretary-General, being rejected) and to get a vote of "public censure" on the pro-Chinese leader A. K. Gopalan.

Turn-About in Australia

We come, finally, to the Australian Communist Party—the only one which, having once been pro-Chinese, has been recaptured, so to speak, by the Soviets. The CPA was one of the few parties that supported the Chinese at the Moscow Conference of 1960—and the only "Western" party in that short list.[30] During the previous decade it had increasingly tended to look to Peking rather than Moscow, sending a steady trickle of militants to China for "training."

But during 1961 a revisionist group in the party leadership, led by Laurence Aarons and backed by Soviet pressure on the Secretary-General, Lance Sharkey, gradually prevailed; and, as the pro-Chinese faction later put it, "many changes on one pretext or another were made in leading personnel." [31] As a result, the Australian delegation to the 22nd CPSU Congress reversed its stand of the previous year by hailing the CPSU program, although Sharkey, heading the delegation, showed by declining to join in the condemnation of the Albanians that his ideological conversion was not yet complete.

After his return from Moscow, however, he moved rapidly toward full support of the Soviet positions. At a decisive Central Committee meeting of February 1962 he gave fulsome praise to the Soviets and condemned the Sino-Albanian theses (while still expressing stubbon reservations on the issue of destalinization). This *volte-face* led to a prolonged factional struggle which had interesting undertones of regional rivalry—Sydney vs. Melbourne; New South Wales vs. Victoria. The revisionists controlled the party in Sydney, while their opponents were strongest in Melbourne.

The pro-Chinese faction was led by E. F. (Ted) Hill, Central Committee member and party secretary in Victoria, a shrewd veteran with a considerable following in the labor movement. As the struggle developed, his faction began to distribute anti-revisionist circulars in the name of "the rank and file committee, Communist Party of Australia." [32] More effective, however, was the direct support of the Chinese—and the mailing lists compiled during the Sinophile years by the Australia-China Society; through these, the anti-revisionist line was propagated by the *Peking Review* and by a more readable monthly, *Letter from China,* edited by Anna Louise Strong.

The struggle reached its climax in the summer of 1963. Hill had already been dismissed from his post as party secretary for Victoria in April, and in June he and four other pro-Chinese militants were expelled first from the Central Committee and then from the party for "fractionalism, breaches of the party constitution and rejection of democratic centralism." [33] By the end of the month some 80 Communists had resigned or been expelled from the party. In mid-July the Melbourne party weekly, *The Guardian,* admitted that 62 members in Victoria had left the party within the previous three weeks. Hill promptly left for a month in Peking, while Sharkey and the CPA President, Reg Dixon, left for prolonged talks in Moscow.

After Hill's return from China the organizational challenge developed rapidly. A meeting in Melbourne condemned the CPA (and CPSU) leaders for their "desertion of Marxism-Leninism," and resolved to "put before the Australian working class the case for the formation of a Marxist-Leninist party to uphold working-class principles [and] to expose the renegades who call themselves Communists." [34] In September the rebels brought out the first number of an anti-revisionist journal, *Vanguard.* This was followed two months later by a theoretical magazine entitled *The Australian Communist, t*he first number containing an article by Hill which declared: "The struggle for Marxism-Leninism involves a struggle to establish a Marxist-Leninist party, for now there is none in Australia." [35]

In a *Pravda* article published during their stay in Russia last summer, Sharkey and Dixon tried to minimize this challenge: "A small group—not more than a hundred people—in the city of Melbourne

[30] According to Maurice Thorez: "Apart from the Albanian Party, the parties of [North] Korea, Burma, Malaya, Thailand, Indonesia and Australia supported the Chinese Communist Party more or less completely [at the 81-party conference]." Report of Dec. 15, 1960, published in the French CP booklet, *Problemes du mouvement communiste international,* January 1963.

[31] "Declaration of Australian Marxist-Leninists," Nov. 11, 1963, as reported in the *People's Daily* of Nov. 27; this communique claimed that Aarons used "intrigue, lies, underhand methods and contact with the Soviet party leaders" to impose his revisionist line.

[32] See "The China Hands Slap Back" (unsigned), *The Bulletin,* (Melbourne), Feb. 16, 1963.

[33] *The Guardian* (Victorian state CP weekly, published in Melbourne), June 20, 1963.

[34] NCNA dispatch, Sept. 24, 1963.

[35] Quoted by NCNA, Dec. 3, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

has formed a pro-Chinese faction and is pursuing anti-party activity." [36] Six weeks later, however, Hill was able to muster nearly 200 followers for a Pro-Chinese rally. Supported by the Chinese mailing campaign, and sustained by its influence in key unions, he will certainly continue to "wage an unremitting fight against modern revisionism." [37]

In such a rapid and necessarily superficial survey of the world movement, it is difficult to see the wood for the trees—or perhaps, rather, the facts for the factions. Yet some general conclusions may be drawn.

First, the present epidemic of factionalism is much more serious than previous outbreaks, such as the Trotskyite defections of the 1930's. The essential difference is that rebellious factions can now look to a major Communist power, with its material and propagandistic resources for aid and encouragement.

Secondly, if the logic of ideology lies mainly with the Chinese, the logic of modern realities is largely with the Soviets (except in regions "objectively" ripe for revolution—and even there the revolutionary dynamic often clashes with such forces as emergent nationalism). This conflict between ideology and opportunism is another factor making for the perpetuation of splits.

Thirdly, factionalism is becoming increasingly institutionalized, so to speak, through the spread of anti-party publications, and even the creation of rival party organizations. The fact that four countries—Brazil, Switzerland, Belgium and Ceylon—now have rival Communist parties will make it almost impossible to settle or limit the dispute through an all-party conference, as in 1960.

Finally, the complex pattern of world-wide factionalism cannot be identified exclusively with the Sino-Soviet dispute. The process of ideological disintegration to which that historic conflict has contributed has in large measure passed beyond the control of either Moscow or Peking, and would not end even if, against present probabilities, the two major protagonists were to compose their differences. Polycentrism is here to stay, and so is factionalism. Today, Stalin's monolith lies in ruins.

[36] L. Sharkey and R. Dixon, "Against Adventurism in the Revolutionary Movement," *Pravda*, Aug. 30, 1963.

[37] Resolution passed at a "recent" Melbourne factional meeting, *Vanguard* (Melbourne), No. 1, September 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

How Monolithic Was the Monolith?

By Robert V. Daniels

Professor of History at the University of Vermont (Burlington), Mr. Daniels has written extensively on Soviet and international communism. His books include The Nature of Communism *(New York, Random House, 1962)* and The Conscience of the Revolution: The Communist Opposition in Soviet Russia *(Harvard University Press, 1960).*

The deteriorating relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China is one of the most misunderstood phenomena of the current international scene. This misunderstanding can usually be traced to the common, if inaccurate, assumption that communism, thanks to its presumably binding and guiding ideology, has always been distinguished by monolithic international unity and discipline.

The picture of a tightly unified and blindly disciplined Communist movement is, to be sure, historically true for a certain phase of the movement—the period of Stalin's domination of Russia and of Soviet domination of the international movement from the late 1920's until 1948. A point of doctrine established in this period was the insistence that the Communist movement *ought* to be tightly disciplined in this manner, and that no national or factional variation in doctrinal interpretation was permissible.

In line with these doctrinal claims of Stalinism, all disagreements or deviations from the Moscow line of theory or practice had to be condemned as heretical. The previous Soviet history of factional splits and debates was therefore rejected as the work of counter-revolutionaries trying to undermine the "general line of the party." A more objective appraisal of the early history of the movement shows to the contrary that the many diverse schools of Communist thought were equally grounded in the ambiguities and inconsistencies of Russian Marxism. Theory in the absence of authority was never a force for unity, but a fertile source of controversy.

It can be shown, viewing the history of communism as a whole, that theory has never served to unify and discipline the movement except when it could be made the instrument of one dominant institution of power. Given a plurality of power centers—whether resulting from a split in the party or the rise of Peking as a rival national center in the international movement—the effect of Communist theoretical commitment is to compel controversy rather than enforce unity.

Early Schisms in Marxism

The Communist movement originated, as a matter of fact, in a schism among Marxists, if we may trace its existence back to the Bolshevik-Men-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

shevik split of 1903. The two groups had started out with a more or less common ideology. They split mainly because of differences in tactics and temperament and the personal ambitions and assumptions of one strong-minded man—Lenin—whom other strong-minded Russian Marxists could not stomach. Clear doctrinal differences came considerably later, though it may be said that as early as in 1902 Lenin was implicitly changing the philosophy of Marxism by his stress on the vital role of the party organization in revolutionary activity. He was, in effect, propounding a new doctrine with his contention that the Russian proletariat should take the lead in the "bourgeois" revolution—though it was characteristically Lenin's pose to claim that not he but his rivals were the ones who were changing, and hence "betraying," Marxism.

Differences of temperament analogous to the Bolshevik-Menshevik antithesis were present to some degree in all the major Marxist parties of Europe prior to World War I and the Russian Revolution. The war and the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia had the effect of extending the Bolshevik-Menshevik break to all the parties of the Second International, as the more radical wing in each country took its stand against the war and in sympathy with the October Revolution. From 1919 on into the 1920's, acrimonious battles were fought in many a Socialist party between the factions favoring and opposing affiliation with the new Communist International. In most places the outcome was a complete rupture, with the left-wing, pro-Soviet minorities seceding to form separate Communist parties belonging to a distinctly new international movement.

If the splits of 1903-05 in Russia and 1919-21 in the International are used as a model for assessing the Sino-Soviet schism, cetrain parallels immediately suggest themselves. Like the cleavage between Social Democracy and Communism, the Sino-Soviet disagreement has proceeded from what was initially a common ideological ground. Continuing the parallel, it appears to have been differences of temperament, tactics, and national circumstances, and the underlying issue of who is to command the movement, that have divided Moscow and Peking, rather than any initially clear differences of philosophy and program. The Russians now, like the Mensheviks and Social Democrats of earlier days, are prone to rest on their laurels, avoid risky violence, and trust to the presumably natural work of history to bring them new successes. The Chinese show much more of the old Bolshevik fervor, the impatience with compromise and gradualism, the emphasis on willful action to promote the fortunes of revolution. Chinese criticisms of Moscow recall Lenin's harping on the sins of "spontaneity" and "tail-endism," *i.e.,* following behind the social forces of history instead of leading them.

At this point it may well be objected that the Bolshevik-Menshevik split is a false parallel because it was only as a result of this split that the modern Communist movement came into being—that the discipline, unity, and doctrinal rigor of the Communist movement embracing both Russia and China are traceable only to the Bolshevik side of the 1903-1917 cleavage. This, of course, is quite true, and it therefore behooves us to direct more detailed attention to the history of schisms and disagreements within the Communist movement itself, after it became established in Russia and coordinated around the world by the Third International.

The Romantics and the Pragmatists

Lenin never tired of stressing unity and discipline as the essential conditions of success in a revolutionary party (an attitude sustained by his successors), and he condoned challenges to the leadership of the movement only when there were rivals at the helm whom he could not control, as was the case until 1912 while the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks remained formally within one party. (Lenin's qualified endorsement of "splitting" tactics in this situation, was recalled by the Chinese last fall and again in February as justification for their encouragement of anti-Moscow splinter movements in many Communist parties.) But even within Lenin's own movement, unity was more wish than reality until nearly the time of his death. The image of totally monolithic, mindless, and submissive unity in the international Communist ranks rates only from the time of Stalin. This kind of unity was itself the product of a tumultuous history of controversy, schism, and purge both in the Soviet Communist Party and in the Communist International.

Even before the 1917 Revolution, as well as for years afterwards, Lenin's Bolshevik movement was troubled by discord between the pragmatic authoritarianism represented by Lenin himself and the revolutionary romanticism that animated many of his adherents. As early as 1909 this cleavage came to a head over the question whether to boycott the Tsarist Duma. Lenin thought the boycott politically inexpedient, while the hot-heads considered participation in the elections a betrayal of

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

revolutionary principle. The upshot was a party purge with the expulsion of Alexander Bogdanov and the other left-wing romantics from the Bolshevik ranks. This did not, however, prevent renewed dissention over purist and adventurist tendencies in the movement, particularly among the ultra-internationalists led by Nikolai Bukharin and Yuri Piatakov between 1914 and 1917.

In 1917, following the fall of Tsar Nicholas and the establishment of the Provisional Government, Lenin himself took the adventurist line by calling for immediate proletarian revolution. Most of the support for this view came from romantics of the Bukharin type, together with numerous ultra-leftists from the Menshevik party who came over to Lenin between 1914 and 1917—people such as Alexandra Kollontai, Gregory Sokolnikov, Karl Radek, and finally, Leon Trotsky—all, incidentally, émigrés. Among the Bolsheviks from the underground in Russia there was only a small faction in Petrograd, headed by Alexander Shliapnikov and, of all people, Viacheslav Molotov, who took the insurrectionist line immediately after the February Revolution. The main body under Lev Kamenev and Joseph Stalin came out for support of the Provisional Government and a defensive war. When Lenin returned to Russia in April 1917, Stalin hastened to switch to the leader's radical line, while Kamenev with Gregori Zinoviev and Alexei Rykov led an anti-insurrectionist minority who dragged their feet until the October Revolution was an accomplished fact.

However, Lenin's tie with the romantics—exemplified by his oft-quoted but untypical book of 1917, *State and Revolution*—was short-lived. Within three or four months after the October Revolution Lenin abandoned the utopian view as to the foreign policy of revolutionary war and the domestic policy of democratic workers' control. Despite a bitter political struggle with the representatives of the ultra-revolutionary line led by Nikolai Bukharin, Lenin insisted successfully on the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk with Germany, which was, of course, based on considerations of power politics. Domestically, he began to push for a structure of bureaucratic authoritarianism for the industry, government, and army of the new Soviet society. One of the few Bolshevik leaders, incidentally, who followed every shift of Lenin's was Joseph Stalin (apart from his brief period of "defensism" in March and April 1917, which has been perhaps overemphasized in the Khrushchevite campaign against the "cult of personality").

Idealist criticism of Lenin's arrangements was strongly voiced between 1919 and 1921 by the "Democratic Centralist" faction of Valerian Osinski and Timofei Sapronov and by the "Workers' Opposition" led by Shliapnikov and Kollontai. These purists tried to insist on democratic "collegiality" in government, army, and industry, such as Marx had envisioned and as the Yugoslav Communists revived in part after 1948. But in Lenin's Russia the idealists were easily overcome by the party organizers, and by 1921 the regime's course toward totalitarian national power was definitely set.

The foreign sympathizers with the Russian Revolution, who made up the Communist International, continued making trouble for a number of years. These people were mostly the revolutionary romantics who had split off from the Socialist parties and naturally expected the Communist movement to take an uncompromising and purist stand in every instance. As a result, most of the Russian effort in the Communist International, from the time of its founding in 1919 to the date of its formal dissolution in 1943, was devoted not to promoting foreign revolution, but to restraining it, and to the imposition of firm Soviet control over the foreigners.

Lenin spelled out his answer to the romantics as early as April 1920, when he wrote in "Left-Wing Communism—an Infantile Disorder":

There are compromises and compromises. . . . To refuse beforehand to maneuver, to utilize the conflict of interest (even though temporary) among one's enemies, to refuse to temporize and compromise with possible (even though temporary, unstable, vacillating and conditional) allies—is this not ridiculous in the extreme?[1]

His problem was to keep the foreign purists under Russian tactical control, and to this end he applied his Russian doctrine of the party:

Repudiation of the party principle and of party discipline—such is the net result of the opposition. And this is tantamount to completely disarming the proletariat in the interest of the bourgeoisie.[2]

It did not take long before the Russians brought the foreign Communists under effective control. The move was taken at the Second Congress of the

[1] Lenin, *Selected Works*, Moscow, 1952, Vol. II, part 2, pp. 360, 395-6.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 366.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

International (the first real one), held in August 1920, where all member-parties of the Comintern were required to subscribe to the "Twenty-One Conditions" drafted by Lenin. The document specified the principles of international Communist discipline under a centralized leadership—located in the Russian Communist Party headquarters in Moscow. Under Lenin's direction, the movement was thus firmly set on a course of militant discipline and Machiavellian pragmatism in the service of the Soviet state.

Establishment of the Monolith

A crucial step towards the implementation of this Leninist pattern within Soviet Russia came in 1921 with the introduction of the moderate New Economic Policy (NEP), the suppression of the Russian utopians who could not accept this retreat, and a shake-up of the party's organizational staff that put the Trotskyists out and the Stalinists in. Scarcely more than a year later Lenin was afflicted with his first in a series of strokes, and the leadership fell to a team of his pragmatic heirs—Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, and Bukharin (a utopian-turned-pragmatist after 1921). Impelled by personal emotions as well as reasons of principle, the more theoretically-minded has-beens clustered around Trotsky, and in the fall of 1923 they launched their attack on the successor leadership over the issues of economic development, favoritism to the workers, and intra-party democracy.

The Trotskyist opposition of 1923 was cut down in a bitter, open political battle in the Communist Party organizations. In January 1924, just before Lenin finally died, the opposition was condemned as a "petty-bourgeois," un-Leninist and un-Marxist deviation, and the leadership firmly established the principle that any factional challenge to the unity of the party was *ipso-facto* counter-revolutionary. This did not, however, prevent the opposition from struggling on to condemn the NEP as a betrayal of the workers and a step toward "state capitalism." In 1925-26, when Zinoviev and Kamenev broke with Stalin and Bukharin and went over to Trotsky, the opposition got a temporary boost, but Stalin's organization held firm. In fact, ever since 1923, the efforts of the opposition seem to have been foredoomed to failure, and it was only as a belated anticlimax that in 1927 the Trotskyists and Zinovievists were expelled from the party, with Trotsky's exile from the country following in 1929.

A major theoretical development during Stalin's contest with Trotsky was the former's theory of "Socialism in One Country." This doctrine has often been misunderstood as a shift to nationalism, in opposition to the "world revolution" which Trotsky presumably represented. In line with this picture the parallelism has sometimes been drawn (even by the Russians last year) between the Chinese Communists and Trotsky as ardent exponents of the revolutionary offensive on the one hand, and Khrushchev and Stalin or Lenin as representatives of political caution on the other. Actually, both the Stalin and Trotsky factions endorsed the goal of world revolution in theory and recognized the need for a defensive line in practice. Theory was not the source of the argument between the two sides, but a political football. The Trotskyists tried to argue that the Stalin-Bukharin regime was becoming unsocialist because it was in fact confined to one country, and Stalin tried to counter by falsifying Lenin's doctrine and claiming that the national isolation of communism made no difference to its internal prospects in Russia. The main significance of the entire question lay in the manner in which Stalin was able to start treating theory—revising its meaning and imposing the twisted revision on the Communist movement as though it had always been the official truth. From this time on the Soviet dictatorship would never be compelled to follow abstract doctrine where it did not wish to tread.

Apart from the faint-hearted who dragged their feet in 1917, all the intra-party opposition to Lenin and to Stalin up to 1928 came from the left, utopian, theoretically committed elements of the Bolshevik-Communist movement. As old-style, unadjusted, romantic revolutionaries who emotionally rejected compromise efforts to live with the status quo, these protestants resembled today's Chinese leaders. However, they differed from Mao Tse-tung's party in having no separate seat of power from which they could defy the pragmatist centralizers, and their theoretical perspective was also very different. The early oppositions—above all the Trotskyists—were genuinely operating in the expectation of a world proletarian revolution and the establishment of a workers' state in the true Marxist meaning of the term. Communist China has totally departed from any meaningful Marxist framework of social evolution and working-class rule, in favor of an ultra-Stalinist bureaucratic regime that rules by imposition on workers and peasants and everybody else alike.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

LESSONS OF HISTORY

PEKING

The struggle between Marxism-Leninism and opportunism and between the forces defending unity and those creating splits runs through the history of the development of the Communist movement. This is the case both in individual countries and on the international plane. In this prolonged struggle Marx, Engels, and Lenin expounded the true essence of proletarian unity. . . .

Lenin put it clearly: "Unity—a great cause and a great slogan. But the workers' cause requires the unity of the Marxists and not the unity of the Marxists with the opponents and distorters of Marxism". . . .

What does the history of the development of the international Communist movement demonstrate?

First, it demonstrates that, like everything else, the international working class movement tends to divide itself in two. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is inevitably reflected in the Communist ranks. It is inevitable that opportunism of one kind or another should arise in the course of the development of the Communist movement, that opportunists should engage in anti-Marxist-Leninist splitting activities, and that Marxists-Leninists should wage struggles against opportunism and splittism. It is precisely through this struggle of opposites that Marxism-Leninism and the international working class movement has developed, and it is also through this struggle that the international working class movement has strengthened . . its unity. . . .

Second, the history of the international Communist movement demonstrates that in every period the struggle between the defenders of unity and the creators of splits is in essence one between Marxism-Leninism and opportunism-revisionism; between the upholders of Marxism and the traitors to Marxism. . . .

Third, the history of the international Communist movement demonstrates that proletarian unity has been consolidated and has developed through struggle against opportunism, revisionism, and splittism. The struggle for unity is inseparably connected with the struggle for principle.

—Jen-min Jih-pao *and* Hung Ch'i, *February 4, 1964.*

MOSCOW

To announce to the world that there has arisen within the international Communist movement a situation similar to that which existed on the eve of the split in the Second International, or similar to the position in the German Social Democratic Party in December 1914 when its leadership took a chauvinist stand, is tantamount, in effect, to telling the international Communist movement that it has landed in the quagmire of opportunism, social-democratic revisionism, and that only one party adheres to correct Marxist-Leninist positions. . . .

There need be no doubt that the Communist parties will reject this presumptuous claim of some to take the place of Lenin and proclaim themselves the sole guardians of the "truth." That pretentious claim is not only fundamentally wrong. It is absolutely unwarranted, for it should be perfectly clear that this attempt to draw an analogy with Lenin's struggle against opportunism in the Second International and thereby justify all manner of divisive activity is totally at odds with the facts of history and the real position within the international Communist movement, which is undeviatingly following the revolutionary, Leninist path. Furthermore, this claim is evidence of inordinate haughtiness, of total lack of respect for the overwhelming majority of fraternal parties, which have [rendered immense services to the international proletariat and have] a rich revolutionary experience.

—Pravda, *January 7, 1963.*

Lenin fostered in the Bolshevik Party (and taught Communists of all countries) the ability to change the direction of the chief blow at the proper time, turning it against that deviation from revolutionary theory and practice which at the given moment represents the greatest danger to the workers' movement.

Lenin in his time called left doctrinairism an "infantile disorder" only because it was then the result of the youth and inexperience of the Communist movement. But Lenin never had any doubts that dogmatism and sectarianism could do enormous harm to the cause of communism.

—Kommunist, *No. 15, October 1963.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Stalin Revolution

The more exact analogue of Chinese Communist thinking is to be found in the policy and propaganda undertaken by Stalin in 1928. For reasons which probably were mainly political, Stalin broke with the Bukharin group at that time and initiated the program of violent collectivization which the Bukharinists were bound to oppose. They honestly thought it would mean disaster, as well as an unacceptable abandonment of the aims of the revolution. "Military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry," is what Bukharin and Rykov called Stalin's collectivization program when it took shape in 1929. This reaction, interestingly, differs only in degree from the view that the Soviet leaders took of the Chinese communes of 1958.

The "Stalin revolution" from 1928 to the mid-1930's meant a profound change in the Communist system in a number of respects. It was a fundamental readjustment from the goal of working-class socialism in an industrialized country, to the pursuit of bureaucratic socialism in a developing country. Secondly, by eliminating all dissent within the party and imposing strict party control on all non-political aspects of life, the Stalin revolution perfected totalitarianism in the USSR. (China and Russia are both still profoundly totalitarian in this respect.) Thirdly, the Stalin revolution represented a shift from Leninist pragmatism to a compulsively self-justifying fanaticism, culminating in the Great Purge. China has exhibited a markedly similar fanaticism since 1958, while Russia under Khrushchev has returned to the more pragmatic dictatorship of Lenin and Bukharin. Bukharin still gets no credit, though his rehabilitation at the present time would be logical. It is noteworthy that the two Communist countries which have shown the most dislike of Chinese Communist policies—Yugoslavia and Poland—are the two with distinctively Bukharin-type economies relying much more than the Soviet Union on market mechanisms and individual peasant initiative.

Stalin's victory in the late 1920's was the victory of the truly monolithic, military-style party organization that he had built up from his position as General Secretary of the party. The actual disgrace of the Trotskyists in 1927 and of the Bukharinists in 1929 was anti-climactic, following the quiet consolidation of power by Stalin, and in the case of the Bukharinists, the almost entirely secret, behind-the-scenes defeat of the opposition in 1928. Here is another point of reference to the Sino-Soviet controversy, *i.e.*, the tendency of the Communist movement to keep its power struggles veiled under the cloak of ideological identity until dissension has reached the point where one or both sides are ready to make an open break on the theoretical plane.

The outcome in Stalin's case was total victory for his personal cause. The result was to cast the whole of Soviet society and the international Communist movement in the same monolithic mold. The Great Purge destroyed the possibility of future opposition in Russia—of actual opposition there was already none—and even the memory of opposition was expunged or defaced in the subsequent propaganda of latter-day Stalinism.

The World Movement Unharnessed

Stalin paralleled his consolidation of dictatorial power in Russia with the elimination of all independent-minded elements from the Comintern. His tactic was to intervene in the factional disputes within the various Communist parties—most notably in Germany—and by political and financial favor to give the nod to the more subservient candidates for the local leadership. He worked with Zinoviev to oust the moderate-leaning German Communist leadership in 1923 and 1924 and install the compliant Center; then ousted the Bukharinists as a "right deviation" in 1928. By 1927 the entire Comintern was shaken by the Stalin-Trotsky controversy, and the pro-Trotsky factions began to quit or suffer expulsion from the movement. This softened up the Communist parties for an equally sweeping purge of the pro-Bukharin groups in 1928 and 1929, after the Sixth Comintern and the adoption of the radical "Third Period" line. After 1930 there was scarcely a single Communist party where most of the original native leaders had not been ousted under Soviet pressure.

Thanks partly to the stimulating presence of their leader in exile, the supporters of Trotsky outside the USSR fought back by organizing their own movement. Trotskyist parties were formed with programs of uncompromising revolutionary internationalism that condemned Stalinism as a bureaucratic betrayal of the workers' cause. In 1934 the formation of the "Fourth International" was proclaimed by the Trotskyists, and the movement still survives under this banner as a splinter tendency in many countries.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The crucial weakness that has prevented Trotskyism from achieving the impact that Titoism has had since 1948 is the fact that no government has ever been controlled by the forces of the Fourth International. It is in this respect that the Chinese-led radical tendency in the Communist movement today differs decisively from the Trotskyist movement. On the other hand, judging from the Trotskyist experience, there is every reason to expect that the Chinese leadership can, if they want, create a new international of formidable proportions by promoting splits in the Communist parties around the world and organizing the pro-Peking factions into a monolithic revolutionary movement of their own. This would be no more than the Russians did in the Socialist International in 1919.

The perfection of the Stalinist monolith inside the USSR during the purges of the 1930's did not suffice to uproot the potential for further dissension in the international Communist movement. When the results of World War II brought the movement opportunities for power or enhanced strength in countries outside the USSR, deviations of both the romantic and pragmatic type appeared. In the closing months of the war it was once again the insurrectionary romantics—guerrilla fighters in South-East Europe and the underground resistance movements in the West—who gave Moscow the most difficulty with their premature urge to strike for power in disregard of the appearances of inter-Allied unity, which Stalin still seemed to prize. On the other hand, with the Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe and the telescoped Stalinization which Moscow undertook to impose on the satellite governments, the local opposition took the direction of right-wing caution and pragmatism exemplified by Wladislaw Gomulka.

Both kinds of Communist dissent, whether impelled by theoretical purism or local opportunism, unavoidably raised the issue of "national Communist" autonomy versus absolute subservience to Moscow. Tito's defiance of the Kremlin was the only successful act of its kind in Stalin's time, partly for reasons of Yugoslavia's geography and war-time history, partly because Tito was the first to have tried it openly. Independence of the national power center has been the consistent denominator of Yugoslav policy through a striking shift of doctrinal stance from the ultra-Stalinist fanaticism of 1945-48 through the Djilas idealism of 1949-50 (which created the workers' councils) and the pragmatic market socialism of today. Tito's would-be emulators in East Europe came from either end of the doctrinal spectrum, but whether it was the doctrinaire fanaticism of a Laszlo Rajk or the gradualism of a Gomulka, the result was national resistance to Soviet influence, which Stalin was determined to smash by any means at his disposal.

Similar developments could be observed within the major Communist parties in the West, where each Moscow policy move has enlisted the inflexible loyalty of a particular Communist faction. In many cases, purges—such as the ouster of Earl Browder from the CPUSA for his softness on capitalism in 1945—became a necessary means to accomplish tactical shifts. A notable instance on the other—romantic—side was the 1952 ouster of André Marty and Charles Tillon from the French Communist leadership because they could not shift from the internationalist revolutionary line to that of a nationalist appeal against American influence. In such a situation a most ardent internationalist in the movement can find himself forced into the position of a national resistant against Moscow.[3]

The case of the deepest national resistance to Moscow—sometimes with a pragmatic inspiration and sometimes a Utopian one—is that of Chinese communism. Ever since 1930 China has been a notable exception to the rule of Soviet dictation in the selection of native Communist leaders. To be sure, Chen Tu-hsiu, founder and leader of the Chinese Communist Party from 1921 to 1928, was blamed for the Comintern's 1927 debacle in China, and expelled from the movement on charges of Trotskyism. Moscow did not, however, succeed in imposing its own candidates for the succession, all of whom had met with failures because of the Comintern's ultra-proletarian line in China at that time.

Instead, as the world well knows, success went to Mao Tse-tung with his totally unorthodox strategy of working through the peasants to win power by guerrilla warfare. The crucial point of the story is that while Mao was for the time being ardently loyal to the Moscow line ideologically, he was independent organizationally. This independence must be attributed in the last analysis to the territorial political base which Mao established in Shensi province in the mid-1930's, a base the like of which no other Communist party

[3] See Marshall Shulman, *Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 233-237.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

had enjoyed until World War II brought some of them the opportunity to emulate the Chinese strategy of guerrilla warfare.

If the Chinese party was never part of the Stalinist monolith, the other Communist movements that succeeded through guerrilla warfare all sooner or later proved to be thorns in the Soviet side. In Europe this has been the case with both the Yugoslav and Albanian parties, the one breaking with Stalin to maintain its national integrity a scant three years after the war ended, and the other managing an incredible record of defiance with Chinese encouragement as the Communist bloc entered the 1960's. In sum, the record of unity among Communist governments is highly negative wherever the country concerned has not been directly occupied or threatened by the Soviet Army.

Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 is actually the closest analogue to the Sino-Soviet schism. Apart from the relative weakness of Yugoslavia and its dependence on outside (*i.e.,* Western) support, Tito's break paralleled Mao's in that it arose, under conditions of ideological unity, as a result of unsolved questions concerning the power relationships between Communist governments. Both Tito and Mao took a stand when their independence or stature within the movement seemed threatened, and then began to conjure up ideological reasons to justify resistance to Moscow. It was perhaps only an accident of time and place that Yugoslavia, in defying Stalin, turned ideologically toward the pragmatic, lower-pressure communism of Lenin and (without credit) Bukharin, while Mao saw his best political opportunity in rejecting the decompression of Khrushchev and reaffirming the uncompromising stance of Stalinism.

The history of modern communism does not show any durable ideological bond between Communist power centers, but rather a natural tendency to split over ideological interpretations wherever the existence of separate factions or independent Communist governments permits this. Inherent in the movement are two types of deviation —the romantic or fanatic ("dogmatist" or "sectarian") rejecting compromise or delay, and the cautious or practical ("revisionist" or "opportunist") that opposes great risks or unnecessary antagonizing of a target nation. Secondly, it now seems a well-established rule that separate national power bases in the Communist world, such as were created in the guerrilla campaigns of World War II, establish a ready potential for deviation in either the romantic or the pragmatic direction. Thirdly, in the disputes between Communist states theory figures not as a unifying or inhibiting force but as a major weapon of controversy. Contemporary events are making it clear that a dogmatic movement such as communism, when it spreads to encompass more than one independent country, is likely to have far more trouble maintaining a semblance of unity and cooperation than an old-fashioned alliance of non-dogmatic powers based on common interest.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Marxisms... How Many?

By Lewis S. Feuer

Mr. Feuer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of California (Berkeley). Editor of Marx & Engels—Basic Writing on Politics & Philosophy *(Anchor Books, N. Y., 1959), he also wrote* Psychoanalysis and Ethics *(Springfield, Ill., C. C. Thomas, 1955), and* Spinoza and the Rise of Liberalism *(Boston, Beacon Press, 1958).*

The rift between the Soviet Union and Communist China will, in the nature of things, have a tremendous influence on the evolution of Marxist ideology. The duocentric political development brings in its wake a duality in ideology. What is taking place in the history of ideology reminds one of what took place in the history of Christianity 1500 years ago when the first religious schism ensued between barbarians and Romans. Most of the invading barbarian peoples chose to become Arians rather than Catholics; the Romans, on the other hand, were Catholics. For many years the two sectors of Christians hated each other more than they hated the heathens.

The Sino-Soviet conflict is similar in its portent. It is not, of course, the first in Communist history: the rupture in 1948 between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had crucial political effects within the Communist domain. On the theoretical level, however, the Yugoslavs' innovations had no profound effect on Marxist ideology: their most significant theoretical revision—Tito's trenchant criticism of the maxim that "the end justifies the means"— merely repeated what Eduard Bernstein had said 50 years before when he called on Marxists to go "back to Kant," and to reject the amoralism which was a corollary of scientific socialism.[1]

Chinese Marxism, on the other hand, has produced a deep-seated fissure in the whole character of Marxism as a theory of world-historical change.

Chinese Marxism, or Maoist Marxism, represents in the first place the development of a neo-Populist Marxism, one oriented primarily not to the world's proletariat but to its peasantry. The peasantry, the exploited majority of mankind, living in so-called backward countries, becomes history's chosen class—the class with a historical mission. A curious reverse movement has thus taken place in the history of Marxism. For Russian Marxism as a distinctive movement first emerged at the end of the 19th century with a polemic against the Populist view that the Russian peasantry could make a socialist revolution directly. Lenin was the youthful spokesman for those Russian intellectuals who were turning to the proletariat for the massive leverage for socialist revolution. Between the youthful Lenin, however, and the Lenin who confronted the world after the October Revolution, there intervened a profound psychological change. Lenin the Westernizer and Europeanizer gave way to Lenin the Asianizer.

Maoist Marxism is the culmination of a process which began with the post-October Lenin—the Asianization of Marxism. Asianized Marxism involved five elements: the acceptance of Asia rather than Western Europe as the decisive theater in the struggle for socialism, the rejection of the notion that Asian feudal or semi-feudal countries would have to go through a capitalistic stage, an increased

[1] *Yugoslavia: Progress of the 5-Year Plan, Addresses by Marshal Tito, et al.,* published by the Embassy of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia, Washington, D. C., 1949, p. 46.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

contempt for the values of Western democratic civilization, the abrogation of the economic dialectic as the law of historical change, and finally the aforementioned elevation of the peasantry as the mission-endowed revolutionary class. Maoist Marxism is thus not concerned with Marx the economic theorist; it is indifferent to arguments about Marx's law of the declining rate of profit; it would be determined to overthrow capitalism in any form, stable or not.

Before World War I, the word "Asiatic" had been used by Lenin as a term of abuse. "An Asiatic government," he wrote, was one which "uses military force to crush every desire for freedom." [2] He condemned the Russian government as "an absolutism impregnated with Asian barbarity." [3] Not unlike China, said Lenin, "in very many and very essential respects Russia is undoubtedly an Asian country and, what is more, one of the wildest, most medieval and shamefully backward of Asian countries." [4]

The breakdown of European social democracy in the World War, however, literally caused a kind of revulsion in Lenin's psyche. He turned from the decadent European world to redemption from the East. He broke with classical Marxism most decisively by saying that the Soviet form of society was applicable to every technological stage: "The idea of Soviet organization is a simple one, and is applicable not only to proletarian, but also to peasant feudal and semi-feudal relations." [5] The Soviet superstructure, Lenin held, could be erected on a pre-industrial foundation.

Lenin also came to believe that a war of nations and not an inner economic decline would be the agency for the transition from capitalism and feudalism to international Sovietism. "In the last analysis, "he wrote in 1923, "the outcome of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe." There would be "a military conflict between the counter-revolutionary and nationalist East, between the most civilized countries of the world and the orientally backward countries, which, however, account for the majority. . . ." [6]

The Western social world was decadent in Lenin's eyes, because it lacked the regenerative resources to produce from within itself a socialist society. Spengler prophesying the decline of the West, which had once "looked upon itself as the center of the universe", was the apt symbol for Lenin's anti-European mood. He was possessed by an apocalyptic vision of a neo-barbarian invasion of the Western world, a just retribution for its imperialist sins. One can perhaps understand today why the eminent Russian historian of Greco-Roman civilization, Michael Rostovtsev, felt—in witnessing the Bolshevik Revolution—as if Europe were fated to undergo a new barbarian prelude to more Dark Ages. [7]

With Maoist Marxism the revolution of the "orientally backward" has found its own ideology. Maoist Marxism will obviously not have the attraction for Westerners which both classical and Soviet Marxism had. The latter exerted its influence on Western intellectuals and workingmen during the period of the great depression when the capitalist economy seemed to be on the verge of foundering, and thereby confirming Marx's hypothesis. This was the era in which the Fabian Webbs extolled Soviet communism, and Bernard Shaw looked to Stalin's leadership, and John Strachey's *The Coming Struggle for Power* and *The Nature of Capitalist Crisis* sold widely in the United States. But that era is gone, and the Soviet economy, despite spectacular satellites, cannot surely reckon as it once did on the superiority of the totally planned economy.

Thus the revolutionary élan tends to pass to Maoist Marxism. The Chinese Marxists have no compunctions in their revolt against the West. Their writings almost never mention the European working class; they are directed explicitly to the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Their attraction is felt, for instance, by such a group as the newly organized Communist Party of Brazil which declares that Chinese Communist doctrines "completely correspond to the actual conditions of our country." [8] Soviet Marxists now often

[2] "The Chinese War" (1900), reprinted in V. I. Lenin, *The National Liberation Movement in the East*, tr. M. Levin, Moscow, 1957, p. 8.

[3] "Speech at the Funeral of Paul and Laura Lafargue" (1911), reprinted in *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[4] "Democracy and Narodism in China" (1912), *op. cit.*, p. 42.

[5] "Report of the Commission on the National and Colonial Questions to the Second Congress of the Communist International" (1920), *op. cit.*, p. 267.

[6] "Better Fewer, But Better" (1923), *op. cit.*, p. 315.

[7] M. I. Rostovtsev, *Proletarian Culture*, London, 1919, p. 9.

[8] "Reply to Khrushchev: Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Brazil," *Peking Review*, Sept. 13, 1963, pp. 39-43.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

slip into the technocratic experimental vocabulary; they are prepared, they say, to see a crucial long-term social experiment which will test the competitive efficiencies of the rival capitalist and communist systems. The Maoists sense that only a government which has partially forsaken the ideology of class struggle will use the scientifically neutral vocabulary of an experimental sociological test. Neo-Populist Marxism wants no experimental confrontation of social systems; it wants to destroy capitalism as a creature of evil which it blames for the distortions and inferiorities of its social character and backward economy. The Neo-Populists are therefore aghast at rapprochement of any sort between the United States and the Soviet Union. According to the Chinese, the Soviet Marxists now lack the basis for empathizing with colonial sufferers.[9] The Brazilian Maoists say: "The broad masses of our continent see that what Khrushchev has said is lies."[10]

The Communist parties of the poorest lands feed on the kind of desperation which comes with deep frustrations; to the lowliest of their followers, who live in the daily anger of the present, discourses on preserving the peace and relying on long-term social change have always sounded hollow. Their hatred is not eased by appeals to maintain a peace which for them means prolonged deprivation. They wish to vent their accumulated aggressive energies in struggle and violence, and they long for the savor of cambat against someone whom they can define as the agent of their misery: The peoples of Latin America cannot afford to wait for their liberation by 'peaceful competition.' "[11] There is a "primitive accumulation" of aggression in the poorest peasant countries for which Maoist Marxism provides ready expression.

The Chinese Communists speak too of their revolt against the "patriarchalism" of the Soviet party. They say to the Soviets: "It is a very, very bad habit of yours thus to put on the acts of a patriarchal party. It is entirely illegitimate." The Chinese are the poor peasant sons in revolt against the smug industrial father: "the relations among fraternal parties should under no circumstances be like the relations between a leading party and the led, and much less like the relations between a patriarchal father and his son. . . ."[12] The metaphor of the revolt against the "patriarchal father" shows something of the deep-seated emotions which are involved in Maoist Marxism's rebellion against the West. The Soviet Communists tell the Chinese condescendingly that the latter are lucky in having the parental protection of the Soviet atomic parasol. They admonish Communist China, peasant and backward, to content itself in its own best interest with the status of a second class power. They tell Communist China that it is not mature enough to make its independent foreign policy but should remain under the tutelage of the industrial and advanced Soviet Union.[13] Colonial countries have always resented the language of condescending familiarity which imperialists have used to "native boys". The Chinese Communists are quick to recognize it when the Soviets begin to speak that way in the Marxist idiom. Maoist Marxism regards the Soviet society as a socialist labor aristocracy which has been corrupted, as the Western workers once were, by a higher standard of living, preventing its unity with the world's lowest class.

Stalin is still in the sacred Marxist pantheon for the Chinese leaders primarily because he is identified with intransigence toward the West. Mao does not idealize Stalin as an infallible leader. Nor, indeed, does he share Khrushchev's guilt-feelings about participation in Stalin's crimes.[14] What binds Mao to Stalin is that Stalin, unlike Khrushchev, was prepared to defy the West even at what was viewed by some as the risk of nuclear war. Stalin was ready to provoke a crisis in Berlin in 1948 at a time when the Western Allies had the monopoly of atomic weapons. Communist China was prepared to do the same when it intervened in the Korean War despite its lack of atom bombs. It was in a talk with Anna Louise Strong, an American Marxist friend of old standing, that Mao Tse-tung first said: "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't."[15] When the Maoists now repeat that "imperialism and all reactionaries are paper tigers," they mean that the

[9] "More on Nehru's Philosophy in the Light of the Sino-Indian Boundary Question," Editorial Department of *Jen-min Jih-pao* (People's Daily), in a Special Supplement of *China Reconstructs* (Peking), December 1962, p. 31.

[10] See footnote 8.

[11] *Ibid.*

[12] "The Origin and Development of the Differences between the Leadership of the CPSU and Ourselves," *Peking Review*, Sept. 13, 1963.

[13] Observer, "China and the Bomb," *New Times* (Moscow), Sept. 4, 1963, pp. 2-3.

[14] *On the Question of Stalin—Comment on the Open Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU (11)*, translated editorials from *Jen-min Jih-Pao* (People's Daily) and *Hung Ch'i* (Red Flag), Sept. 13, 1963; issued as an unattributed pamphlet, Peking, 1963, pp. 11-12.

[15] Cited in *The Differences between Comrade Togliatti and Us*, translated editorial from *Jen-min Jih-pao*, Dec. 31, 1962; Peking pamphlet, 1963, p. 21.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON FATHERS, MOTHERS, BROTHERS AND OTHER FAMILY MATTERS

What Peking Is Saying:

Contrary to the principles guiding relations among fraternal parties . . . the leaders of the CPSU ignore the independent and equal status of fraternal parties, insist on establishing a kind of feudal patriarchial domination over the international Communist movement, and turn the relations between brother parties into those between a patriarchal father and his sons. Khrushchev has more than once described a fraternal party as a "silly boy" and called *himself its mother* (note 2). With his feudal psychology of self-exaltation, he has absolutely no sense of shame [Italics added—Ed.]
Note 2: Cf. Khrushchev's interview with Gardner Cowles, editor of the US magazine *LOOK*, April 20, 1962; report by Khrushchev to the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, December 12, 1962.

—From "The Leaders of the CPSU Are the Greatest Splitters of Our Times," Peoples Daily (Peking), Feb. 4, 1964.

What Khrushchev had said:

1. In his interview with Cowles.

It may happen, of course, that someone [i.e., one of the countries building socialism] adopts a wrong decision and then stubbornly refuses to change it. Well, even in such case it can be said that people learn from experience.

In life we see that when a child's powers of cognition begin to develop, he has to experience many things for himself. Even though a mother tells her child that one thing is hot and another cold, he won't really understand the words until he himself touches things with his finger and comes to know from experience what is hot and what is cold.

(Pravda, April 27, 1962)

2. In his speech to the Supreme Soviet.

. . . I spent my childhood and youth in the coal fields . . . I remember that in the miners' towns foulmouths used to do this: They would find a little boy who had barely learned to repeat words and did not understand their meaning; they would teach him the dirtiest oaths and would tell him: "Go under the windows of people's homes and say these words to the people." Or, worse, they would say to such a child: "Go to your mother and repeat these words to her. Here is three kopeks for this, and afterwards we shall give you five more."

The child would run under the windows of houses or run around his mother, repeating the oaths; this would provide a form of entertainment for the foulmouths.

Now the Albanian leaders are acting like those silly boys. Someone taught them to pronounce foul words, and they walk under windows and shout hooligan curses at the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But this is their mother! For their swearing they get the promised three kopeks. And when they begin to swear more violently and colorfully, they get another five kopeks and are praised.

(Pravda, December 13, 1962)

United States has shown itself too much bound by its ethical conscience to use nuclear weapons against an enemy; therefore, a highly aggressive policy can be followed with impunity, and the hesitancies and timidities of the Soviet Union are unwarranted.[16] The Chinese defense of Stalin is not based on any ideological need arising from the stage of its internal economic development, for if anything, what has been called the Chinese NEP (New Economic Policy) would be compatible with a greater degree of liberalism.

There can be little doubt the Chinese Communists are right in saying that the Soviet Communists are revising basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism. They are right in saying that Khrushchev has gone far toward giving up the Marxian theory of the state. When Khrushchev said in 1961: "In our country, for the first time in history, a state has taken shape which is not a dictatorship of any one class, but an instrument of society as a whole, of the entire people,"[17] he was indeed violating a basic principle of Marxian political gram-

[16] *Leninism and Modern Revisionism*, translated editorial from *Hong ch'i*, No. 1, 1963; Peking pamphlet, 1963, p. 12.

[17] N. Khrushchev, *On the Communist Program*, (report on the program of the CPSU to the 22nd Party Congress, Oct. 18, 1961), Moscow, 1961, p. 80.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mar, for as the Chinese insist, there cannot be, in Marxist terms, a supraclass political party, dictatorship, or state. When Soviet writers speak of possible peaceful transitions in democratic countries from capitalism to socialism, the Chinese are right in saying that they are revising Leninism, for Lenin did say: "The replacement of the bourgeois by the proletarian state is impossible without a violent revolution."[18] Maoist Marxism can justly pride itself on its Ideological Puritanism. Peasant creeds, born in frustration and resentment, have always veered to the Fundamentalist wing.

Can an international Communist movement exist without a "patriarchal party"? Does not a movement built on Marxist ideology require a dogmatic unique center of authority and infallible exegesis? Who will decide the authoritative canons? Who will define the character of the historical period? For the Communist Party throughout the world is unique in trying to be for its members what sociologists call a "primary group"; it displaces the family as the locus of central psychological ties; it provides comrades instead of brothers, and the Party Leader as the surrogate-father. Khrushchev's speech at the 20th Party Congress therefore had a tremendous psychological impact. He had carried out the first parricide in the history of Marxism, and he had indeed shown that when Stalin slew his comrades, it was Cain again destroying Abel. And Maoist Marxism, for all its attacks on Soviet "patriarchalism," longs especially to preserve a patriarchal party. It is still psychologically in a stage where it wishes to preserve intact the Chinese Communist Party as a primary group; it is still in the throes of a family revolution whose chief agency is the party as a substitute-family.

In the Soviet Union, on the other hand, the family has gradually been reasserting its institutional importance, and the party is less the surrogate primary group than it used to be. Thus Khrushchev is in a dilemma; how to re-establish authority when its psychological base has been weakened. And Maoist Marxism has undermined Soviet authority all the more by accusing Khrushchev of parricide. Mao must now inevitably present the Chinese Party as the One Loyal Son, and in the world of the peasant, colored races must try to reconstitute a new Communist Clan.

We are entering an era of differentiation and fission in which many Marxisms will arise as socio-economic, psychological, and racial differences impress themselves on the doctrine. In addition to the duocentric evolution of a peasant as well as an individual variety of Marxism, this period will see a proliferation of what we may call "syncreto-Marxisms," that is, combinations of Marxism with national, tribal, and racial ideological ingredients. Even the Indonesian Communists, who form the biggest non-ruling Communist Party, talk of a national form of Marxism-Leninism. They are neo-Populists in their insistence, despite ritualistic phrases about the proletariat, that the most fundamental problem is the peasant problem, but they add: "the Indonesian Communist Party must be able to combine the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism with the concrete practice of the Indonesian revolution, and it must 'Indonesianize' Marxism-Leninism."[19] Syncreto-Marxism is a trend which, while influenced by Maoism, and perhaps absorbable by it, is still at the present time distinct from it.

Varieties of "syncreto-Marxisms" have begun to proliferate. For the essence of a "syncreto-Marxism" is that it follows the traditional Asian pattern of assimilating yet another god into the local pantheon. The syncreto-Marxist does not claim, as does the Maoist, to be an orthodox Marxist-Leninist. Rather he borrows eclectically from Marxism such doctrinal points as its analysis of imperialism, which he finds suitable for practical political purposes. The syncreto-Marxist is neither revisionist nor orthodox, for his point of departure in political thinking is no self-conscious definition of himself as a Marxist; some other allegiance, whether nationalist, tribalist, or religious, is primary, and within its ideology he has incorporated Marxist elements. A syncreto-Marxism therefore generally relies on the national religion for its underlying ethic and world-view; it can be Buddhist, Islamic, or animist. Maoist Marxism, on the contrary, retains in principle an uncompromising opposition to religion as the continuing opiate of the people. Among current varieties of syncreto-Marxism, one finds the amalgam of Marxism, Islam, and nationalism that make up Sukarno's "Indonesian socialism"; the Burmese socialism of U Nu and U

[18] V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution*, New York, 1932, p. 20.

[19] D. N. Aidit, "Some Questions of the Indonesian Revolution and the Communist Party of Indonesia," *Peking Review*, Sept. 13, 1963, p. 37; "The Indonesian Revolution and the Immediate Tasks of the Communist Party of Indonesia," *ibid.*, p. 30.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ba Swe, which in its first stage tried to synthesize Marxism with Buddhism; the revisionist socialists of India, who combine a Marxist historical analysis with a Vedantist ethic; the "Khmer socialism" of Cambodia, which conjoins Marxist ingredients to a Buddhist base; and the African Marxism of Kwame Nkrumah which makes an amalgam of the dialectic with tribal ritualism.[20] The sort of unique syncreto-Marxism that results is illustrated by the case of Burma, where astrologers were consulted in the decision to make January 4, 1948, the day of independence, and likewise determined that Premiers U Nu of Burma and Chou En-lai of Communist China should sign their treaty of October 1, 1960, "at the astrologically propitious hour of 5:50 P.M."[21]

The syncreto-Marxisms are unstable amalgams. They will probably tend to break up into one of three ideological compounds: first, they can evolve, under optimal conditions, in the direction of an ethical democratic revisionist Marxism, adapted to peasant countries, of the sort propounded for instance by Asoka Mehta in India;[22] second, they may shed their Marxism as they revert to traditional modes of dictatorship; or third, they may crumble in the face of a revolutionary rejection of traditional culture, religious masochism and political practice, opening the door to Maoist Marxism. If the unstable syncreto-Marxisms of today come to grief, they may indeed generate an immanent pressure towards Maoist Marxism. The next generation of syncreto-Marxist student leaders, revolting against a past generation of syncreto-Marxist student leaders, may well find in the Maoist Marxist identification an expression of their revolutionism.

The peasant-industrial contrast is not the exclusive causal factor in the rift between Maoist and Soviet Marxism. For the first time in the history of the international Marxist movement, a major division has taken place in which racial differences are paramount.

[20] See George Gomori, "New Asian Approaches to the Theory of Socialism," *The Review: A Quarterly of Pluralist Socialism* (Brussels), Nov. 4, 1962, pp. 55-66; Francis Carnell, "Political Ideas and Ideologies in South and Southeast Asia," *Politics in Southern Asia*, ed. Saul Rose, London, 1963, p. 293; Philippe Devillers, "Dynamics of Power in Cambodia," *ibid.*, pp. 160-61; Richard Butwell, *U Nu of Burma*, Stanford, 1963, pp. 26-28, 50-51, 97-98; Richard Wright, *Black Power*, New York, 1954, pp. 59, 228; George Delf, *Jomo Kenyatta*, New York, 1961, pp. 92-98.

[21] Richard Butwell, *op. cit.*, pp. 94, 234.

[22] Asoka Mehta, *Studies in Asian Socialism*, Bombay, 1959.

ON MARXISM(S) AND NATIONALISM(S)

Is the idea of two Communist parties functioning side by side tenable from the standpoint of revolutionary theory? Can a true Marxist-Leninist *work for or tactitly condone the forming of parallel Communist groups and parties?*

The answer, as Marxist-Leninist theory and the experience of more than 100 years of working-class struggle show, is an unequivocal no. Marxism-Leninism is a universal and integral teaching, and for this reason there cannot be two or several kinds of Marxism either on the international or the national plane. . . .

. . . . the events of recent years have shown that the various deviations, all the superficial differences notwithstanding, are all essentially manifestations of a nationalism which has sprung up either as a reaction to the national oppression in the capitalist world or as an alternative to the practices which encroached on the independence of the parties during the period of the personality cult.

Ignoring the common interest, the nationalists aim at using to their own advantage the objective need to strengthen the independence of the parties and impelling the parties to overstep the demarcation line . . . between vitally necessary independence and isolation from the Communist movement. For the sake of these aims they want to break up the movement into national compartments.

—From "Unity Is the Guarantee of Success," by Vaclav Slavik (member of the CC of the Czechoslovak CP), Norman Freed (Canadian CP), and Mourad Kouwatli (identified as a "Syrian publicist"), World Marxist Review, January 1964, pp. 6-7.

Race has been a troubling factor to the theory of historical materialism. Karl Marx himself was inclined to consider race an independent causal factor in history; in *Capital*, he wrote of race as a limiting factor in the productivity of labor distinct from society's economic form.[23] He inclined with enthusiasm to the anthropological theories of P. Trémaux which today would be regarded as having racist overtones. Trémaux had advanced the hypothesis that differences in the earth's soil had led to corresponding racial divergences, "that the common Negro type was a degeneration from a quite higher one" (in Marx's words), and that

[23] Karl Marx, *Capital*, Modern Library Edition, p. 562.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the differences in aptitude and type between the Slavic and Lithuanian races were correlated with geographical distribution. Marx asserted that Trémaux's theory was an important advance over Darwin—"In the historical and political application more important and richer than Darwin. For certain questions, as nationality, etc., here alone is the natural foundation found." Curiously the very letter of August 1866 in which Marx writes with such approval of racial divergences and their historical significance was also the one in which he announced to Engels the betrothal of his daughter Laura to the part-Negro Paul Lafargue.[24] His economic anthropology of race was not a racist ideology.

A kind of racialism at times appeared in the debates in the Second International over such questions as imperialism and immigration. They never had the crucial import of what has taken place in the Sino-Soviet rift. The Soviet Communist Party now for the first time has suggested that the Chinese have sundered the appeal to the international working class with a divisive racialism:

The militant call "Workers of all countries, unite!" formulated by Marx and Engels means that at the basis of this unity was anti-imperialist class solidarity, and not any principle of nationality, color or geographical location. The uniting of the masses in the struggle against imperialism solely on the basis of their belonging to a particular continent—whether Africa, Asia, Latin America or Europe—can be detrimental to the fighting peoples.[25]

Hitherto, the charge of racialism has been reserved for European social democracy. Now one has the incipient counter-racialism in the Marxist ideology of the colored peoples.

The continental division of Marxism does correspond largely to a racial division—Asia with its Mongoloid race, Africa with the black, and Latin America with its basic substratum of American Indian. The racial tie can be stronger than the economic factor in determining allegiance to Maoist Marxism. For instance, since Japan is a relatively industrialized country, one would expect that Soviet Marxism would appeal to its Communist Party far more than Maoist Marxism. Nevertheless, the Japanese Communist Party is emotionally drawn to Maoism; the five years that Sanzo Nosaka, the party's secretary, spent with Mao in Yenan during the guerrilla war from 1940 to 1945 typically outweigh the nine years of indoctrination he received at the Comintern in Moscow from 1931 to 1940.[26]

A racialist overtone is strongly present in the present Chinese Communist effort to convene an African-Asian conference on the pattern of the Bandung Conference of 1955. Richard Wright, the gifted novelist, was a perceptive reporter of the Bandung Conference, and as a Negro, was repeatedly told in the most intimate and confidential way the racial import of that conference: "This is the first international conference of colored peoples in the history of mankind!" An Indonesian novelist explained to Wright why he considered himself colored:

Because I feel inferior. I can't help it. It is hard to be in contact with the white Western world and not feel like that. Our people are backward; there is no doubt of it. The white Western world is ahead of us. . . . So you can't help feeling inferior. And that is why I feel that I'm colored.

A "dark Indonesian official" snubbed a white American newspaperman, but courteously took care of Wright as "one of his kind": "I was a member of the master race!" The Bandung Conference, according to Wright, was imbued with the ideology that the colored races now would "practice racism, a racism that they have been taught too bitterly and too well."[27] It is in this setting of racial animosity that Maoist Marxism feels itself instinctively at home.

The racial cleavage between Soviet and Maoist Marxism is thus real. Each side charges the other with having introduced it. Leninism, according to Stalin, "broke down the wall between whites and blacks, between Europeans and Asiatics, between the 'civilized' and 'uncivilized' slaves of imperialism."[28] But, say the Chinese, the present

[24] *Karl Marx und Friedrich Engels, Historisch-Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, ed. D. Rjazanov, Band 3, Berlin, 1930, pp. 354-56, 360-63. Also cf. V. L. Komarov, "Marx and Engels on Biology," in N. I. Bukharin *et al.*, *Marxism and Modern Thought*, tr. Ralph Fox, New York, 1935, pp. 194-96.

[25] "Letter of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Central Committee of the CCP," *Peking Review*, June 21, 1963, p. 30.

[26] Rodger Swearingen, "Nosaka: Japan's 'Lovable' Communist," *Communist Affairs* (Los Angeles, Calif.), June-August 1963, pp. 21-27.

[27] Richard Wright, *The Color Curtain: A Report on the Bandung Conference*, Cleveland, 1956, pp. 136, 190, 113-15.

[28] Stalin quotation cited in "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," *Peking Review*, Oct. 25, 1963, p. 13. (Original quotation in J. Stalin, *Foundations of Leninism*, 1932, p. 76.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet leaders are trying "to rebuild this wall of racism." The Soviet leaders slander the unity of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Latin America by alleging, say the Chinese, that it is "one of the colored against the white race". The Soviet leaders are "inciting racial hatred among the white people. . . . The leaders of the CPSU have raised a hue and cry about the Yellow Peril and the 'imminent menace of Genghis Khan.' " [29]

This racial division is the most tragic development in the history of Marxism since Lenin broke with the traditions of social democracy. It conjures up irrational hatreds and emotions which it was the aim of the classical Marxist movement to eradicate. It envelops the purely economic cross-purposes of advanced industrial and backward peasant countries with all the sensitive nervous tissues of racial difference. It is of little avail that the Chinese insist, in pedantic fashion, that Genghis Khan was a Mongolian, and not a Chinese, and that the Soviets have made a blunder in history. For the blunder itself has a psychological Freudian significance: to the Russians, the Chinese seem to be saying, all yellow men look alike, and a Mongolian is a Chinese; the Russians have their white man's racial stereotype about the Chinese.

The Sino-Soviet rift represents indeed the culmination of a failure in Marxism dating back to the history of the Second International. The Marxist movement of the pre-World War I era was never able to integrate within it the freedom movements of the colored and colonial peoples. In the debate on colonial policy, Dutch Socialists would argue for a necessary stage of tutelage for backward peoples; Kautsky, unhampered by any practical experience in the field, would call unreservedly for democracy. There was, to be sure, the dramatic occasion when in the midst of the Russo-Japanese War, Plekhanov and Katayama, delegates of the Russian and Japanese socialists respectively, shook hands before the cheering congress of the International. But Asian, African, and Latin American representatives were notably absent from the congresses of the Socialist Internationals; the international socialist bond of workers' brotherhood never knew how to reach out beyond the circle of the advanced countries.

Thus, when an Asian Socialist Conference was finally constituted in 1953, composed primarily of the parties of Japan, Burma, and India (with the Israeli Labor Party, too, securing admission), it rejected, despite a personal appeal by Clement Attlee, any direct tie with European socialism. The Asian Socialists emphasized the unique character of Asian socialism, arising from the predominance of their peasant class. This was the socialism of the "underdeveloped countries," where, moreover, "class antagonism was aggravated by racial animosity," and a revulsion of feeling against metropolitan, exploiting countries. Asian Socialists simply felt that the European Socialist International was not strong enough in its hostility to imperialism. They hoped, too, to pursue a neutralist foreign policy as between the "two rival power blocs" of the United States and the Soviet Union. Their special aim was to correct the "grave economic unbalance between the highly-developed one-third of the world and the underdeveloped two-thirds of it." [30]

Where democratic socialism and Marxism failed to achieve a unity of the laboring people of all races, so likewise has Soviet Marxism failed. Only the failure is more overwhelming in the latter case because Lenin indubitably had perceived the historical rhythm of the colonial liberation movements, and had transformed Marxism into their ideological creed. Now an Asian specter confronts the Soviet technobureaucratic Marxism.

There is still another group to whom Maoist Marxism makes a persuasive emotional appeal; we may call them "the spiritual defectors" from Western civilization. They differ from another group, the "seceders," who have a general animus against industrial society, and tend to withdraw from political involvement; the "seceders" feel no sympathy for any of the contending powers. The "spiritual defectors," however, embrace a motley group ranging from the embittered editors of the New York *Monthly Review*, who have long waited with repressed revolutionary anxiety for the collapse of Western society, to the leaders of the recently unified "Fourth International," a congeries of small, brooding sects, who await a Second Coming of the Revolution and of Leon Trotsky, as once the Fifth Monarchy Men looked to the return of the Messiah.

To understand this group, which poses a problem in sectology (a name we may give to the sociology of sects), and its significance in the evolution of Western Marxism, we can learn from similar phenomena of the past, particularly during the barbarian invasions of 1,500 years ago. There were defectors then, too, from Roman civilization.

[29] "Apologists of Neo-Colonialism," *loc. cit.*

[30] *Three Years of the Asian Socialist Conference*, Bombay, 1956, pp. 2-3. *Yearbook of the International Socialist Labour Movement 1956-1957*, ed. J. Braunthal, London, 1956, p. 78.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

They claimed to find the barbarians nobler in virtue than the civilized Romans. Orosius recorded, for example, that the barbarians, having given up the sword for the plow, "are affectionately treating the rest of the Romans as comrades and friends, so that now among them there may be found some Romans who, living with the barbarians, prefer freedom with poverty to tribute-paying with anxiety among their own people." [31] The Christian priest, Salvian, about 440 A.D., contrasted the high morality of the Vandals with the degeneracy of the Romans, sunk in all manner of vices. He added:

. . . you find men passing over everywhere, now to the Goths, now to the Bagaudae, or whatever other barbarians have established their power anywhere, and they do not repent of their expatriation, for they would rather live as free men, though in seeming captivity, than as captives in seeming liberty.[32]

In every clash of civilizations, defections have been an incident. Christian Greeks observed that they were better ruled and more lightly taxed by their Turkish conquerors than under Christian Byzantium.[33] As late as the 17th century, it was observed that the "main body" of the Barbary Corsairs were not born Moslems but rather "renegades from every part of Christendom." A reporter in 1719 declared that "it often happened that a slave remained a slave by preference, sooner than return to Europe and be beggared. . . ." [34]

The Western adherents of Maoism provide a strange new chapter in the history of Marxism. Maoism is the new ideology of the American anti-Americans. The latter have seen Marxism rejected by the American working class; in anger and resentment, as rebuffed intellectuals, as rebuffed leaders, perhaps like rebuffed lovers, they look to another class, another people, another race, to become the bearers of the historic mission for realizing communism, and they find the new historical elect primarily in the Asian peasantry. The editors of the *Monthly Review* in 1957 wrote apocalyptically of "the still largely uncommitted masses of Asia and Africa acting as judges from whose decision there can be no appeal." [35] The peasant of the backward countries was being transmogrified into history's ultimate judge, the Ultimate Historicist and Super-Ego.

To such mentalities, or more properly, emotionalities, Maoist Marxism is highly congenial. Disaffected with the Western workers, the editors by 1963 were writing: "The workers, in other words, were not revolutionaries at heart, and no amount of exhortation by the Communists could turn them into revolutionaries." Consequently, they said, European Communists were tending to become reformists. "Now along come the Chinese with their overwhelming proof that Khrushchev's ideas and the political line he bases on them are not Leninist at all. . . ." What then should American Marxists do, in the editors' opinion? There are two alternatives: Communists "either have to adopt policies which are acceptable to their own workers or else go into the political wilderness, perhaps for a long time. It can be argued, and we think correctly, that it is better to take the latter course. . . ." [36]

Thus, the Western adherents engage in a kind of retreat from Western civilization into a Marxist hermitage in the "political wilderness" where they identify vicariously with the Asian peasants 10,000 miles away, and wait patiently for the capitalist collapse. The editors of the *Monthly Review* consequently take comfort from the fact that their readership in Asia and Latin America exceeds that in the United States. As Marxism in the United States has declined from the status of a political movement into an ideology of political withdrawal, its practitioners find their formula of retirement into Marxist seclusion precisely in Maoist Marxism. The official Communist Party of the United States, loyal to Soviet Marxism, naturally berates the Maoism which seems so attractive to the remnant of Marxist intellectuals.[37]

With some reservations, the surviving fragments of Trotskyist sects also are drawn to Maoist Marxism. Their standpoint, as elaborated by their leader, Michel Pablo, is that the "epicenter" of the world revolutionary movement is now the peasant class. Their reservations pertain to the con-

[31] *Seven Books of History against the Pagans: The Apology of Paulus Orosius*, tr. Irving Woodworth Raymond, New York, 1936, p. 392.

[32] Salvian, *On the Government of God*, tr. Eva M. Sanford, New York, 1930, pp. 109, 217.

[33] Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Story of Turkey*, New York, 1888, p. 32.

[34] Stanley Lane-Poole, *The Story of the Barbary Corsairs*, New York, 1890, p. 244.

[35] "Review of the Month." *Monthly Review;* (New York), September 1957, p. 132. Also cf. "The Most Bizarre Faction Fight Ever—Stalinists v. Stalinists," *The Newsletter: Weekly Journal of the Socialist Labour League* (London), Nov. 23, 1963, p. 2.

[36] "The Split in the Socialist World," *Monthly Review*, May 1963, pp. 17-18.

[37] Cf. *The Ideological Struggle in the American Left* (reprinted from *Political Affairs*, theoretical organ of the CPUSA, August 1963, pp. 1-18), New York, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tinued involvement of the Chinese Communists with "unreconstructed Stalinists" and to the bureaucratic character of the Peking regime. Together with the Chinese, they look to the Cuban Revolution as opening the way to similar Castroist movements in Latin America. Their estrangement from Western civilization is extreme. In the case of one Trotskyist sect of Latin America, that of J. Posadas in Argentina, it has taken the destructive form of advocating the "right" of the Soviet Union to "initiate" a nuclear war. Another sect of English Trotskyists holding to this doctrine foresees a "cataclysmic reckoning": "The Third World War is the coming reality. . . ." [38] This is the strange logic of finimundialism, the doctrine of the end of the world, or a good part of it; the Latin American sect has a vision of the United States and the Soviet Union destroying each other, and their supersession by the "backward countries." It is precisely this ideology which enrages the USSR with Maoist Marxism. As Moscow stated on August 21, 1963:

Who has given the Chinese leaders the right to vilify the ultimate aim of the international labor movement—labor's victory over capital—by asserting that the road to that aim lies through a world thermonuclear war, and that it is worth while sacrificing half of the world's population to build a better civilization on the corpses and ruins. The conception has absolutely nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism. It is an inhuman conception, and we reject it.

The Soviet statement adds sarcastically that the Chinese Communist Party can now boast of its newfound allies—"the so-called 'Fourth International,' which unites tiny Trotskyite groups. 'Worthy' partners in 'proletarian internationalism!' " [39]

In closing, a word of warning should be sounded against the type of technological interpretation which views Maoist Marxism solely as the ideology of a backward peasant technology, the ideology of the "underdeveloped area." [40] For such an interpretation is quite apt to omit the most significant factor of all—the consciousness of being exploited, the consciousness of an imposed sense of inferiority. The American colonies 300 years ago achieved high standards of democratic politics though their farming technology was "underdeveloped." It is where a pre-industrial technology has been the basis for a contrast effect with a rich imperialist advanced country that resentful inferiority-feelings and a consciousness of exploitation have made the backward technology into such a symbol of inferior estate. "The historical movement of humanity," Alfred Adler once wrote, "is to be regarded as the history of the feeling of inferiority and of its efforts to find a solution of its problems." [41] No historical master-key is all-sufficient, but resentment of inferiority is indeed the mainspring of Maoist Marxism. It is this emotional basis which underlies the present transplantation of Marxism. Botanical history tells of some striking cases where a transplanted species found a more abundant ecological setting in its new invironment. The ecology of ideology for the present tells the same story about Maoist Marxism.

[38] Farrell Dobbs and Joseph Hansen, "Reunification of the Fourth International," *International Socialist Review* (New York), No. 4 (Fall) 1963, p. 132. "Dynamics of World Revolution Today: Text of Resolution Adopted by Reunification Congress of the Fourth International, June 1963," *ibid.*, p. 119.

[39] "Statement of the Soviet Government," *New Times*, Sept. 4, 1963, pp. 42-43.

[40] Such an interpretation is implicit, for instances, in Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, New York, 1960. I have tried to deal with this "industrialization thesis" in my review of his book in *American Sociological Review*, (New York), October 1961, pp. 802-803.

[41] Alfred Adler, *Social Interest: A Challenge to Mankind*, London, 1938, p. 97.

A YUGOSLAV COMMENT

Of course, I do not intend to argue about whose "Marxism" is better or "more correct", the "Yugoslav" or the "Chinese," or any other Marxism. Like every science Marxism is accessible to all, but the extent to which anyone has applied that science in practice is not dependent solely on his desire to be a Marxist. For this reason we do not reproach the Chinese critics for the fact that their Marxism merely serves to conceal their policy—which happens to be just what they reproach us with. But at the same time it is not our view that anybody's policy or any sort of policy can be justified and monopolistically imposed as the "sole Marxist" policy, for a subjective self-justification of that sort, even if sincere, never has more than a relative value.

—From Socialism and War, by Edvard Kardelj, Belgrade, 1960, p. 16.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Soviet Citizen and the Threat from the East

By Victor S. Frank

Mr. Frank, a writer of Russian extraction now living in England, is a frequent contributor to Survey, The Tablet, Forum Service *and other British periodicals. He is currently at work on a biography of Boris Pasternak.*

An historical development as momentous as the emergence of Communist China in the role of Russia's preeminent challenger for the leadership of international communism and as a potential threat to her territorial integrity is bound to bring about a vigorous controversy inside the Soviet Union. Or, so one would assume. But a controversy of that nature presupposes the existence of an articulate public opinion; of a press able to mold varying political philosophies; of parties and coteries each anxious to enlist new supporters; of open debates; of an opposition suggesting alternatives to the government's policies.

All this is, of course, absent in the Soviet society of today, however much it may differ from the state in which it was some ten years ago. No doubt, acrimonious discussions take place behind the closed doors of the meeting room of the Presidium of the CPSU's Central Committee. No doubt, there is a great deal of canteen gossip and shop talk among the thousands of top and medium rank executives; no doubt searching and embarrassing questions are being asked at local party gatherings, and passionate debates go on between students in parks and dormitories.

But these modes of communication do not add up to public opinion, if only because views expressed in them are not and cannot be brought into the open. Their confidential or clandestine character prevents them from spreading beyond their points of origin, from being quoted by third parties, from turning into catalysts. The Soviet public trails far behind informed opinion in the West as to news of their own country. In the last two years Western radio stations broadcasting to the people of the Soviet Union have been receiving letters in which listeners tell them: "We did not believe you when you first began talking about the split between the CPSU and the CCP. Now our own press has admitted it. . . ."

It is as simple as that: *Public opinion does not exist as long as opinion is not public*—a perfect tautology, perhaps, but a useful thumb-rule nevertheless.

Is then an attempt to find out what the people inside the USSR think or feel about the great political issue of the day a forlorn undertaking? I do not think so. Much can be gleaned, provided one sticks to three rules: First, since there is no question of a genuine public opinion, let us be content with private opinion; secondly, let us not generalize: though there is no controversy in public, people's opinions differ from each other in the Soviet Union, as much as they do in any other

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

country, between age groups, nationalities, social strata, political affiliations and so on; thirdly, let us remember that under the circumstances we can hardly expect coherent rational arguments: we must be content with something less tangible—moods, attitudes and instincts.

With these three guiding rules in mind, we can, I think, embark on our attempt. It is important to note at the outset the two basic motivations of Soviet citizens of all types—the craving for an easier life, and the fear of war. All political developments are assessed by the overwhelming majority of Soviet citizens with the help of these two criteria: Does it make life easier or harder? And, does it make war more or less likely? There is nothing specifically "Russian" or "Soviet" about these motivations, except that they are more urgent and exclusive in Russia than either in many Western countries or in countries untouched by the last war. Life in the USSR is still much harder than in the industrialized West, while the memories of war are more enduring and more frightening than in many other parts of the world.

Every other criterion is likely to be subordinated to these two. The desire for personal security, for instance, has been largely satisfied for the majority of people by the reforms of the post-Stalin era. The issue of intellectual and artistic freedom, on the other hand, is an aristocratic concept and is of major interest by and large only to the intellectual *élite*—writers, artists, critics and the like. The mass of Soviet citizens may sympathize with the struggle waged by this minority, but it is not likely to be drawn actively into it.

But while the desire for an easier life and the dread of war form the austere twin foundations of Soviet political consciousness, its superstructure is far more complex and variegated. Other factors come into play at this stage: traditional attitudes such as national pride and xenophobia; more recent conditional reflexes such as fear of "imperialism" and remnants of Communist messianism; and sober patriotic concern. National differences are very important: an Uzbek is unlikely to share all of a Great-Russian's prejudice against the Chinese. So are social gradations: the egalitarian trend of Chinese communism is unlikely to arouse the same revulsion in the heart of an underpaid laborer as it does in the well-padded chest of a privileged member of the elite. Then there are purely political differences: a crypto-Stalinist bidding his time may think wistfully of Chairman Mao's reverential attitude to Stalin's memory, while a man on Mr. Khrushchev's bandwagon may consider the Chinese line an abomination.

With all that, however, it is probably true to say that on the whole the trend of opinion in Soviet society is anti-Chinese. Not that the average citizen is interested in, or impressed by ideological arguments. But he senses that China's line is a harbinger of a harsher climate in international relations, that China is prodding the Soviet Union towards war.

Doubtlessly, the Central Committee's propaganda experts take into account these semi-articulate sentiments when compiling their anti-Chinese documents, and do their very best to fan them. After all, they are concerned not only with impressing other Communist parties and the outside world at large with the CPSU's unblemished record both as a revolutionary force and as a champion of peace. They are equally if not more concerned with persuading their own people that unpopular as many of the policies of the party leadership may be, they are still preferable to the policies advocated and pursued by the Chinese Communists. One can easily imagine the effect on Soviet citizens, for instance, of the following passage appearing in *Pravda:*

"The atomic war is a paper tiger," "it is not terrible at all", [the Chinese Communists] assert. The main thing, they say, is to put an end to imperialism as soon as possible. But as to, How? and, At what cost?—these questions are allegedly of secondary importance. One may be allowed to ask: of secondary importance to whom? To the hundreds of millions of human beings who would be doomed to death if a thermo-nuclear war is unleashed? To the countries which would be obliterated from the face of the earth within the first few hours of such a war? No one, not even a great power, has the right to gamble with the destinies of millions of people. Those who refuse to make efforts to eliminate war from the lives of nations, to prevent the mass extermination of human beings and the destruction of values of human civilization, deserve to be condemned. . . . Some responsible Chinese leaders have also been talking of a possibility of sacrificing hundreds of millions of people in a war. "The victorious nations"—we read in the collection of essays, Long Live Leninism! *sanctioned by the Chinese Central Committee, "will create very quickly, on the ruins of imperialism, a civilization a thousand times superior to the one existing under capitalism, will build their own, truly sublime future." One may be allowed to ask the*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Chinese comrades whether they are aware of what sort of "ruins" a world-wide thermo-nuclear war is likely to leave behind." [1]

It is safe to assume that the main target of this rhetorical passage (which, by the way, disingenuously simplifies and distorts the Chinese argument) is the captive audience at home. "You may dislike us," the CPSU leadership says in effect to its people, "but look at the alternative. . . ." The emphasis on the argument that the Chinese are out for war is bound to have far greater effect on Soviet citizens than even the most telling denunciations of Mao Tse-tung's alleged ideological heresies. And the implied decision of the Soviet Government not to share its H-bomb know-how with the Chinese is bound to be extremely popular at home.

Coupled with the fear of China's irresponsible aggressiveness is the acute discomfort which Soviet citizens are bound to feel as they contemplate the sheer numerical size of their neighbor. "Who would benefit from another war?"—a Russian recently said to a foreign correspondent.[2] "Our new cities and towns would be destroyed, America and Europe would be laid waste. But the Chinese have little to lose in the way of industry, and even if they suffered vast casualties, there would be enough of them left to overrun the world." This feeling is the more disconcerting to the Russians, as, in the last 150 years or so, they have been wont to think of themselves as a people which, despite its backwardness, was sure of at least one area of superiority—the sheer weight of numbers. In the past century they were willing to concede superiority in "brains" to the advanced nations of the West, particularly to the English and the Germans. But deep down in their hearts they preserved the faith that, come what may, in the end the size of the country and the numerical strength of the people would prevail. Russian messianism, rooted in religion and national mythicism as it was, had its quantitative aspect, too.

This instinctive belief received its first crack in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-05, when the enormous mass of Russians was challenged by a small country—and not even a European one at that. The jingoist slogan at the beginning of the war was: *Shapkami zakidaiem!*—We'll bury them under our caps! Yet, within one year, with the Russian navy destroyed, with the land armies defeated, with Port Arthur gone, the *makaki* (monkeys) had triumphed, and the Russian Far Eastern empire had all but crumbled. The World War which followed nine years later mercilessly exposed the fallacy of the *mystique* of numbers on a far larger scale. Not even a nation of Russia's geographical vastness and biological resilience could afford a blood-letting of the size suffered in 1914-18. The lesson was obvious: quantity in itself was not enough; quality was required, too. The response to this challenge was, of course, the ruthless industrialization and collectivization drive initiated in the 1930's. Millions of human lives were sacrificed by Stalin on the altar of "historical necessity." The moral and intellectual fibre of the nation suffered deep and enduring damage. Nevertheless, World War II found the Soviet Union in far better shape to face the onslaught than had the first. But the USSR was still no match for the Germans on the technological and administrative levels and finally achieved victory only at the price of "great blood" (*bolshoy krovyk*) by sacrificing millions of her men and women.

The Soviet Union of 1964 is certainly a country very different from Russia on the eve of the Russo-Japanese war. But old habits of thought die slowly. Even today, despite home-produced H-bombs, sputniks and all the other impressive technological and educational achievements, the feeling of a basic qualitative inferiority vis-a-vis the older industrial countries, lingers on in Russia. So—in spite of the bitter experience of three wars—does the compensatory trust in the efficacy of numbers.

Seen from this angle, the confrontation with the demographic reality of China must have a curious and unsettling effect on Soviet citizens. For China appears to the modern Russians exactly as they themselves appeared to the West in the past: as an enormous, unwieldly, undifferentiated mass, inspiring a vague dread by its very size. The Russians are now engaged in a difficult psychological reorientation. They are beginning to see themselves, in relation to China, as a numerically smaller, but technologically superior nation. This role does not come natural to them.

Evidence that the CPSU leadership took cognizance of this attitude can be traced back at least to 1958. On October 2nd of that year, *Izvestia* carried a large photograph, displayed prominently (and not, one would think, without malice) showing a hilly landscape covered with swarms of human ants—Chinese coolies building a water reservoir. Two solitary cranes were seen against the

[1] *Pravda*, July 14, 1963.
[2] *Daily Telegraph* (London), October 12, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

sky-line, but otherwise the picture showed nothing but thousands of workmen carrying yokes with buckets at either end. The caption read: *China Building Socialism*. The accompanying article called this photograph an illustration of China's progress towards socialism. On the opposite page of the same issue there was a photograph of a complex combine harvester operated by one single technician on a Soviet state farm. It was an adroit journalistic device to exploit and to foster an attitude to the Chinese which the editors knew existed among the readers.

The image of China as a vast, underfed, instinct-driven horde, simplified and incomplete as it is, is certain to produce two emotions among Soviet citizens. The first is the fear that the Chinese human sea may flood its shores and spill over into the under-populated Russian territories. "Sometimes I think," wrote a Ukrainian listener in March, 1962, to a foreign radio station (Radio Liberty) broadcasting to the Soviet Union, "what can those Chinese do when they are so cramped at home? Will they not ask to be let into Siberia and the Central Asian expanses, where they would not be so cramped?" This thought must be particularly obtrusive in the case of those Soviet citizens who have a personal knowledge of Eastern Siberia and the Far East where the presence of China just across the two great rivers, the Amur and the Ussuri, is felt with a greater immediacy.

The other fear is less rational. It is expressed in the Russian slang term for the Chinese, *zheltorotiki*, yellow-beaks. The notion that, as long as the Chinese remained allies, the Soviet people would be somehow responsible for the maintenance of the millions of hungry yellow dependents, was, of course, a myth. Nevertheless, it was accepted as true by many Russians. China's gratitude to "the great Soviet people for its fraternal aid to the people of China," a motif of all Peking communications with Moscow until recently, must have had a hollow sound to Soviet citizens. So when the awareness of the deepening breach between the USSR and the People's Republic of China began to harden during 1962 and 1963, it could not but be welcomed in the Soviet Union, if only for a mythical reason.

But let us not exaggerate. On the whole, China matters little to the average Soviet citizen. A Moscovite in his 'thirties may have been startled by the exotic strangeness of Chinese opera; he may remember dimly the slogan of "the yellow danger"; he may have heard stories of Chinese cruelty during the Civil War; he may have been told by his parents that in the past the best laundries in Russia were run by Chinese. But all these impressions and memories are marginal to the core of his personal interests and collective destinies as he sees them. Emotionally involved as he is in the relationship of his nation with the West, he shows a curious lack of interest and concern about the Soviet Union's relationship with her greatest Asian neighbor. This contrast is due not only to the vast geographical distance between the heartlands of the two civilizations (America is still farther away). Neither is it due merely to the fairly recent date of Russia's confrontation with China (the Russians became aware of China's geopolitical presence late in the 17th century, one hundred years before the United States came into being). It is due largely to the fact that, despite her vast colonizing and imperialist activities in the East, Russia's military, political, economic, cultural, religious destinies always linked her with the West.

So, while Russia's attitude towards Europe (and America, as an extension of Europe) is an amalgam of deeply personal emotions growing out of a long and complex relationship—love and hatred, admiration and contempt, envy and pride—her attitude to her Asian neighbor is strangely impersonal and void of curiosity. Considering the ideological links between the two countries in the first decade after the Communist revolution in China, contacts between the two peoples have been remarkably tenuous. According to Peking, in the first ten years of the People's Republic 10,800 Soviet experts went to China, most of them for about three years. Since many of them took along their families, this must have brought between 25,000 and 30,000 Soviet citizens to China. But from all accounts it would appear that there were little or no social relations between the nationals of the two countries. On the other hand, about 36,000 Chinese students, technicians and specialists have gone to the USSR for training. In this case, too, spontaneous contacts appear to have been very rare. At Soviet universities in particular Chinese students have been as unpopular with their mania for work, as a Stakhanovite is among his coworkers for forcing the work-norms upwards.[3] For the time being, at least, most Russians view China with utter incomprehension and a vague fear and distrust. That is exactly how Europeans felt about Russia throughout the 19th century.

[3] The best account of the human aspect of Soviet-Chinese relations is given by Klaus Mehnert in Ch. XII of his book, *Peking and Moscow*, New York, G. P. Putnam, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ON CHINESE STUDENTS IN MOSCOW

Moscow students feel more uneasy than amused when they hear about a Chinese classmate who went without the necessities of life and saved enough from his grant to buy a camera, but who then succumbed to the pressure of his fanatical countrymen, sold the camera, and handed in the money because, in order to satisfy a personal desire, he had not had enough to eat, had impaired his intellectual powers, and had thus harmed the Chinese state. A young German from the Soviet Zone of Germany, who had spent many years in Moscow as a student and had fled to West Germany in 1961, told me: "After 1958 the Chinese formed a community of their own in the institute; they completely isolated themselves. The Soviet students smiled when, for instance, the Chinese sat in the reading room even on New Year's Eve, cramming Marx. The iron discipline of the Chinese went so far that they made a kind of 'party resolution' for one and all to stop studying at midnight and go to bed. They kept to this, too, and at three in the morning they all got up again to go on working. They went in for athletics in a body, they attended cultural events in a body, they didn't smoke and didn't drink, and they had half the money from their grants sent to Peking via the embassy. It always seemed to me that the different way of life of the Russians and the Chinese reflected a different interpretation of Marxism. The Russians were freer, more relaxed, and often regarded the Chinese as backwoodsmen who couldn't grasp what was new in Moscow's policy.

—From Peking and Moscow, by Klaus Mehnert, New York, G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1963), p. 319

The conflict between the CPSU and the CCP has brought into the open, as we know, a deep crisis in the international Communist movement. Already badly damaged by the Yugoslav rebellion, the movement, once upon a time rigidly centralized in, and controlled from, Moscow, appears to be sprouting in all directions. It is unlikely, however, that the Soviet "man in the street" feels either deeply worried, or highly elated on this account.

Why should he? True, for a short period immediately after the October Revolution, Lenin succeeded in persuading the public that the Bolshevik *coup d'état* was but a prelude to a world revolution due to break out in the industrial countries of the world and then spread to other areas. But this original confidence wore off very quickly, and by 1924 it became clear that Russia must "go it alone". From then foreign Communist parties became a very mixed blessing. And when Stalin had formulated his "socialism in one country" policy, Russia turned inwards once again. Even the growing menace of aggressive Fascism, even the Spanish Civil War and the threat of an attack by the Germans and the Japanese failed to rekindle a genuine popular belief in the international solidarity of the proletariat.

The war and the immediate post-war years brought the foreign Communist parties, at least in the "liberated" countries, to a position of greater prominence. But the Bieruts, Rakosis, Ulbrichts and Gottwalds were not personalities likely to arouse great enthusiasm. They were viewed merely as foreign extensions of a regime which dominated everything and everybody at home. The flush of victory, and the proud knowledge that the Soviet Union had become one of the mightiest nations in the world, combined with the impact of the pre-war slogan of "socialism in one country," produced a chauvinistic brand of communism in Russia which certainly was not conducive to a revival of an internationalist consciousness among the masses. The Russians have a streak of healthy cynicism in them, and they understood perfectly well that communism became a success in Europe only in those areas where Soviet armed forces and the MGB were able to supervise and bolster it. To the extent, then, that ordinary Russians thought of other Communist parties at all, they tended to view them with contempt and indifference.

Stalin's death in 1953 and the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 brought about a profound change in all attitudes in the country. The consistent if schizophrenic *Weltanschauung* which Stalin's despotism had imposed on the nation was shattered. The world which the Soviet men and women saw after waking up from their nightmare was far more complex and confusing than the world which they had dreamed up. In the opinion of this writer, the greatest rediscovery was that of foreign countries which were no longer seen and thought of merely as arenas of class struggle between the "capitalists" and the working classes led by Soviet-subsidized Communist parties. They became instead places to visit, to enjoy, to shop in, to talk about. Although a business trip or a tourist

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

journey abroad is still a rare prize in the Soviet Union, enough people have come home to tell their friends and relations of what life is really like abroad. The reverse flow of foreign tourists and visitors into the Soviet Union has been another contributory cause to the withering away of the notion of world revolution.

Speaking in purely human terms, a West German tourist, for instance, is of much greater interest to the average Soviet citizen than a German Communist. The former has something that a Russian has not yet achieved and that he wants to achieve: a higher standard of living, expressed in terms of a shiny car, a faultless fountain pen, and stylish clothes. He is an object of curiosity, of envy, of admiration. A German Communist, on the other hand, is a creature deficient in things that the Russians have to excess. He still wants his country to reach a stage which the Russians had reached long ago, and of which many of them are by now quite tired.[4]

The rediscovery of *zagranitsa* (abroad) as a source of enjoyment is well in line with the general bourgeois character of modern Soviet society. Of course, people continue to pay lip service to the old slogans and theses. Of course, they still talk and act as if the world revolution was their concern. Basically, however, Soviet citizens are far too preoccupied with trying to raise their own standard of living to have much sympathy with any foreign Communists still trying to bring about revolutions in their own countries.

Today's Soviet society may be described as a conservatively-minded body of people whose energies are directed, first and foremost, at construction—that is, at bettering their own lot. Revolutions, they know from their fathers' tales, mean destruction, civil and international war, typhus, famine, homelessness. That is why, to a vast majority of them, the fate of international communism is a matter of indifference. That is why the very mention of China fills them with fear and mistrust. And that, too, is why the Soviet regime, in its stand towards Peking, finds itself in the extremely rare position of being at one with the mass of Soviet citizens.

[4] A choice example of this differentiation is told by the German writer Klaus Mehnert who was in Moscow in September, 1955, on the occasion of Chancellor Adenauer's visit there. A taxi driver told him quite casually that the day before one of his colleagues "had driven a German into the ditch." When Mehnert, concerned over the safety of his friends, inquired what sort of a German it was, he received the classical answer: "Oh, thank God, it was one of ours. Otherwise there would have been a tremendous scandal . . ." (Klaus Mehnert, *Der Sowjetmensch*, Stuttgart, 1958, pp. 28-29).

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Rivalry in Underdeveloped Areas

By Herbert Dinerstein

Mr. Dinerstein, a Soviet affairs expert on the staff of the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California, is currently specializing on Soviet policies in underdeveloped areas. His works include War and the Soviet Union *(New York, Praeger, 1959).*

When Eastern Europe lost the remnants of its independence in the late 1940's and when Communist China became directly dependent on the Soviet Union during the Korean War, most Western observers (and probably, also, many Communist leaders) believed that Communist foreign policies would follow one general line in whose determination Moscow would have the governing, if not the only voice. Now, Communist China and the Soviet Union obviously pursue differing, and sometimes mutually exclusive, goals in foreign policy, and—to mention only two well-known cases—Castro's Cuban regime and the Italian Communist Party pursue somewhat independent foreign policies. Thus far, divergence has been accommodated, but further open confrontation of the Sino-Soviet or Albanian-Soviet type may develop. To put differences in Communist policy toward newly independent and developing countries into their proper setting, it is necessary to set forth the essential condition for the new phenomenon of multiple Communist foreign policies.

The most cohesive force in alliances, including, as it now appears, alliances of Communist countries, is an outside threat to the continued existence of the partners, whether it be from war or the threat of war. In both the Soviet Union and China, fear of war has now subsided to the point where concerted measures for mutual security no longer automatically relegate all other issues to second place. At present, Communist China and the Soviet Union share the assumption, long held in the West, that there need be no general nuclear war unless the Communist powers challenge the West on major issues. Since Soviet polemicists have insisted in the last few years that the Chinese Communists are bellicose and reckless of the dangers of war, this proposition requires some discussion.

The Western position has been remarkably consistent since its promulgation in the US in the late 1940s as the policy of "containment." The United States and its allies unilaterally undertook not to employ what was at first a monopoly, and later a superiority, in nuclear weapons against the Communist states unless the latter broke out and tried to expand some more. In actual fact, this self-limitation went even further: on several occasions, notably the Korean War, the Berlin uprising of June 1953, and the Hungarian revolution of 1956, the Western powers failed to explore and exploit obvious opportunities to roll communism back. But the policy of containment was not simply a policy of accepting the *status quo*. It was hoped, on assumptions as different as those held by Mr. Isaac Deutscher and Mr. Allen Dulles, that political forces within the Communist bloc would produce major changes. Now, the existence of multiple Communist foreign policies justifies the hopes of the framers of the containment policy.

The simple statement of the West's resolve not to employ its nuclear superiority unless provoked on a major issue did not automatically still Soviet and Chinese fears. But the events of the fifteen years since the enunciation of the containment policy have demonstrated to the Communist states that nuclear war is up to them. The attack on South Korea, guerrilla activity in South Viet Nam, the absorption of Tibet, the campaign against West Berlin, the communization of Cuba and the attempt to emplace Soviet ballistic missiles in that

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

island—none of these Communist acts has caused the United States and its allies to abandon their self-imposed counsel of restraint.

The Soviet Union, having developed its own nuclear weapons, became reassured earlier than Communist China, since its independent nuclear power reinforced American restraint. Communist China has since reached the same conclusion, even though without an independent nuclear force of its own and in growing doubt that the Soviet Union would risk war for anything less than China's continued survival. Finding itself alone in the world, as it were, and yet not in danger of attack, Communist China's confidence has grown. The Chinese have expressed this new confidence in various formulas: nuclear weapons did not prevent the Chinese "victory" in the Korean War; nuclear weapons do not freeze international relations; the enemy's strength must be tactically respected, but strategically despised. Translating this into more familiar terms, the Chinese Communists have been saying that although American nuclear power is a force to be reckoned with, there are limits within which they can confidently operate.

The Chinese Communists have never maintained, as the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia have charged, that they *want* a nuclear war because it will create favorable conditions for the building of world communism. On the contrary, they insist that nuclear war should and can be avoided. It would carry us too far afield from the main subject of this article to present all the evidence for the proposition that the Chinese Communists, like the rest of the world, neither want nor expect nuclear war.[1] The reader is simply asked to reflect on whether the Chinese would not have maintained good relations with the Soviet Union at any price, *if* they thought that nuclear war with the United States was a real possibility.

Once it is accepted that there is a reduced fear of nuclear war both in Peking and in Moscow, and that this has the effect of thrusting differences on other policies forward, it becomes necessary to examine how far general Soviet and Communist Chinese objectives support each other and how much they work at cross purposes. Then, Sino-Soviet differences specifically relating to policy toward newly independent and developing countries will be explored, to be followed by a more detailed examination of a single case—India.

The respective goals of the USSR and Communist China have been schematically outlined in the chart below as a convenient device for examining the issues which either bind or separate the two major Communist powers.

[1] See, for example, Marshal Chen Yi's statement of January 1962 that all China's problems, including national defense, "could be solved by self-reliance": in Raymond L. Garthoff, "Sino-Soviet Military Relations," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* (Philadelphia) September 1963, p. 92; and A. H. Hsieh, *Communist China and Nuclear Force*, The RAND Corporation, P-2719-1, Revised, August 1963.

Objectives of The Soviet Union and Communist China

Soviet Union

I. Military security; maintaining nuclear power.

II. Building communism.

III. Safeguarding Communist territorial gains of the 1940's in Eastern Europe.

IV. Advancing communism in the industrialized areas of the world.

V. Advancing communism in the underdeveloped countries.

1. Supporting Soviet foreign policy.

a. Keeping or pushing the United States out of newly independent or developing countries.

2. Competing with China for influence in newly independent or developing countries.

3. Creating favorable conditions for the transition to communism.

Communist China

I. Military security; acquiring nuclear power; legitimization of the regime; gaining "irredenta" like Taiwan.

II. Building communism.

III. Safeguarding Communist gain in North Korea, Viet Nam, and Tibet; creation of a zone of "positive neutrality."

IV. Advancing communism in the intermediate zone between capitalism and socialism.

1. Supporting Chinese foreign policy.

a. Keeping or pushing the US out of underdeveloped areas.

b. Reinforcing the policy of keeping adjacent countries "positively neutral."

c. Weakening the United States by causing it to disperse its energies.

2. Competing with the Soviet Union for influence in newly independent or developing countries.

3. Creating favorable conditions for the transition to communism.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This schematic listing is somewhat deceptive, for while the general objectives of the two powers are seen to be almost identical, Soviet and Chinese Communist policies are in fact often at cross purposes. The aphorism that to govern is to choose also applies to foreign policy. Differences on priorities, that is, on the relative urgency of particular objectives, produce major conflicts. Only a common overriding objective, such as victory in war or preparation for a likely war, suppresses the manifestation, or mutes the expression, of these conflicts. Now to a closer examination of how Soviet and Chinese objectives diverge.

Military Security

In the attainment of this objective, as in the attainment of the next two, the Chinese Communists have a longer road to go than do the Soviets. Since the end of World War II, the Soviet Union has had no "irredenta": there is no unfinished business of state-making. For China, on the other hand, Taiwan occupies only the first place on the list of territories to be regained (because its rulers claim to be *the* government of China). While not now pressing its claims to *all* the "lost" Chinese territories, Peking has carefully avoided giving them up for the indefinite future. And China's neighbors know that the stronger a country gets, the longer its memory for irredenta.

Furthermore, the Chinese Communists suffer from deep feelings of national humiliation. The rankling shame at the subjection of their country to Western "barbarians" for more than a hundred years makes the re-establishment of China's natural borders a holy cause in the best (and worst) traditions of European nationalism. This powerful sentiment extends far beyond the ranks of those who support communism for its own sake on and outside the Chinese mainland. Thus, Chinese Communist foreign policy is popular—not a negligible consideration for a regime which demands great sacrifice and exertion.

The Soviet Union is the second greatest military power in the world, with the first power, the United States, genuinely committed to the defensive policy of containment described above. By contrast, the Chinese Communists have less than a first-class modern military establishment even in conventional weapons, and are not expected to achieve a nuclear capability in the near future. Nevertheless, China's military power can be effectively exerted across her borders, as the Indian operation of the fall of 1962 demonstrated. Present Chinese military power, then, can support the pursuit of only *some* Chinese territorial objectives. The Chinese Communists now feel, and have said, that the acquisition of nuclear weapons will make it easier for them to gather in the lost territories without nuclear war. (They seem unimpressed by the failure of the Soviet Union to convert the possession of nuclear weapons into political gains.)

In the view of the Chinese, consequently, the Soviet refusal to furnish them with nuclear weapons defers the attainment of vital foreign policy objectives. In the Soviet view, Chinese power to pursue a foreign policy divergent from that of the Soviet Union is reduced.

These marked differences in the stage of national consolidation and in military power make for important differences in the relations of the two countries with the United States. Extravagance in hostile words, restraint in deed, and total lack of communication are the hallmarks of Chinese policy toward the United States. Soviet policy, on the other hand, spans a much wider range. Fluctuations characterize the verbal level, efforts at advance alternate with pauses, and communication with Washington is constant. Although for the long term the Soviets believe no less than the Chinese that the United States *esse delendam*, the Soviet Union acts in the interim as an adversary rather than as a total enemy. The attempt to emplace missiles in Cuba, had it been successful, would have yielded greater gains than anything the Chinese Communists have tried. But, having failed, the Soviet Union proceeds to negotiate a partial test-ban treaty in the hope of inducing the United States to limit the arms race without more specific agreements. Soviet estimates of progress in arms technology enter into the equation, as do the problems of resource allocation to various sectors of the economy.

It is possible in this article only to refer to this complex and imperfectly understood phenomenon of the "adversary relationship," but perhaps enough has been said to establish that while the Chinese restrict a foreign policy problem to judging whether they will gain or lose in a particular area, the Moscow leaders deal in an equation made up of many factors. Being a world power, the Soviet Union considers a wider range of problems, including its relations with the United States, than does Communist China, an Asian power without significant strategic naval or air forces. The Soviet penchant for looking "at the whole picture" almost always relegates Chinese interests to second place because Chinese interests are essentially confined to one part of the world.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Building Communism

Quite obviously the Soviet Union still faces serious problems in the elementary task of feeding its population properly and providing it with more than the bare minimum of consumer goods. But difficult as managing the economy is for the Soviet leaders, it is more difficult for the Chinese. Although it seems unlikely that the Chinese Communist regime will founder, it must traverse a longer and harder road before reaching the modest abundance of communism. The Soviet Union is unwilling, and probably unable, to tender Communist China enough economic help to make the entrance of both countries into communism simultaneous. In return for massive Soviet economic aid, were it a possibility, the Chinese Communists might be willing to postpone some of their foreign policy objectives.

Safeguarding Communist Territorial Gains

Here, too, the situations of the USSR and Communist China, though superficially similar, are different in important ways. In the middle 1940's the Soviet Union presided over the installation of Communist regimes in all of Eastern Europe, Greece excepted. The maintenance of Soviet control over these regimes is essentially a problem in the relations among Communist states, the only losses of such control—over Yugoslavia and Albania—having grown out of centrifugal forces within the Communist system rather than from Western prompting. Only for the rump state of East Germany does the very existence of a politically and economically superior West Germany present a permanent problem.

The Chinese Communists are almost exclusively concerned with maintaining gains in two rump states, North Korea and North Viet Nam. (Tibet will be considered separately.) As in the case of East Germany, neither North Korea nor North Viet Nam can be accounted fully secure as long as South Korea and South Viet Nam exist. Successful Communist guerrilla operations in those areas involve the danger of expanding the war.

Another method of preserving the gains of communism is the creation of a "zone of positive neutrality." The notion is simple. It means that countries contiguous to Communist states, while "neutral," are to be induced to lean toward the Communist side in their foreign policy. In Europe such "positive neutrality" has taken varied forms, as in Finland, Yugoslavia, Sweden and Austria. But Communist China, being militarily weaker and having more vulnerable areas to protect, requires a larger measure of "positive neutrality" from nations on its borders than does the Soviet Union.

Advancing Communism in Industrialized Areas

The Soviet Union, for purposes of framing policy, divides the non-Communist world into industrialized and non-industrialized sectors, according predominant importance to the former. The Chinese, even before the completion of the revolution in China, talked of an "intermediate" zone. The Soviet ideological formula is that the major characteristic of the present era is the struggle between capitalism and socialism, of which the national liberation struggle is an important component; the Chinese formula is that the main problem of the present era is the national liberation struggle. The thousands of words devoted to these formulas in the Sino-Soviet polemic reflect genuine political differences.

In singling out the struggle between capitalism and socialism as the chief problem of the age, the Soviet Union gives greater weight to revolutionary prospects in industrialized countries than in non-industrialized countries when their claims compete. Thus, for example, in the first stages of the Algerian revolution, the Soviet Union perceived it mainly as an opportunity for promoting the internal division of France, possible civil war, and the long-term political impotence of Western Europe. Hence, Moscow's primary objective lay in the continuation of the struggle rather than in a quick Algerian victory, and Soviet aid to Algeria was meted out accordingly. Once the Algerian victory was in sight, however, the Soviet Union gave full diplomatic support and some economic support. The Chinese manifested their dissent from this policy by extending much-advertised, though essentially insignificant, aid to Algeria. The Algerian victory was more important to Peking for the evidence it furnished of the correctness of the Chinese theoretical position than for its immediate effect on Chinese political power.

In all cases where an Asian country is concerned, with the exception of industrialized Japan, the Soviet viewpoint entails the application of a

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

double standard of evaluation—namely, the interests of the revolution, first, in the industrialized world and, second, in the underdeveloped world.

Advancing Communism in Underdeveloped Countries

● *Supporting Communist foreign policy.* In the rapid liquidation of colonial empires since the end of World War II, the Communists have discerned a great setback for world capitalism and have therefore applauded—and, on occasion, aided—what they call the national liberation movement. They have been reluctant to believe that the West would accept the loss of imperial domination without a struggle, and they accuse the Western powers of attempting to reinstate imperialist domination in new forms denounced by the Communists as "neo-colonialism."

Some events seemed to furnish evidence for such an interpretation: 1) the colonial wars in Indo-China and Algeria, 2) the brief Anglo-French-Israeli campaign against the Egyptian nationalization of Suez, 3) the United States' assumption of responsibility for keeping communism out of South Viet Nam. However, the first two now appear to have been last stands, and it seems difficult to interpret the American presence in Viet Nam as a resurgence of imperialism. But whether or not the Soviet leaders believe that their support of national liberation movements was important in discouraging a supposed Western attempt "to turn back the clock of history," they are satisfied that every subtraction from the power of the enemy camp is a plus for them. Viewed in terms of these broad

NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS: A MATTER OF OPINION

The oppressed nations and peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America are faced with the urgent task of fighting imperialism."

History has entrusted to the proletarian parties in these areas the glorious mission of holding high the banner of the struggle against imperialism, against old and new colonialism and for national independence and people's democracy, of standing in the forefront of the national democratic revolutionary movement and striving for a socialist future.

In these areas, extremely broad sections of the population refuse to be slaves of imperialism. They include not only the workers, peasants, intellectuals and petty bourgeoisie, but also the patriotic national bourgeoisie and even certain kings, princes and aristocrats who are patriotic . . . .

On the basis of the worker-peasant alliance, the proletariat and its party must unite all strata that can be united and organize a broad united front against imperialism and its lackeys. In order to consolidate and expand this united front it is necessary that the protetarian party should maintain its ideological, political and organizational independence and insist on the leadership of the revolution.

—From CCP letter of June 14, 1963, to the CPSU, Peking Review, June 21, 1963.

There is yet another important question— . . . the relation between the struggle of the international working class and the national liberation movement of the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America . . .

How do the Chinese comrades solve this question? This is apparent from a new "theory" of theirs according to which the basic contradiction of our time is . . . the contradiction not between socialism and imperialism, but between the national liberation movement and imperialism. In the opinion of the Chinese comrades, it is not the world system of socialism, not the struggle of the international working class, that acts as the decisive force in the struggle against imperialism, but once again the national liberation movement.

Thereby the Chinese comrades apparently hope to win popularity among the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America . . . But let no one be deceived by this "theory." Its actual sense, whether the Chinese theoreticians want it or not, consists of isolating the national liberation movement from the international working class and . . . the world system of socialism. But this could represent a huge danger to the national liberation movement itself.

—From Open Letter of the CPSU Central Committee, Pravda, July 14, 1963.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

perspectives, the internal political order of the newly independent countries is of secondary importance. Consequently, whenever newly independent or developing countries become involved in quarrels with members of the NATO, CENTO, or SEATO pacts, they found the Soviet Union ready to sell them arms in large quantities on easy terms. Egypt, Indonesia, Afghanistan and Cuba are only some of the examples.

The Soviet leaders also felt, especially after Castro turned his revolution into a Communist one, that successful national liberation movements could become Communist revolutions of a sort. This of course lent added attraction to the policy of supporting such movements, but the prospect of reducing the sphere of capitalism was sufficient by itself to justify the policy.

On the chart given earlier, Chinese Communist goals in underdeveloped countries are represented as more differentiated. The Chinese leadership sets more exacting standards for the success of the national liberation movement than does the Soviet. In Peking's view, it must also serve the goals of legitimizing the regime and safeguarding the gains of the revolution. The Soviet Union is the foremost military power in Europe, and the Communist gains made there in the 1940's are protected by that power. In the western Pacific, however, the United States is the strongest military power; consequently, in that area, China requires more from the underdeveloped countries than a generalized anti-Western or neutralist stance. It requires a positive neutrality that involves active support of Chinese policies.

For the Chinese, in areas far from the mainland of China, the encouragement of revolutionary activity in underdeveloped countries is the only way they have of coping with the totality of American power, whereas the Soviet Union has a varied range of instruments at its disposal—*e.g.,* technological advances, especially in missiles and space; military preponderance in Europe; weapons test moratoria, a partial test-ban treaty. In the Chinese view, a series of Communist uprisings all over the world is necessary to force the United States to disperse its strength. This is, in essence, an international variant of the strategy of the Chinese revolution: the weaker force wears down the stronger by guerrilla tactics until the latter's strength is reduced and it can be directly engaged.

● *Sino-Soviet competition for influence.* Old-fashioned rivalry for spheres of influence also plays an important role in the Sino-Soviet conflict. The Bandung Conference of 1955, to which the Soviet Union was not invited, marked a critical point in the development of this rivalry. The conference could have been interpreted at the time as signifying a division of labor: the Chinese Communists would play the major role in promoting anti-American neutralist policies in Asia, while the Soviet Union would bear the responsibility for the rest of the world. If this was indeed the understanding, it quickly deteriorated.

Whatever may have been the purposes of Peking and Moscow, the neutralist organizers of the Bandung meeting, especially the Indians, hoped to separate Communist China from the Soviet Union and its policies. (An American scholar who attended the conference and had long interviews with its initiators has established this point.[2]) The Chinese representative certainly seemed to fall in with this plan. He was more than forthcoming, spoke of a peculiar Asian identity, and was quite willing to retire the slogan of co-existence in favor of others. If a private scholar could discern an anti-Soviet or exclusively Asian tone in the conference, the always suspicious Soviet leaders probably drew more far-reaching conclusions, and their interpretation very likely influenced the active Soviet policy of large-scale aid to India and Indonesia. It is hard to fix the precise moment when uneasy Sino-Soviet cooperation and division into spheres of influence passed over into outright competition, but relentless conflict is now unmistakable. Not only in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but even in Western Europe, the Chinese Communists are supporting pro-Chinese wings and factions within the local Communist parties.

● *Creating favorable conditions for the transition to communism.* From the Soviet point of view, reduction of the Western sphere of control and rivalry with the Chinese are sufficient reasons for Soviet support of the national liberation movement. The creation of favorable conditions for the transition to communism is a welcome bonus when it happens, but it is not necessary to justify the policy. This lower priority accorded by the Soviet leaders to the promotion of communism is the issue on which the Chinese have criticized the Russians most. That Peking's own policy towards Cambodia, Nepal, Sikkim, and Indonesia follows the same order of priorities does not embarrass them. The Chinese complain that the Soviet Union expects the bourgeoisie to prepare the way for the revolution in the underdeveloped countries, and that instead the bourgeoisie consolidates its position and stifles genuine revolutionary movements.

[2] George McTurnan Kahin, *The Asian-African Conference,* Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Chinese criticism probably represents more than an attempt to score points in the ideological debate. It probably reflects a radically different experience in revolution.

The Soviet historiography of the Russian revolution, which has already been invested with the aura of revealed truth, depicts the revolutionary process in a special way. The old regime crumbles, rotted through by internal contradictions and shaken by war. The short-lived successor, failing to cope with the situation, permits the establishment of a dual power in which the Communist share grows. Then, at the correct moment, the Communist Party seizes power. (In Soviet hagiography, Lenin is revealed as a saint of the dialectic because he struck neither one day too late nor one day too soon.) Once the Bolsheviks have taken power, the struggle begins in earnest, and it is in the Civil War that the Communist Party is forged into an instrument able to defend the revolution and build communism.

The Chinese memory of their own revolutionary victory is totally different. The break with the "bourgeois" Kuomintang in 1927 was the necessary condition for the ultimate success of the revolution. The children of Israel had to wander in the desert for two generations before entering the Promised Land; for the Chinese Communists one generation sufficed. The critical phase of the revolution was the struggle with the bourgeoisie *before* it collapsed. In that struggle the Communist Party of China was hammered into the weapon which made the revolution.

From this fundamental difference in outlook many corollaries flow. The Soviet Union claims that the parliamentary path to communism represents a realistic possibility; the Chinese, while accepting it theoretically, minimize its chances of success. The Soviet Union points to the danger of poorly prepared revolts that fail and slow up the revolutionary process; the Chinese Communists emphasize the demoralization of inactivity and collaboration with the bourgeoisie. The Soviet Union fears that Communist revolutions, if ill-timed, may provoke Western intervention and cause local wars; the Chinese view revolutionary struggles as creating the most favorable ground for the growth of Communist parties.

But one need not accept the claim of the Chinese that they always support revolutionary struggle while the Soviet Union always procrastinates in hope of a more opportune moment. We have already referred to the Chinese Communist policy of collaboration with bourgeois regimes in neighboring countries when Peking judges that China's immediate foreign policy interests should take precedence over the prospects for revolution. And it was Soviet economic and military assistance that played a major, if not the determining, role in the establishment of the Communist regime in Cuba, the first such victory since the Communist triumph in China in 1949. Soviet support of Castro, though hesitant, was tangible; the Chinese merely shouted encouragement from the sidelines. Moreover, as the CPSU program makes perfectly clear, the Soviet Union is not wedded to an exclusive policy of nonviolent revolution.

Sino-Soviet doctrinal disagreements over the proper tactics to adopt toward the bourgeoisie, supporting wars of national liberation, and accepting the risks of local wars have already been thoroughly described.[3] It may be useful, therefore, to examine a specific case in which the Soviet and Chinese prescriptions on these issues came into conflict.

The Conflict over India

Future historians will probably view the Sino-Indian border conflict as an important turning point in Far Eastern international life. Although much has already been written about it, much is still obscure, and the account that follows probably will require revision in both its particulars and its essentials as more information becomes available. Nevertheless, enough is now known to permit an analysis of the conflict as a concrete example of Sino-Soviet disagreement.[4] Perhaps there have been equally significant differences over policy toward Laos, Viet Nam and Indonesia, but not enough evidence has been revealed.

The Sino-Soviet conflict regarding India has centered largely on the Tibetan problem. The interests of China and India in Tibet are fundamentally different, and in the end they could not be accommodated to each other. For China the Tibetan question is essentially one of the legiti-

[3] See, for example, Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961,* Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1962; Harry Gelman, "Russia, China and the Underdeveloped Areas," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences,* September 1963, pp. 130-142.

[4] This account is based primarily on Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose, and Robert A. Huttenback, *Himalayan Battleground,* New York, Praeger, 1963; Chanakya San, *Tibet Disappears,* New York; Asia Publishing House, 1960; *Concerning the Question of Tibet,* Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1959; *The Sino-Indian Boundary Question* (Enlarged Edition), Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1962. The best short account is Leo E. Rose, "Conflict in the Himalayas," *Military Review* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) February 1963, pp. 3-16.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

macy of Chinese rule and the attainment of China's "natural" borders; and the frustration of Communist China's aspirations in Taiwan has made victory in Tibet all the more important to her. Soviet opposition to Peking's policy in Tibet must have confirmed the Chinese Communists in their suspicion that Soviet support of their claim to Taiwan was only *pro forma,* while Soviet (and Indian) suggestions that the Chinese should direct their energies toward Taiwan and Hong Kong instead of Tibet have probably been regarded in Peking as the mockery and contempt that are the lot of the weak.

The requirements of India's Tibetan policy have been quite different. While the British determined that policy, it was to make Tibet a buffer state separating India from China and Russia. China accepted British recognition of her suzerainty (rather than full sovereignty) over Tibet since she was then too weak to contest the case and the concept of suzerainty left the door open for further Chinese claims in the future. Whatever little impulse Imperial Russia, and later the Soviet Union, had to expand to the Indian border yielded place to more urgent considerations: namely, Imperial Russia's need for an alliance with Great Britain against Germany and Austria-Hungary (1907), and the Soviet Union's need to break out of isolation and divide its enemies (the Anglo-Russian trade treaty of 1921). Great Britain ensured these arrangements by first establishing her physical presence in Tibet and forcing that country to enter into foreign relations with her (the Younghusband Mission, 1904).

Independent India also wanted to maintain Tibet as a buffer state, but the means at her disposal were more modest for three reasons: First, she renounced the British positions in Tibet as a survival of imperialism and confined herself to the borders she claimed. Second, Chinese power after 1949 was on the ascendant. Third, whatever resources India was willing to divert to the military establishment were primarily earmarked for the conflict over Kashmir which erupted with Britain's grant of Indian independence.

When the Chinese Communists occupied Tibet militarily in 1950-51, India accepted Peking's assurances that Tibet would remain autonomous and that no territorial dispute or controversy existed between India and China. India seemed loath to consider the alternatives of improving her bargaining position vis-à-vis China by improving her military position. Instead India avoided raising the Tibetan issue with China, assuming that the latter would preserve the buffer status of Tibet.

In an effort to convince China that she had nothing to fear from India—and probably out of genuine conviction, too—India consistently supported Communist China's admission to the United Nations and her claim to Taiwan. The Chinese meanwhile did nothing to discourage the Indian expectation that Tibet would enjoy special status within Communist China. Assurances that the social revolution in Tibet would move slowly were repeated. For example, on one occasion in 1956, the Dalai Lama, who was in India at the same time as Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai, was reluctant to return to Tibet because he feared that Chinese policy in that country was moving toward full-fledged communization. However, Nehru obtained reassurances from Chou, and when these were passed on to the Dalai Lama, he returned to Tibet. Although the Chinese Communists gave no formal undertakings to preserve Tibet's autonomy and not occupy it in force, they encouraged the Indians to believe that this would be the case.

This uneasy but nevertheless mutually acceptable arrangement became untenable, however, when Communist China's hold on Tibet was threatened by a spreading rebellion which started in Kham in 1955. Whether the rebellion started because the Chinese stepped up the pace of *Gleichschaltung,* or the Chinese quickened the tempo because of the rebellion, is unclear. In any case, the new Chinese military policy in Tibet undermined the Sino-Indian understanding.

The direct routes from western China to the areas in which the Khampa tribesmen live are poor and in wintertime impassable. The route from Sinkiang province southeastward to Kham is better and—most important of all—open in the early winter. It has the disadvantage, however, of first passing through the Aksai Chin, long recognized as Indian territory and then very close to the Indian border. If the Chinese Communists were to make this their main avenue for the military pacification and control of Tibet, not only would the Indians lose some territory, but all hope of keeping Tibet as a buffer region with small Chinese occupation forces would vanish.

By 1959, when the Indians learned that the Chinese had already occupied the remote Aksai Chin area, the earlier basis for agreement had disappeared. Peking charged that the rebellion in Tibet was inspired and supported by Indian, American and Kuomintang agents, especially in Katmandu—a version which the Chinese Communists found it more congenial to accept than to acknowledge that the Tibetans had risen against

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communist rule on their own. Thus, India, in Chinese eyes, had shifted from a position of positive neutrality to that of agent of the imperialists who wanted to prevent China from exercising legitimate control over her own territory.

Indian opinion became highly exercised over the Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin, and Prime Minister Nehru had to defend publicly his Chinese and Tibetan policies. What worried the Indians was not only the realization that Tibet's buffer status was completely lost, but also the studied and deliberate vagueness of the Chinese claims with respect to India's northeastern frontiers. Did the Chinese encroachment in the border region represent the final Chinese claim, or the first in a series?

Communist China's communications to India in 1959 drew a distinction between Nehru and his "evil advisers," suggesting Chinese hope that Nehru could and would prevail upon Indian public opinion to swallow the bitter pill of the Chinese military presence on the frontier. However, Soviet intervention on the Indian side reduced the chances that such hopes would be realized. From the Chinese statements published in the summer of 1963 we learn that the Soviet Union notified the Chinese of Moscow's intention to publish a note charging that the Sino-Indian conflict had been instigated by those who wanted the then imminent Khrushchev-Eisenhower meeting at Camp David to fail. The Soviet purpose, obviously, was to get the Chinese to relax their pressure on India. The Chinese asked the Russians not to publish the note, calculating that public evidence of Soviet support for India would encourage Nehru to resist. Notwithstanding this appeal, the Soviet news agency TASS published the note on September 10, 1959.

Here, the essential nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict is revealed. The Soviet Union—in an adversary relationship with the United States—hoped, through negotiation with Washington, to gain a change in the status of West Berlin and to prevail on the United States to do less than its utmost in the arms race. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, had nothing to gain from negotiations with the United States and confined themselves to the issue of the security of their Tibetan province. Although the Chinese remained in the Aksai Chin, the Indians, far from accepting the situation, took measures to improve their strategic position. By 1962 the Indians, with Soviet help, including even Soviet helicopters manned by Soviet personnel, had improved their communications to the area, suggesting the likelihood that in time it would become easier for them to support military operations in the area than for the Chinese.

Meanwhile, Soviet-Chinese relations were deteriorating steadily. The Chinese felt and said that the Soviet policy of negotiating with the United States had failed. Soviet economic and military aid to China dwindled. But if this Soviet action was designed to force the Chinese to submit to Moscow's direction, it had the contrary effect of making the Chinese feel there was nothing left for them to lose. When the Indians sought in 1962 to regain control over territory they had lost in 1959, they did so from a position strengthened by Soviet material assistance; but this aid was no more effective in changing Chinese policy than Soivet verbal support of the Indians had been in 1959. One Communist ally made war on India; the other furnished her military equipment and promised more.

Such completely opposed policies can be found at times in all alliance systems, including NATO. The Suez crisis and French refusal to accept the test-ban treaty are two cases in point. But such conflicts are very much less disruptive in the Western alliance system because divergences of interest among its members are accepted as inevitable, even if awkward. In the Communist system, with its assumption that only one correct foreign policy line exists, divergence is much harder to manage.

It is not altogether impossible that with the disappearance of the chief Chinese or the chief Russian figure in the quarrel, the diverse interests of the two major Communist powers can once more be brought into some measure of harmony. More probably, however, matters have gone too far for genuine and lasting repair. Barring the development of some common threat to both regimes, each side can be expected to act upon its own divergent convictions.

But one should not simply expect the Chinese Communists to create revolutionary movements, and the Soviet Union to stifle them. It is more likely that the Chinese will be able to influence Soviet policy more effectively in open opposition than when forced to pretend to a common policy. Especially in areas remote from China's borders, such as Angola or Zanzibar, the Chinese may well force the tempo of Soviet involvement by threatening to pre-empt revolutionary leadership. The Soviet Union cannot fail to act without forfeiting its claim to that leadership. Thus the Chinese Communists though weak in resources and cast in the role of international pariah, might conceivably influence Soviet policy in the underdeveloped world more than ever before.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Perspectives for Eastern Europe

By Richard V. Burks

Mr. Burks, who is Policy Director for Radio Free Europe in Munich, Germany, has published numerous scholarly articles in the field of Soviet affairs and a full-length study entitled The Dynamics of Communism in Eastern Eudope *(Princeton University Press, 1961).*

There is little doubt that the Sino-Soviet dispute came as a greater surprise to Eastern Europe than to any other part of the world. Indeed, the extent and nature of this conflict are still not generally understood there, and this fact will most probably delay the full impact of the break. Nonetheless, the conflict is already introducing a totally new element into East European politics.

The contention between Moscow and Peking is much more than a passing quarrel; it is rather in the nature of a schism in a world-wide movement, comparable to the separation of the Orthodox and Catholic churches in the eleventh century, or to the breakdown of Western religious unity in the sixteenth. It is an expression of deep-going cultural differences between Europe and Asia as well as an outgrowth of clashing Soviet and Chinese national interests. The doctrinal disputes which remain at the focus of international attention only reflect these underlying differences, and it is unlikely that a genuine reconciliation can take place within the foreseeable future.

The schism leads in two directions. For one thing, it promotes the division of the Communist world into two camps: one with its capital in Peking and its main support among the colored peoples of the developing countries; the other with its center in Moscow and its following among the more advanced industrial countries of preponderantly white population. But the schism has also produced a marked intensification of factional conflict within existing Communist parties and the splinter parties. The long-range consequences of these developments for the inherently unstable Communist regimes of Eastern Europe should be far-reaching.

Ideology and National Interest

It is, first of all, important to remember in this connection that in the doctrinal aspects of the Moscow-Peking conflict, it is the Soviets who are the innovators, particularly as far as the twin doctrines "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful transition," or such concepts as the "all-people's state,"

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

are concerned.[1] In the pursuit of their struggle to maintain the leadership of the Communist movement, the Soviets will therefore feel compelled to insist on the orthodoxy and acceptance of their "revisionist" views, and this will be an additional reason for their dependents, particularly in Eastern Europe, to adopt a similar posture. In this respect, Moscow's official position will reinforce the latent political tendencies in the area.

On the other hand, however, Soviet capacity to ensure political conformity in the bloc has been weakened by the fact that the world Communist movement no longer possesses a single center of undisputed authority. In such a situation, the individual parties find more room for maneuver, and the risks of deviation are smaller.

In fact, many Communist regimes today have a choice of patrons; Albania exercised this option by choosing Chinese patronage. Or by threatening to switch protectors, a satellite can enlarge its freedom of action, as Rumania has shown in the last two years. On this level, then, as well as on the higher—Moscow-Peking—level of Communist international relations, Khrushchev has encountered disappointment, for he believed that upon granting autonomy to the satellite regimes after Stalin's death a harmonious bloc foreign policy would automatically emerge as a reflection of the common ideology held by the various regimes. Instead, he has found that communism as a professed creed is far from being the perfect solvent of conflicts of national interest. (Indeed, in the case of the Sino-Soviet conflict, Communist ideology has hampered, if anything, the resolution of the quarrel. By often approaching their differences ideologically rather than pragmatically, the Chinese and the Soviet leaders have tended to elevate their divergencies from questions of interest to issues of principle.)

The most recent case in point is the estrangement between Moscow and Bucharest. The issue that has clouded Soviet-Rumanian relations over the past two years is the question of the kind of industrial development Rumania should pursue: should capital investment be limited to the fields of petro-chemicals, synthetic fertilizer and food processing, as Moscow has proposed through Comecon, or should the industrialization of the country proceed along more traditional Stalinist lines; *i.e.*, by concentrating on the development of a heavy-industrial base, as the Rumanian leadership desires? What Moscow has proposed is perhaps more reasonable, especially when viewed from the standpoint of the interests of the bloc as a whole, but what Bucharest insists on is more orthodox and, at the same time, more in consonance with its conception of Rumanian national interests.

Rumania's resistance to Soviet pressure first became evident in the winter of 1961-62, after the 22nd CPSU Congress and Khrushchev's open denunciation of the Albanian leadership. The proportion of Rumanian trade with non-Communist countries, which began growing even before the congress, continues to increase; it has risen from 22 percent of the total foreign trade amounting to 5.7 billion lei in 1958 to 33 percent of 10.6 billion in 1962.[2] Thus in exchange for such hard-currency-earning products as oil and oil drilling and refining equipment, and through the sale of emigration visas to citizens who have wealthy relatives in the West, the Bucharest regime appears to be importing much of the advanced machinery and hiring most of the technicians required for the construction, now just beginning, of a major iron and steel works at Galati. There are apparently no Soviet experts at Galati and since June of 1960 there has been no public reference by any Soviet leader to this project.

In the spring of 1962, furthermore, the regime completed the collectivization of agriculture, which at the Rumanian party congress of 1960 had been foreseen as a gradual process ending only in 1965. Since collectivization of agriculture had been the key to Soviet industrialization, providing both the necessary (forced) savings and the necessary labor, it seems reasonable to conclude that the hasty final collectivization drive in Rumania was intended to provide additional resources for an independent policy of all-round industrialization.

[1] The doctrine of "peaceful coexistence" holds that because of the present strength of the "socialist camp" war is no longer inevitable, even under conditions of "imperialism." The doctrine of "peaceful transition" asserts that under present conditions the seizure of power by the proletariat led by the Communist party through parliamentary processes is possible, thus reinforcing the proposition that the ultimate world triumph of communism need no longer be preceded by a military holocaust. The doctrine was extensively formulated by a Czech Communist writer, Jan Kozak, in a pamphlet entitled *How Parliament Can Play a Revolutionary Part in the Transition to Socialism* (London, Independent Information Centre, 1961; published in Czech in 1957). The "all-peoples'" state was officially proclaimed in the Soviet Union at the 22nd CPSU Congress (October 1961) as having succeeded the "dictatorship of the proletariat." Since the latter concept was based on the notion of the class struggle which in Stalin's time justified terror, the new formulation signified the formal abandonment of arbitrary force in the conduct of domestic affairs.

[2] *Revista de statistica* (Bucharest), October 1963, pp. 54, 56. For the citations in East European languages I have to thank my colleagues in the research departments of Radio Free Europe.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prezentarea scrisorilor de acreditare

Desen de CIK DAMADIAN

Caption above: Ambassador Extraordinary of Coexistence—Mercury.

Caption below: Presentation of credentials. (Emblem in Mercury's hand bears the word Commerce)

—*Urzica* (Bucharest), Nov. 30, 1963.

It is worth recalling at this point that Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the Rumanian party leader, defied Khrushchev on yet another issue, that of destalinization. At the Central Committee plenum convoked in Bucharest shortly after the 22nd CPSU Congress, Gheorghiu-Dej and his colleagues undertook a public reinterpretation of Rumanian party history. According to the view that emerged from this presentation, the evils of Stalinism in Rumania had been perpetrated by foreign and pro-Soviet elements in the party leadership. Since these had been removed from power with the purge of Pauker, Luca and Georgescu in 1952, and of Chisinevschi and Constantinescu in 1957, nothing further needed to be done along the line of destalinization. It is true that police controls have been relaxed somewhat in the interim, since the new policy has earned for Dej a certain amount of popular support, but surely it is not without significance that in travelling through the country by road citizens still must pass an inspection point every 50 kilometers!

Rumanian party historians have also revised the official interpretation of the events of August 23, 1944, when Rumania deserted the Axis. The advance of the Soviet army across the Rumanian border is now minimized or even ignored altogether, and the changeover is presented as the result of a broad national movement, under Communist leadership to be sure, but including the traditional bourgeois parties and even the King. This shift in historiography was followed by such events as the closing of the Maxim Gorky Institute, the chief Rumanian center for the spread of Soviet culture, the dropping of Russian as a required language in secondary schools, the discontinuation of the Rumanian edition of the Soviet political journal *Novoe vremia,* and the favorable reevaluation of the works of leading pre-Communist Rumanian authors. The new policy of the regime thus combines Stalinist orthodoxy with an assertive nationalism.

The Rumanian determination to pursue a policy of all-round industrialization has severely hampered Soviet plans for a closer integration of East European economies, including common planning institutions and procedures, as well as common investment allocation. The Rumanians have insisted on their right not to participate in economic planning they deemed against their national interest, and they seem to have gotten their way.

There are two points to be made in connection with this rather startling development. One concerns the successful Rumanian use of blackmail. In January 1963, Rumania, the first and only Soviet bloc country to do so, sent its ambassador back to Tirana. The following June, the Bucharest press published extensive excerpts from the now notorious Chinese letter of the 14th of that month denouncing the Soviet leaders and their policies [3]—and this in spite of the explicit warning from Moscow that any propagation of the document prior to a Soviet formal reply would be regarded as an unfriendly act. No other satellite regime even mentioned the existence of the letter. Later that same June, Gheorghiu-Dej ostentatiously refused to go

[3] *Scinteia* (Bucharest), July 18, 1963, p. 3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to East Berlin where all Soviet-bloc leaders had been summoned by Khrushchev. Finally, last November, the Rumanian delegation at the United Nations voted together with the Yugoslavs in support of an atom-free zone in Latin America, even though the USSR and the other members of the Soviet bloc abstained.[4] All these moves indicated the Rumanians' willingness to deal with Peking if Moscow were not sufficiently amenable, and Khrushchev, who was already facing a host of troubles, apparently decided he could not afford to risk the defection of another, and major, satellite.

Secondly, it should be borne in mind that the Rumanian deviation could constitute an important precedent. What Rumania has done, any other European satellite, with the notable exception of the GDR, can also attempt. In other words, the Rumanian action has introduced into Eastern Europe a potential for some degree of independence in foreign policy—this in addition to the greater autonomy in internal affairs which the satellites have acquired since Khrushchev's rise to power. The opening of West German trade missions in Warsaw, Bucharest and Budapest, a significant increase in Western tourism, and new access to non-Soviet sources of iron ore and grain are all recent developments that complement the loosening of Soviet controls in East Europe and make for greater diversity and a freer play of national interests. The current Soviet rapprochement with Yugoslavia adds further to this atmosphere of permissiveness.

Increased Contacts With the West

Reinforcing certain tendencies that have been discernible in satellite politics for some time, the Sino-Soviet schism has thus strengthened in Eastern Europe the forces of revisionism, while contributing to a decline in Moscow's authority. It may be expected that in the longer run this trend is likely to express itself in the following developments: (1) greater contact with and dependence upon the West; (2) the emergence of at least an embryonic public opinion; and (3) the development of mixed economies.

Increased traffic with the West may soon become apparent, especially in the sphere of trade. Within the next three to five years, satellite trade with the West is likely to rise in absolute terms and also as a proportion of the total foreign trade of the area. Almost all the members of the bloc are already planning to import sizeable quantities of grain. Bulgaria signed a long-term wheat contract with Canada last October,[5] and the Soviet Union and Hungary have now made their first purchases in the United States.[6] More and larger agreements are expected in the future. The grain shortage which has been chronic in Eastern Europe since World War II became critical this year because of crop failure in the USSR, which has limited the Soviets' supply ability and because of the poor harvest in the satellite countries themselves. Remedial measures are now being taken in the Soviet Union—mainly in the form of increased investment in the production of synthetic fertilizers—but it will be some years before this can have an effect on average per-hectare outputs, and even fertilizers will not help soils that suffer from want of moisture.

But grain shortages are only one element in the painful economic condition of Eastern Europe. There is also the difficulty of securing up-to-date machinery from bloc sources. The Rumanians have therefore been buying increasingly large quantities of equipment in the West, and they have made it known to their bloc partners that deliveries from the West arrive on schedule and are of higher quality and cheaper.[7] The Yugoslavs, whose economy is by and large functioning better than that of any other country in Communist Eastern Europe, now receive some 75-80 percent of their imports from the non-Communist world.[8] Czechoslovakia, too, would like to draw on Western industrial technology; the country is plagued, among other things, by a labor shortage and outmoded productive facilities, and it could alleviate its economic crisis by importation of modern equipment from the West. The regime in Prague, just as the Bulgarian Government, has therefore indicated an interest in exchanging trade missions with West Germany—and presumably at the same political price the Poles, the Rumanians and the Hungarians have already paid for the same purpose: surrender of the demand for diplomatic relations with Bonn and *de facto* recognition of West Berlin as a part of the West German economy.

[4] *Ibid.*, November 21, 1963, p. 4; *Borba* (Belgrade), November 22, 1963, p. 3.

[5] BTA, October 9, 1963, as monitored by Radio Free Europe.

[6] *Pravda* (Moscow), October 2, 1963, p. 2; Carl Zoerb, "Bloc grain imports: a box score," Radio Free Europe Budget Item F-1730; *Wall Street Journal*, February 3, 1964; *Nepszabadsag* (Budapest), December 10, 1963, p. 4.

[7] *Scinteia*, May 24, 1963, p. 3 and May 31, 1963, p. 5.

[8] *Ekonomska politika* (Belgrade), January 25, 1964, p. 152.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

However, if they are to increase their trade with the West the regimes in Eastern Europe will have to find new sources of hard currency, for the availability of long-term credit is limited. Something along this line could be achieved by a readaptation of some of the East European manufactures to Western market requirements. Another quick, though short-run, solution is tourism. The Yugoslavs have already made a major national enterprise of the tourist trade and they now issue visitor's visas at the frontier with few questions asked. Bulgaria has built a major resort area at Varna, on the Black Sea, and has relaxed visa and currency requirements. Hungary has experimented with free entry for attendance at the music festival at Sopron and visitors are no longer limited to Budapest and Lake Balaton. Czechoslovakia has opened her border with Austria to three-day visitors, and a similar practice is soon to be established along her West-German frontier. Entry and exit requirements along the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border have been substantially eased.

It is true that quick foreign-exchange gains could be made in the tourist field, but the longer run limitations of this approach are clearly visible. For one thing, Varna and Prague and Sopron will have to be able to compete with Corsica and Madrid and Salzburg. It is as difficult for state-owned enterprizes to provide personal service as it is troublesome for totalitarian regimes to tolerate the freedom of individual movement and contact which tourism involves. To take a single instance, at Varna only Communist Western newspapers have been available in hotel lobbies. But why should a German-speaking businessman do without his *Frankfurter Allgemeine* or his *Neue Zürcher*? And if such papers should be distributed in the hotels, how can they then be denied to the local citizenry? Furthermore, if foreigners in great numbers are let in, how can the regimes in the long run refuse to let their own "middle" class out? That this kind of pressure makes itself felt is shown by the example of Hungary, which in 1962 granted 45,000 passports for travel to Western Europe. In the first eleven months of 1963, more than 120,000 Hungarians visited the West as private tourists.[9]

An increase in trade with the West will most likely be accompanied by stepped-up cultural contacts. Even though the Communist regimes are interested mainly in scientific and technological information, East European intellectuals are hungry for contact with their Western counterparts. Recently, for example, Slovak writers have put forward the demand that they should be granted access to Western writings in order to know better the enemy they are called upon to combat. It is a good argument, if somewhat disingenuous.

One sign of the Communists' willingness to increase cultural contact with the West is the decline in the jamming of Western radio broadcasts. The Soviets have set the example here; in June 1963 they ceased jamming official Western radios such as the VOA. The following month all jamming of Western broadcasts in the Rumanian language ceased, and seven months later, in February 1964, an end was put to all jamming of Western broadcasts in Hungarian.[10]

Jamming has always been a costly operation, costly in electricity (which is in short supply) and costly in lost prestige. Furthermore, it makes little sense to spend money on cultural exchanges and at the same time reduce contact through expensive

Austrian Tourists in Czechoslovakia

—"Porter! . . ."

—"Sorry, you'll have to be patient until we get our wage funds."

—*Dikobraz* (Prague), Jan. 16, 1964.

[9] *Magyar nemzet* (Budapest), February 1, 1964, p. 1.

[10] Polish ground-wave jammers were destroyed by the mob in 1956 and never rebuilt, but Western broadcasts in Polish are jammed by sky-wave installations located outside the country. Bloc sky-wave jamming of Western broadcasts in Albanian stopped simultaneously with sky-wave interference with Western broadcasts in Rumanian. There have never been ground-wave jammers in Albania.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

jamming operations. It is also hard to pretend having the ultimate in the way of a social order and, at the same time, blot out broadcasts coming from the "older" centers of civilization.

One effect of the decline in jamming should be an improvement in Communist news media. They will have to reduce the amount of time or space devoted to propaganda and increase the attention given sports, human interest stories, and news. Such changes should in turn improve the political atmosphere.

Emergence of Public Opinion

Increased contact with the West should also assist East European writers and artists in their struggle for freedom of expression. Of late this fight is being fought more and more in the open. Recently the Hungarian writer Peter Veres announced to an assembly of Hungarian, Rumanian and Czechoslovak authors that in Hungary the writers themselves determine the "what" and the "how" of the new socialist literature.[11] In Czechoslavakia, confronted with a party admonition to mind their own business, the writers have publicly reasserted that they represent the "conscience of the nation," a slogan they first advanced in 1956.[12] Interestingly enough—and much to the dismay of the East Germans—the Prague regime has now officially rehabilitated the works of Franz Kafka, an author whose art is deeply rooted in the Bohemian capital but hardly reconcilable with the canons of socialist realism. In Bulgaria, similar pressures against the political straightjacketing of the arts have been felt. There First Secretary Todor Zhivkov has called in the writers for a private showdown while a major poet has published rhymes obviously meant to criticize the personal foibles of the Bulgarian leader.

In other spheres of public life, signs of a growing concern for non-party opinion are also becoming apparent. Significantly, opinion polls have been tolerated in Poland for some time now and recently they have made their appearance in Hungary too. In the latter country, a year ago, the Communist party conducted national elections as if there were any doubt about the outcome; party leaders took to the hustings, mass meetings were held throughout the country, and there was a strong pretense of currying public favor. Furthermore, both Hungary and Bulgaria have shown signs of reviving, in guarded fashion, the parliamentary practice of interpellation. In Poland, recently, the regime even permitted the Sejm (parliament) to write substantial modifications into a bill on the organization of the bar which it had submitted for that body's approval.[13]

Increased cultural exchange, the decline of jamming, greater use of parliamentary institutions, and, above all, the ever more insistent demands of writers for freedom of self-expression will all contribute to the formation of an embryonic public opinion in Eastern Europe. The most promising development in this direction would be the emergence of the writers and artists as a second source of authority and ideas alongside the party. If writers and artists are allowed to debate public issues in their work—as they are already beginning to do—the party's monopoly of ideas and information will not have been broken, but it will have been seriously infringed upon. The substance of dictatorship will not have changed, of course, but its totalitarian character will have been diluted. As long as the regimes continue to seek the active cooperation of their subjects at home and a measure of respect for themselves and their policies abroad, they will have to manifest concern for non-party opinion.

Development of Mixed Economies

Apart from a certain relaxation of ideological control, we have witnessed in Eastern Europe during the past five years increased emphasis on improving the living standards of the people. The stick of police terror has been much less in use throughout the area and the carrot of consumer goods much more in evidence. Where industry is increasingly characterized by complex machinery and complicated processes, the positive cooperation of the mass of workers is more and more required; and whenever governments feel politically dependent on a measure of public support, their commitment to a betterment of living conditions is even more important.

[11] "Vita a szocialista irodalomrol," *Elet es irodalom* (Budapest), October 5, 1963, pp. 3-4.

[12] Speech of Vojtech Mihalik at the Third Congress of the Union of Czechoslovak Writers as reported in *Kulturny zivot*, May 25, 1963, pp. 1-9.

[13] Aleksandra Stypulkowska, "Czyzby koniec niezaleznej adwokatury?", *Na antenie* (London), September 22, 1963 p. 2; *Dziennik ustaw*, No. 57, December 21, 1963, item 309, pp. 596-604.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

In Eastern Europe a major obstacle to improved living standards has been the low productivity of collectivized agriculture which has been unable to feed the increasingly urbanized population of the area. As a result, except for Rumania, the East European regimes are partially dependent on imports of bread grains. Probably a good deal could be achieved with heavier inputs of mineral fertilizer, insecticides, hybrid seeds, and machinery, but all the countries concerned are characterized by capital shortages, and the fact that throughout the bloc the favored state farms operate in the red is by no means encouraging. On the other hand, the astonishing contribution of the miniscule private plots to national income suggests that in conditions of capital scarcity the short route to improved yields lies in the area of personal incentive. This road is also indicated by the success the Poles and the Yugoslavs have had with their state-managed private agricultures.

In the development of personal incentive the Hungarians have without fanfare taken a commanding lead. The variety of "material incentives" now offered the Hungarian peasant is impressive. To take but one example, hay is now farmed throughout Hungary on a crop-sharing basis (one-third goes to the farmer) and in some collectives common fields have been turned over to individual peasant families to farm on shares. (While sharecropping may represent a retrograde practice in the American South, in Eastern Europe it has the great advantage of liberating the *kolkhoznik* from his status of residual claimant at harvest time which makes him bear the risks of nature.) The number and variety of officially sponsored "material incentives" is so great that the government recently got out a pamphlet cataloguing and characterizing them all. In the course of 1963 most collective farms in Hungary adopted one or another system of personal incentives, combining it with the traditional *trudoden*. Hungarian agriculture thus appears to be in the process of fumbling toward a system which will be collective in form but something else in fact.

While the other East European countries with collectivized agricultures have so far done little in this respect, a few concessions to the private sector have recently become known. Czechoslovakia has restored the free market for goods produced on private plots, and Bulgaria has begun to double the size of such plots. (There have been meat lines of late in Czechoslovakia, while Sofia has introduced *de facto* bread rationing.) It seems likely that in the next several years we shall witness in Eastern Europe a retreat from collectivization, either in the form of greatly increased material incentives or even, perhaps, in a turn to state-managed private agriculture.

The situation in East European industry is not much better than that prevailing in agriculture. Real wages throughout the area, except again for Rumania, either remained static in 1962, or declined.[14] The Polish, Czechoslovak and Bulgarian regimes are in fact faced with economic problems of a critical nature. The situation is worse in Czechoslovakia, where the regime has had to abandon long-range planning and accept for 1963 an absolute decline in industrial production.[15] Except for Rumania and Yugoslavia, the short-term outlook for industrial growth is poor.

One of the causes of this predicament is the gap between Communist dogma and economic reality. It is no surprise, therefore, that in the industrial sector Communist doctrine has already begun to erode. As usual, the Yugoslavs were the first to grapple with reality. Under cover of their workers' councils they began experimenting with a semi-market economy approximately a decade ago. Their success has been only moderate, but they were the first Communists to put factories on a profit-and-loss basis, to reintroduce the concept of an economic rent in private housing and to accept the notion that a modicum of unemployment may be the lesser of several evils. Their reversion to a modified market economy greatly facilitated their commercial connections with the West.

More recently, the satellite regimes have begun to experiment along somewhat similar lines. As early as 1955 such Polish economists as Lange and Bobrowski were talking about a "new-model" economy by which they meant something approximating the Yugoslav experiment. In the last two years, however, the Poles have actually set aside 52 factories to work experimentally on a profit-and-loss basis. The Hungarians last November quietly decreed the introduction (as of January 1964) of an annual levy of five percent on all equipment and stock, to be deducted from the net income of industrial enterprises; in other words, the equivalent of an interest rate. That same month, *Hospodarske noviny*, the official economic organ of the Czechoslovak party Central Committee, published

[14] *Economic Survey of Europe, Part I: European Economy in 1962*, New York, United Nations, 1963, pp. 26-30; *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 24, 1963. Regime 1963 plan fulfillment reports indicate a continuance of the stagnation in real wages.

[15] *Rude pravo* (Prague), January 25, 1964, p. 1.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

proposals involving the decollectivization of the service industries and greater overall reliance on market mechanisms. At the same time, *Novo vreme,* the theoretical organ of the Bulgarian party Central Committee, carried an article proposing the introduction of something equivalent to the Yugoslav variety of workers' councils and suggesting much greater reliance on private property as a source of worker and peasant motivation. Even in the GDR there has been serious consideration of introducing interest rates and enterprise autonomy.

The drift of all these experiments and proposals is in the direction of mixed economies in which industry remains nationalized but certain market forces are set in operation. Under such a system, central planning of overall goals would continue, but not central management. Instead of receiving allocations of productive resources at a centrally determined price, enterprises would have to compete for them in the market. Instead of being rewarded for overfulfillment of a gross output target, enterprises would be rewarded for a given assortment mix of products at reduced cost. Thus state interference with price formation would become more indirect and the price structure more flexible. It is quite possible that in the next several years one or two of the satellites may refashion their economies along these lines.

Counterforces and Countertrends

In the preceding pages attention has been concentrated on the forces making for change in Eastern Europe. Little has been said, however, about the forces that run counter to the trends described. In most countries in Eastern Europe, the greatest single obstacle to the drift toward more enlightened and humane government is the party apparatus.

In the USSR, evidence of a divergence of views between the apparatus and the central leadership has been accumulating for a number of years and Khrushchev's successive destalinization campaigns have been directed in part against recalcitrant "elements" in the party bureaucracy. They were meant to be a warning that the apparatus, selected and trained under Stalin, must change its ways and learn the arts of persuasion and leadership. The party statutes were revised to require rotation in party office, and a continuing effort has been made to better educate the cadres for their tasks. It has even been argued, and quite persuasively, that Khrushchev's party-state reform of November 1962–February 1963 was designed to downgrade the apparatus.[16] Certainly one effect of the reform was to replace the first party secretary, hitherto the kingpin in the system, with two competing first party secretaries in most oblasts.

One country where the apparatus has so far put up a stubborn and successful struggle against destalinization is Bulgaria. The present Zhivkov leadership—apparently imposed on the party in November 1962 by Soviet intervention—has been unable until now to subdue successfully the Stalinist elements among the bureaucracy. Zhivkov did put into effect an amnesty for political prisoners, but a new set of rules of order aimed toward a revival of parliamentary activity proved stillborn. He seemed also unable to enforce existing legislation providing for an equitable distribution of fodder to the holders of private plots. And while he did succeed in enlarging the size of the private plots in some provinces, he evidently thought it wiser to keep this from public knowledge for many months. His effort to improve relations with the West, and notably with the United States, was offset last December by the mounting in Sophia of an anti-American spy trial and a controlled riot in front of the American Embassy.

In Hungary, to take a converse case, the regime has moved slowly but steadily towards liberalization. The stiff opposition of the provincial apparatus was offset by Kadar's skillful leadership and by the shadow of the 1956 revolutionary upheaval. Kadar's principal weapon has been the policy of rehabilitation of the non-party expert. Many, if not most, of these experts are in fact anti-Communist, but Kadar ruled that the past should be forgotten and that non-party experts could hold any office in the land, except party office. By assigning them to positions as factory managers, kolkhoz chairmen, and bureau chiefs, Kadar in effect began developing a second non-party hierarchy of public officials.

The Bulgarian and Hungarian examples suggest something of the dimensions of the problem. What Lenin called the "party of the new type" is preeminently designed to seize and hold power, but evidence suggests that it cannot successfully govern an advanced industrial country. In part this is a problem of personnel, particularly in the younger regimes of Eastern Europe where the great bulk of the *apparatchiki* are men without university training and a sizeable minority has only completed elementary school. While it is true that

[16] See Richard Lowenthal, "The World Scene Transformed," *Encounter* (London), October 1963, pp. 3-10.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

considerable numbers of people of education and culture in these countries have joined the party in order to continue the practice of their professions, few of these have joined the apparatus. The Polish so-called Partisans—a faction in the PUWP whose members are bound by common service in the Armia Ludowa of 1944-45—are more typical of the East European *apparatchiki* than many might think. Most of these prewar party members are men who have only finished elementary school, who both hate and fear intellectuals, who are nationalist in their sentiments and anti-semitic, and whose idea of government, in the main, is the discipline of the knout.

However, the poor quality of party personnel is by no means the whole story. The Soviets have had forty years in which to educate the apparatus —and great strides have been taken in this direction under Khrushchev—and yet, the party is having great difficulty in governing a modern state.

Conclusion

To sum up then, we can expect that the East European governments, with the notable exception of the GDR, will continue their erratic evolution toward greater diversity and a less totalitarian form of despotism. As a result of the deep split in the world Communist movement, they may feel compelled to look more and more inward, and less outward; in other words, the ruling parties are likely to become more national and less universal in character, more established and less sectarian, more concerned with the accumulation of worldly goods and less with the propagation of the faith. Furthermore, declining Soviet authority in the bloc, in conjunction with Moscow's need to establish revisionism as the new Communist orthodoxy, is likely to encourage continuing differentiation through local adaptation. The extent of the already existing diversity gives us some measure of what the future may bring: there are now in Eastern Europe two countries with essentially private agriculture, one operating a qualified market economy, two that have been receiving Western economic assistance, four where the jamming of Western broadcasts is either non-existent or substantially reduced, one that has set out on an independent course of industrialization based in good part on trade with the West, and one that has become the protégé of an Asiatic power.

The question arises once again whether the Communist party dictatorship, as we know it today in Eastern Europe, is a suitable way of governing relatively modern and increasingly industrialized societies. When Khrushchev rose to power in the Soviet Union, he supplanted Stalin's antiquated counter-productive personal despotism by reviving the party apparatus as the main organ of control and by introducing material incentives as the principal stimulus to productivity. This pattern was followed with more or less alacrity elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and yet, today, as grain shortages, planning deficiencies and falling rates of economic growth plague the bloc, Khrushchev's response appears insufficient. As a result, the search for solutions may now lead even further along the path toward a system that would be less revolutionary and totalitarian than the present one, but more rational and cognizant of the virtues of bureaucratic efficiency. More specifically, as there come to the fore in each country increasingly numerous and autonomous groups of scientists, technicians and industrial managers—not to speak of the newly articulate writers and artists who are beginning to infringe upon the party's monopoly of ideas and information—one may legitimately wonder whether the swift flow of social development has not already bypassed the party apparatus as a useful instrument of government. There are thus in Eastern Europe important social and economic forces pressing for basic political change. Whether the change comes, and whether it will be timely in coming and peaceful, will depend in large part on the means and tenacity with which the *apparatchiki* are ready to defend their system of absolute rule.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Face of Italian Communism

By John Ducoli

Mr. Ducoli has done advanced studies in the general field of Communist affairs and on the particular subject of Italian radical politics. As a free-lance writer, he has contributed to The New Leader, The Bulletin *(Munich) and other journals.*

The eight-year period that has elapsed since Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin at the 20th Soviet Party Congress has witnessed a striking transformation of the posture and policies of one of the most important Communist parties of Western Europe—the Communist Party of Italy (PCI). Once a party that slavishly obeyed Stalin's orders and promptly adjusted its action to support the changing objectives of Soviet international policy, the PCI has altered since 1956 to become the foremost advocate of decentralization of the international Communist movement. It is today a party which vigorously asserts the right to pursue its own Italian "way to socialism," and which, though adhering to its tie with Moscow, occasionally dares to voice disagreement with certain aspects of Soviet policy.

The purpose of the present article is to review the salient features of the PCI's response to Soviet policy since the close of World War II, showing the transition from the conformity of the Stalin era to the limited dissent of the post-1956 period. The paper will also seek to point out the factors underlying the PCI's present advocacy of greater freedom of action for individual Communist parties and to clarify where the party stands in relation to the current confrontation between Moscow and Peking.

Early Postwar Policy

The period extending from Italy's capitulation to the Allies in September 1943 until 1946 was marked by the PCI's adherence to policies dictated by the current Soviet line requiring the avoidance of any extremism which might impede the successful conclusion of hostilities against Nazi Germany. Soon after returning to Italy from exile in Moscow in March 1944, PCI chief Palmiro Togliatti called for the adoption by the party of a posture of moderation involving the suppression of insurrectionist tendencies in its ranks, willingness to collaborate in the Badoglio government, agreement to defer temporarily the question of the retention or abolition of the monarchy, and continued cooperation with all anti-Fascist forces in carrying on the struggle for national liberation.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Warning against sectarian extremism, he told his followers:

It must always be remembered that the insurrection which we desire does not have as its aim the imposition of socialist or communist social and political changes, but pursues the objective of national liberation and the destruction of Fascism. . . .[1]

Thus, the PCI appeared to be acting as a national party pursuing purely national aims. In fact, however, its proscription of a revolutionary attempt to seize power—at a time when the Italian scene manifested many of the symptoms of the Russian environment of 1917—was clearly determined by the requirements of Moscow policy. As two former Communist members of the Italian Parliament have acknowledged, "when the policy of compromise with the monarchy appeared [to represent] the genius of Cavour, it was [actually the result of] a Soviet directive aimed at guarding the political and military interests of the Soviet Union in the war against Hitler."[2]

In abjuring a direct seizure of power, however, the PCI did not renounce efforts to gain control of the Italian state by other methods. In April 1944 Togliatti's policies culminated in the entry of the PCI into the left-of-center Bonomi cabinet, in which the Communists were allocated the vitally important Ministry of Justice. The ministry had as part of its machinery a special section for eliminating Fascists, and to head it the Communists designated the militant Mauro Scoccimaro, who proceeded to utilize his powers in the political interests of the party. His zealousness in ridding the bureaucracy of both real and alleged Fascists caused numerous cabinet crises and finally resulted in the government's fall. Although the PCI failed to gain control of two other key ministries—interior and armed forces—this method of seeking power through coalition was the precursor of the design later used so successfully by the Communists in Eastern Europe. If it failed in Italy, the reason was—as PCI spokesmen have often iterated—that Italy was occupied by "Anglo-American armed forces, not by the Red Army."[3]

The "Zhdanovshchina" in Italy

The next phase of Soviet (and PCI) policy was ushered in by Stalin in February 1946 when he proclaimed the termination of the wartime "Grand Alliance" and "popular front" and called for resumption of the class struggle in both the national and international arenas.[4] Soviet delegate Andrei Vyshinski, addressing the United Nations General Assembly the following September, underscored the new hard line by accusing the Soviet Union's recent Western allies of aggressive tendencies equalling those of Nazism and Fascism.[5] These declarations were the prelude to a series of aggressive Soviet actions including the step-by-step satellization of Eastern Europe, the establishment of the Cominform, and the imposition of the Berlin blockade. Soviet diplomatic moves towards Italy sought to hinder the latter's economic recovery by effecting the confiscation of Italian assets in the Balkans and to perpetuate Italy's status as a defeated Axis power through three successive Soviet vetoes barring Italian entry into the UN.

The new Soviet line brought an abrupt change in the tactics of the PCI, which shed its cloak of moderation and embarked on a course of action designed to hinder national economic reconstruction and accomplish the overthrow of the government. Between the summer of 1946 and early 1947, the party fomented a series of strikes and riots, with armed workers seizing possession of several plants. Attacks on government establishments and personnel and disturbances involving destruction of public and private property occurred in the port of Bari and several southern provinces. Togliatti assailed the government's counter-measures, including use of the armed forces, as acts aimed at the "grinding down of the working classes of southern Italy."[6]

The Communists' resort to violence produced sharp political repercussions. A right-wing faction of the Socialist Party viewed the new tactics of the PCI as a manifestation of its subservience to "foreign forces"[7] and subsequently withdrew from the Socialist-Communist coalition.

[1] Palmiro Togliatti, *Per La Salvezza del Nostro Paese,* Rome, S. A. Puligrafica Italiana, 1946, p. 156.

[2] V. Magnani, A. Cucchi, *Crisi di una Generazione,* Florence, Nuova Italia, 1952, p. 61.

[3] See, *e.g.,* Mauro Scoccimarro, "Introduction to the Russian Edition," *Novaia Demokratiia,* Moscow, Izdatelstvo inostranoi literatury, 1959, p. 6; Luigi Longo, "Sorok let zhizni i borby Italyanskoi kommunisticheskoi partii," *Kommunist* (Moscow), No. 3, Feb., 1961, p. 85.

[4] Stalin speech of Feb. 9, reported in *Pravda,* February 10, 1946.

[5] Committee on Foreign Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, *The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism,* Washington, D. C., 1948, pp. 184-207.

[6] Martin Ebon, *World Communism Today,* New York, McGraw-Hill, 1948, p. 237.

[7] *New York Times,* Jan. 14, 1947, Section A, p. 19.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Prime Minister Alcide de Gasperi in May 1947 forced the left-wing Socialists and their Communist allies out of the government, ending the period of Communist participation in the cabinet.

Meanwhile, in Moscow, the action of the Italian party was viewed as weak and indecisive. Accordingly, at Cominform meetings held in September-October 1947 and June 1948, the PCI was severely admonished for incorrectly evaluating the national political situation and neglecting opportunities to seize power, and the party was ordered to upgrade its estimate of Italian working-class strength and grasp the offensive.[8] The PCI's response was a new series of Communist-instigated disorders in which large estates were seized in several rural provinces and seemingly synchronized riots took place in some of the largest urban centers. Fear of civil war became widespread.

The climax was reached in July 1918 when a near-successful attempt on Togliatti's life touched off what appeared to be a Communist effort to initiate real revolution. Within an hour of the assassination attempt general strike orders went out from the Communist-controlled Chamber of Labor, and *l'Unità*, the central party newspaper, called for "the elimination of the government of civil war." Although important debates were in progress in both houses of Parliament, a number of the Communist members, apparently following a planned course of action, went to various provincial centers to direct the revolutionary movement. The ensuing disorders were marked by such plainly insurrectionary acts as the blockade of roads, attempts to occupy radio stations and seize arms, and the occupation of factories. Revolutionary disorders were particularly intense at Turin, where Communist senators led the agitation, and at Genoa, but elsewhere the party's action proved largely ineffective. At Leghorn and Venice insurrectionary activity was held in check by police action and public apathy, while in the south workers even refused to join in the general strike, although sporadic acts of violence took place at Taranto and Naples.

The abortive attempt at revolution seriously damaged the public image of the PCI. Reviewing the July events, the *Nuovo Corriere della Sera* of Milan (July 17, 1948) commented:

It was not merely a general strike that failed, but a general attempt at a true and real Communist insurrectionary movement. The failure was brought about not only by the firm stand of the authorities and the forces of order, but also by the profound isolation which the revolutionaries have seen increasing around them and by the deep cleavage that exists between the country and this turbulent and seditious minority which dares to execute the orders of the Cominform.

The sharp setback suffered by the PCI led Togliatti shortly afterward to rule out further indulgence in "insurrectionary opportunism," but the period of the "Zhdanovshchina" produced ample additional evidence of the party's subservience to Soviet policies. As one of the PCI leaders, Pietro Secchia, frankly stated, "Communist parties and their leaders are guided . . . by Soviet attitudes, and the interests of the USSR are absolutely identical with those of the workers of all countries."[9] Thus, on a whole series of international issues such as the problem of Trieste, Soviet reparations claims against Italy, disposition of the Italian fleet, and Italian participation in Western security groupings, the PCI took positions that clearly served Soviet rather than Italian national interests.

The party's abrupt reversal of its stand regarding Trieste illustrated its subordination to Moscow with particular force. Prior to Stalin's break with Tito in 1948, Moscow supported Yugoslav territorial claims against Italy in the disputed border region, and in line with this Soviet policy the PCI sought to promote a settlement based on an offer conveyed by Tito to Togliatti, whereby Belgrade would consent to the cession of Trieste to Italy in return for the cession of certain adjacent Italian territory to Yugoslavia.[10] Tito's terms would have resulted in the isolation of Trieste from the rest of Italy and consequently aroused intense indignation among the Italian public; nevertheless, Togliatti continued to press for "a direct agreement with the new Yugoslavia."[11] With the Stalin-Tito rupture, however, there was a sudden and complete turnabout in the PCI's attitude. Dropping its previous advocacy of a settlement along the lines of Tito's proposal, the party instead urged execution of the Italian peace

[8] Josip Broz Tito, "The People's Front and the New Yugoslavia," *Political Affairs* (Belgrade), Jan., 1948, p. 80 ff; A. Zhdanov, *The International Situation*, Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1947, pp. 43-47.

[9] *Il Nuovo Corriere della Sera* (Milan), July 1, 1948.

[10] *Relazioni Internazionali* (Milan), Oct. 9, 1954, p. 1114.

[11] Ebon. *op. cit.*, p. 240.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

treaty provisions calling for the transformation of Trieste into a "Free Territory" under international administration. This, Togliatti argued, was necessary to assure that Trieste "would cease to be a military base for the Anglo-Americans and the Yugoslavs."[12]

The Communist Peace Offensive

The aggressive policies pursued by the Soviet Union during 1946-48 spurred the Western nations into taking steps to build up their own collective defense system, resulting in the conclusion of the NATO treaty in April 1949 and a commitment by the United States to provide extensive military assistance to its European defense partners. The Italian government signed the NATO treaty on April 14, and on July 20 the Soviet Union formally protested this action, charging that Italy had joined "a military grouping having an aggressive character and directed against the Soviet Union and the people's democracies," and that Italian acceptance of US military aid would be a violation of peace treaty provisions limiting armaments.[13] In a statement published in Moscow a few days later, Togliatti alleged that the Italian government had joined the NATO alliance in an attempt to preserve the social system and avert revolution.[14]

Faced by the tightening of Western defense solidarity, the Soviet leadership in 1949 shifted to a strategy of diplomatic maneuver aimed at creating an atmosphere of detente coupled with a worldwide Communist peace campaign designed to obstruct implementation of the NATO alliance. At a Cominform meeting in Hungary in November 1949, Soviet delegate Mikhail Suslov declared that "the defense of peace and the struggle against the warmongers must be the center of Communist activity," and that it was the special responsibility of the West European Communist parties to prevent the American "imperialists" from using their peoples as "cannon fodder." The West European parties were called upon to undertake efforts to attract non-Communists and even anti-Communists to the tasks of "defending peace" and "preventing war."[15] The PCI Central Committee shortly afterward adopted the Cominform program *in toto*.[16]

To discharge its responsibilities, the PCI proceeded to organize strikes, demonstrations, and mass meetings condemning "war preparations." There were widespread disturbances in various parts of the country, and in Parliament Communist deputies engaged in scuffles with members of the ruling Christian Democratic Party. "Peace partisans" bombarded the legislature with petitions demanding the prohibition of atomic weapons and disarmament of the police. The arrival of the first shipment of American arms evoked threats of violence, but Communist attempts to disrupt unloading of the cargo proved unsuccessful.

Following the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, Moscow called upon Communist parties in the West to encourage acts of sabotage against support of UN military action for the defense of South Korea. The PCI responded by organizing a symbolic strike, and the Communist-controlled Italian National Peace Committee cautioned the government that "under no circumstances . . . should the will of the nation for peace be compromised by direct or indirect acts of military intervention or solidarity with aggression."[17] Although these moves failed to deter the Italian government from aligning itself with the UN action, the PCI continued the peace campaign, collecting 17 million signatures to the Communist-sponsored Stockholm Appeal.

In the spring of 1951 Togliatti tried a different method of promoting Soviet objectives, offering to renounce PCI opposition to the government in both Parliament and the country provided the government would switch to a neutral foreign policy.[18] This proposal, however, was rejected, and the Socialist-Communist coalition renewed its activities in promoting strikes and peace demonstrations. PCI spokesmen claimed that in the period from April 1948 to March 1951 nearly 100,000 persons, three-fourths of them party members, had been arrested "for fighting in defense of work, freedom, and peace"; that almost 19,000 had been sentenced to prison; and that 63 had been killed, and over 3,000 wounded, in clashes with the police.[19]

[12] Togliatti interviews with *L'Humanite*, as reported in *Relazioni Internazionali*, Oct. 4, 1952, p. 1035.

[13] *Izvestia*, July 20, 1949.

[14] *Pravda*, July 23, 1949.

[15] *Bolshevik* (Moscow), No. 22 (Nov., 1949), pp. 10-14.

[16] *Pravda*, Dec. 24, 1949.

[17] *For A Lasting Peace, For A People's Democracy* (Prague), June 23, 1950. (Hereafter cited as *FLP, FDP.*)

[18] *FLP, FPD*, April 13, 1951.

[19] *FLP, FPD*, Mar. 9, 1951.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

During 1952 the PCI continued to manifest its support of Moscow policy by attacking the Italian government's pro-Western orientation. In a statement echoing Soviet charges, PCI Deputy Secretary-General Luigi Longo censured the government for allowing the United States to use Italian territory as "a base for aggression," for participating in an "aggressive bloc" in violation of the peace treaty, and for procrastinating in making reparations payments to the Soviet Union.[20]

PCI-CPSU Relations Since Stalin

The death of Stalin in March 1953 was the prelude to a period of far-reaching change in Soviet domestic and foreign policy as well as in relationships between the CPSU and other Communist parties. While moving cautiously in the direction of political relaxation at home, the new leadership directed its external efforts towards easing international tensions; its actions over the next several years included the termination of the state of war with Germany and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the West German Federal Republic, signature of the Austrian peace treaty, the return of a military base to Finland, and the rapprochement with Tito.

In Italy, Togliatti promptly echoed the new Moscow line by calling for an international detente, an end to the trend towards "the bifurcation of Europe," a curb on the resurgence of "German militarism," and steps to implement a policy of peaceful coexistence.[21] The PCI also strove to improve its public image and heighten its appeal to the Italian electorate by championing the grievances of urban and rural workers and stressing the threat of atomic war and the necessity of preserving peace.[22]

With Khrushchev's revelations at the 20th CPSU Congress, however, the long servitude of the PCI to Moscow began to show signs of erosion. The repudiation of Stalin evoked a profound reaction in the Italian party, impelling some of its leaders to raise questions about the complicity of others in Stalin's crimes and to demand a satisfactory explanation of the causes responsible for the rise of the cult of personality. Togliatti himself criticized the Soviet leadership's attribution of the errors of an entire group to a single individual as an "un-Marxist" judgment, sought the erection of safeguards against a repetition of Stalin's crimes, and questioned the universal applicability of Soviet experience to other countries.[23]

But perhaps the most significant aspect of Togliatti's reaction was his thesis that the international Communist system was evolving in the direction of "polycentrism," which would permit "complete autonomy of the individual movements and Communist parties."[24] Although the 20th Congress had granted recognition to the principle of divergent paths to socialism, the Soviet leadership was unprepared to sanction such a dilution of central Soviet authority as Togliatti's concept of a multi-centered Communist system implied. The decisions of the 1957 Communist conference in Moscow tended, in effect, to support the Soviet view by setting limits to the autonomy which individual Communist parties might exercise.[25]

The second wave of destalinization launched by Khrushchev at the 22nd CPSU Congress in late 1961 gave rise to even more acrimonious debate within the PCI Central Committee. Togliatti claimed that the Soviet leader's move was without relevance for the Italian party, and he complained that the further publicity given to Stalin's criminal acts was not only causing a split between the old and new generations of Soviet society but also doing serious damage to the international Communist movement.[26] Others pointed to Khrushchev's participation in decision-making under Stalin, voiced dissatisfaction with Soviet explanations of the personality cult, and blamed the CPSU leadership for the degeneration of the Soviet bureaucracy.[27] One of the more liberal members of the party leadership, Giorgio Amendola, called for an end to the "fictitious unanimity" of the Communist movement and for recognition of

[20] *Relazioni Internazionali,* Mar. 1, 1952, p. 243; *FLP, FPD,* Mar. 21, 1952.

[21] Palmiro Togliatti, *Per un Nuovo Indirizzo della Politica Italiana,* Rome, Stam. Tip. EII, 1953, pp. 21-25.

[22] M. Grindrod, *The Rebuilding of Italy,* London and New York, Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1955, pp. 114-115; *Esteri* (Rome), No. 2 (Jan. 31, 1955), p. 5.

[23] Palmiro Togliatti, *Dopo Il XX Congresso del P. C. U. S.,* Milan, Stampa della Federazione Milanese del PCI, 1956, *passim.*

[24] *Ibid.,* p. 97.

[25] See Richard Lowenthal, "Schism among the Faithful," *Problems of Communism,* No. 1 (Jan.-Feb.) 1962, p. 4.

[26] *L'Unità,* Nov. 11, 1961; *Civitas* (Rome), No. 3 (March), 1962, pp. 43-44.

[27] *Civitas,* Nos. 11-12, 1961, pp. 188-190; *Nuova Generazione* (Rome), Nov. 17, 1961; *Rinascita* (Rome), No. 2, 1962, pp. 129-131.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the right to form minorities within the PCI.[28] *Nuova Generazione,* organ of the Italian Communist youth organization, even went so far as to "rehabilitate" Trotsky, calling him "one of the most original personalities of the October Revolution."[29]

FROM CONFORMITY . . .

The banner of bourgeois democratic freedoms has been cast overboard. I think it is up to you, the representatives of the Communist and democratic parties, to raise this banner and carry it forward if you wish to rally the majority of people around you.

—From Stalin's speech to the 19th CPSU Congress, Pravda, Oct. 15, 1952.

We are raising this banner, we are holding it high and defending it, confident that in doing so we are defending the cause of progress and the interests of the vast majority of citizens.

—Togliatti's response to Stalin's appeal, reported in Izvestia, Jan. 14, 1953.

. . . TO DISSENT

. . . in reality, the "common market" is a state-monopolistic association of Western Europe's financial oligarchies, which threatens the vital interests of all peoples . . .

—From statement by Khrushchev, reported in Relazioni Internazionali (Milan), June 9, 1962.

The tendency to overcome the actual situation [West European economic inferiority] and prepare a better future through enlargement of restricted national markets and new forms of international collaboration in the economic world is . . . understandable and even just.

—From March 1957 resolution of the PCI Directorate, reprinted in Rinascita (Rome), Sept. 22, 1962.

The criticisms emanating from the Italian party drew a prompt rebuke from *Pravda* (Nov. 21, 1961), which complained that "some honest people abroad . . . fail to probe more deeply . . . into the nature of Soviet society, and discuss the problem from a foreign viewpoint. In fact, they accept the bourgeois thesis of a degeneration of Soviet society." Meanwhile, on the issue of polycentrism, Soviet opposition to the stand of the PCI leadership received backing from the Polish and Czechoslovak parties. Gomulka warned that polycentrism might stem from either dogmatic or revisionist tendencies within a party,[30] while Czechoslovak party journals viewed it as an obstacle to the spread of Leninism.[31]

Nevertheless, the positions taken by PCI representatives at various conferences of Communist-controlled international organizations since the 22nd Congress have continued to reflect the Italian party's insistence upon greater autonomy within the international Communist movement. This was strikingly evident, for example, at the Fifth Congress of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) which took place in Moscow in December 1961, shortly after the 22nd Congress. In the debate on a proposed new program for the WFTU, the Italian delegates, led by Agostino Novella, Secretary-General of the Italian General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) and a member of the top PCI leadership, voiced strong opposition to the program on the ground that it denied the national trade union organizations within the WFTU sufficient freedom to act according to their own interests rather than in subservience to Soviet policy. Trade union activities, Novella argued, should not be required to support any country's foreign policy.[32] In the end, however, the draft program was adopted over the Italian objections following a warning by Khrushchev that "it would be an irreparable error for the trade union forces to split before the world attack of imperialism and become closeted in national compartments."[33]

The same basic issue of autonomy was again at the core of a conflict between the Soviet and Italian viewpoints at a WFTU meeting which took place at Leipzig in December 1962 to deliberate on policy towards the Common Market. In line with

[28] *Civitas,* No. 3, 1962, pp. 43-44.

[29] *Nuova Generazione,* Nov. 10, 1961.

[30] Polish Agency Press (PAP), *Materials and Documents,* No. 23 (1961) p. 17.

[31] *Bratislava Pravda,* Mar. 17, 1962; see also *Mlada Fronta* (Prague), Mar. 7, 1962.

[32] *Relazioni Internazionali,* Dec. 30, 1961, p. 1780; See also G. E. Lynd, "Workers Disunite," *Problems of Communism,* No. 2 (Mar.-Apr.) 1962, pp. 18-19.

[33] *Relazioni Internazionali,* Dec. 30, 1961, p. 1780.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Soviet policy, which called for a concerted struggle "to counter the imperialist policy of integration,"[34] WFTU Secretary-General Louis Saillant proposed a resolution for the establishment of a world anti-monopoly committee to coordinate action. The representatives of the PCI, however, objected on the ground that the proposal would result in a sterile propaganda gesture and argued that what was needed was a plan for coordinated efforts by West European trade union organizations to overcome the "closed area" of the Common Market. They further advocated emphasis on traditional trade union objectives, accompanied by organizational reforms permitting greater worker participation in decision-making. The Soviet delegate criticized the Italian position for failing to take into account the divergent goals of "capitalist" and "socialist" trade unions, while the Chinese and Albanian representatives flatly condemned it as reeking of class collaboration.[35] The final outcome was the adoption of a compromise resolution incorporating some concessions to the Italian viewpoint but reiterating the standard Soviet condemnation of the Common Market.[36]

Perhaps the root cause of the PCI's strong insistence upon greater freedom of action is the feeling which has arisen within the party that the CPSU, in exercising its international leadership, has often acted more in the interests of the Soviet state than of the Communist movement as a whole, and that it has failed to give due consideration to the special situations of the individual parties. Thus, the PCI leadership feels that Moscow should recognize that the Italian party operates in an open society, and that such Soviet actions as the ruthless suppression of the 1956 Hungarian revolt and the breaking of the moratorium on nuclear testing hardly help either to further the Communist cause generally or to improve the national image of the PCI. Togliatti's comment on the Soviet move to change the name of Stalingrad to Volgograd aptly reflected this sentiment:

The Soviet comrades should consider the real conditions and sensibilities of popular opinion in capitalist countries and should not require undertakings that are not absolutely necessary.[37]

[34] *Pravda*, Aug. 26, 1962.

[35] *Rinascita*, No. 34 (Dec. 29, 1962), p. 13; *Relazioni Internazionali*, Dec. 22, 1962, p. 1518.

[36] See supplement to *Problemy mira i sotsializma* (Prague), No. 4, 1963, pp. 1-4.

[37] *Ibid.*, No. 1 (Jan. 5, 1963), p. 32; *Civitas*, Nos. 11-12 (Nov.-Dec., 1961), p. 189.

The PCI and the Sino-Soviet Conflict

Important as the divergencies are between the PCI and CPSU, they obviously are far less serious than those which divide the Italian and Chinese Communists. In fact, on most if not all of the major issues involved in the Sino-Soviet conflict, the PCI has taken positions either identical with or close to those of the Soviet leadership. The disagreements between the Italian and Chinese parties concern five main topics and may be briefly summarized as follows:

Nuclear war. The PCI leadership concurs in Khrushchev's view that nuclear war must be avoided since, as Togliatti has stated, it would mean that "nothing will remain of human civilization."[38] The CCP, Soviet claims to the contrary notwithstanding, also wishes to avoid a nuclear holocaust; yet it views its possible outbreak in a far more sanguine light, contending that a nuclear conflict would result in Communist victory, the destruction of capitalism, and the creation of "a civilization a thousand times better than the capitalist system."[39] PCI organs have retorted that Peking's "unrealistic" evaluation is at the root of the CPI's tendency to accept only total solutions to international problems,[40] while the Chinese view the Italian party's position as possibly "leading to unconditional surrender and complete abandonment of all revolutionary ideals and principles."[41]

Disarmament. Although its attitude on this issue has not always been consistent, the CCP has on several occasions taken the position that complete and universal disarmament could result in the continuation of imperialist domination over the non-socialist world.[42] It has also voiced resentment over Soviet refusal in 1959 to help China attain her own atomic capability[43] and has roundly

[38] *Pravda*, July 28, 1960.

[39] From a Chinese pamphlet, *Long Live Leninism;* parts have been translated in *Rinascita*, No. 4 (April 1962), p. 291. *Hung C'hi* (Peking), Mar. 4, 1963, examines the CCP's differences with Togliatti on nuclear war: Italian translation in *Relazioni Internazionali*, No. 34 (Aug. 24, 1963), pp. 1149-1153.

[40] *Rinascita*, No. 33 (Aug. 24, 1963), p. 2.

[41] *Jen-min Jih-pao* (Peking), Dec. 31, 1962: English translation in *The Washington Post*, Jan. 1, 1963.

[42] This view was emphasized by Chinese Communist spokesmen at a recent meeting of the World Peace Council at Stockholm and at the conference of Afro-Asian writers in Cairo. *Rinascita*, No. 4, (April 1962), p. 295.

[43] Official Chinese statements of Aug. 15 and Sept. 1, 1963: Italian translations in *Relazioni Internazionali*, No. 35 (Aug. 31, 1963), pp. 1215-17; No. 37 (Sept. 14, 1963), pp. 1281-83.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

THREE PARTIES, THREE VIEWS

In a sense . . ., the whole cause of the international proletarian revolution hinges on the outcome of the revolutionary struggles of the people of these areas [Asia, Africa, and Latin America], who constitute the overwhelming majority of the world's population.

—From CCP letter of June 14, 1963, to the CPSU, English translation in Peking Review, *June 21, 1963.*

. . . the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party . . . treats as something secondary the task of strengthening the power and unity of the socialist camp, the heroic struggle of the working class and the Communist parties of the western countries. Peking declares that "the main zone of world revolutionary storms is Asia, Africa, and Latin America."

The CPSU and the entire world Communist movement decisively reject the harmful theoretical formulation of "the main zone of storms."

—From Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunardnyie otnosheniia *(Moscow), No. 11, 1963, p. 84.*

The solidarity of the world workers' movement does not depend automatically on the presence and strength of the powerful socialist camp and a strong workers' movement in capitalist countries . . .

—From editorial in Rinascita *(Rome), No. 29, July 20, 1963, p. 2*

condemned the recent Soviet-American nuclear test-ban treaty as a "betrayal" by Moscow of the interests of the socialist camp. The PCI, on the contrary, advocates disarmament as necessary to isolate "the warmongers" and to facilitate the anti-colonial struggle,[44] and it favors adopting "any legitimate means" of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. As for giving them to China, Togliatti has flatly stated:

If it is true that the Soviet Union has refused to make China an atomic power, our opinion is that it was right and that it served the cause of peace, international detente, and disarmament.[45]

The world balance of power. The PCI shares the Soviet view that the world balance of power is shifting in favor of the socialist camp, as opposed to the Chinese argument that the shift is only quantitative and has not altered the fundamentally aggressive character of imperialism. Though not contesting the Chinese assessment of imperialism's nature, the Italian party points out that United States policy has successively shifted from roll-back to containment, and finally to negotiation. "The CCP's dogmatic assertion of the unchanging nature of imperialism," argues the PCI's monthly organ, "forces Communists and fighters for peace to fall into the absurdity of fearing an imperialism compelled to maneuver rather than wage war."[46]

National liberation. The PCI criticizes the Peking leadership for failing to draw any line of distinction between "struggles" and "wars" of national liberation and contends that the Chinese policy, if accepted by the bloc, could result in "the isolation of the proletarian vanguard." A Communist decision to continue the wars in Algeria and Vietnam after the cease-fire agreements, stated a PCI comment, "would have been sheer folly indicative of a blindness to . . . imperialism's greater difficulty in exporting counter-revolution."[47] On the other hand, the CCP equates the Italian position with the advocacy of peaceful coexistence between oppressors and oppressed.[48]

Peaceful transition to socialism. In spite of its recognition by the 20th CPSU Congress, Togliatti's concept of the feasibility of a peaceful transition to socialism through parliamentary methods has consistently been attacked by Chinese Communist spokesmen as "revisionist" and "an error of principle." Though the CCP grudgingly acknowledged it at the 1957 and 1960 conferences of Communist parties, it has made clear that it did so only out of "higher considerations of unity."[49] For its part, the PCI adamantly refused at the 1960 conference to accept any formulation that "would result in watering down or changing the thesis," and the party leadership has stated that any attenuation of the concept would undermine the whole basis of the PCI's postwar policy and practice.[50]

[44] *Rinascita,* No. 4 (April 1, 1962), p. 295.
[45] *Ibid.,* No. 33 (Aug. 24, 1963), pp. 1-2.
[46] *Ibid.,* No. 4 (April, 1962), p. 294.
[47] *Ibid.,* p. 295.
[48] *Jen-min Jih-pao,* Dec. 31, 1962: English translation in *The Washington Post,* Jan. 1, 1963.
[49] *Jen-min Jih-pao,* Sept. 6, 1963: Italian translation in *Relazioni Internazionali,* No. 39 (Aug. 28, 1963), pp. 1333-1342, especially p. 1342.
[50] L. Basso, *Da Stalin a Krusciov,* Milan Edizione Avanti, 1962, p. 96.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Outlook

The transformation that has taken place in the PCI's relationship to Moscow since 1956 represents in large measure the result of pressures stemming from the national environment. The Italian party operates in an open society where ideas circulate freely, and the stand which its leadership takes on domestic and international issues constitutes the measure of the appeal it will have to its own membership, to its Socialist sympathizers and collaborators, and to the public in general. Complete concurrence by the leadership in all Soviet policies would necessarily strengthen the forces threatening to split the party and deepen the isolation of the PCI in the Italian body politic.

Since the revelations of the 20th CPSU Congress, the party membership has declined by about one-fifth. The question of whether the evils of the Stalin cult represented a mere aberration or were the inevitable outgrowth of defects inherent in the Soviet political system continues to plague the party's followers, and the PCI leadership finds itself hard put to defend Soviet political institutions and to explain away many of the repugnant features of the Stalin era—leadership apotheosis, bureaucratic distortions, maximum centralization, forced industrialization, slave labor camps, and doctrinal dogmatism.

Much of the effectiveness of the PCI in postwar Italian politics has depended upon its ability to work in cooperation with the Socialists, and the issue of the PCI's subservience to "foreign forces" has been an important factor in the vicissitudes of that cooperation. At present, with the PCI's former left-wing Socialist allies (the PSI, under Pietro Nenni) participating in the left-of-center Moro government, the Italian Communists find themselves in a difficult position of political isolation. Still, an important measure of Socialist-Communist cooperation continues at the local government level and in the CGIL, and this makes the PCI leadership understandably reluctant to identify the party with policies unacceptable to the Socialists. Moreover, Togliatti still hopes to restore the PCI's influence through efforts to bring about the formation of "a historic bloc of forces" including liberal Catholics and segments of the middle class—a policy which, incidentally, the Chinese Communists hold repugnant as an example of class collaboration.

Another important element conditioning the PCI's desire for autonomy is the fact that it must necessarily exercise circumspection in criticizing the various multilateral European economic arrangements which have contributed so much to Italy's present economic prosperity. Increased affluence has caused the Italian public generally to give wholehearted support to West European economic integration, and the PCI, whatever Moscow's attitude, can hardly afford to take a position that would run counter to this sentiment.

Thus, the national milieu in which the PCI functions impels it to press for the decentralization of international communism. Unity in diversity is its goal. The party's advocacy of polycentrism is accompanied by opposition to the convocation of international Communist conferences designed to "impose unity from above": it argues against any resort to excommunication of dissenters and urges instead bilateral discussions to iron out inter-party differences and promote better mutual understanding of each individual party's problems.

All this, of course, has a vital bearing on the PCI's attitude towards the Sino-Soviet conflict. On the substantive issues in dispute, as indicated earlier, the Italian party stands much closer to Moscow than to Peking, but it nevertheless does not wish to see a solution based on a reassertion of centralized Soviet domination of the international Communist movement. It therefore seems probable that the PCI leadership will remain cool to any move to coerce the Chinese into compliance with Soviet policies and will try instead to promote a reconciliation based on compromise and mutual accommodation. However, in the event—which this writer now considers possible—that the conflict between Moscow and Peking should intensify to the point of final rupture, there is little doubt that the PCI would take its stand in support of the CPSU. After all, Togliatti has unequivocally stated:

. . . the tie with the Soviet Union has been our life; it has been an essential part of the life and conscience of the working class and its vanguard. Therefore, this tie is placed above and beyond the debate which we all want to conduct.[51]

[51] *L'Unita*, Sept. 29, 1957.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

BOOKS

Peking Versus Moscow

Peking and Moscow, *by Klaus Mehnert. Tr. from German by Lelia Vennewitz. New York, G. P. Putnam & Sons, 1963.*

The New Cold War, Moscow v. Peking, *by Edward Crankshaw. Baltimore, Md., Penguin Books, 1963.*

Mao against Khrushchev: A Short History of the Sino-Soviet Conflict, *by David Floyd. New York and London, Praeger, 1964.*

Zerfall des Weltkommunismus: Einheit oder Polyzentrismus, *by Gunther Nollau. Cologne, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, 1963.*

Reviewed by Erik Willenz

Mr. Willenz, who teaches at the School of International Service, American University (Washington, D.C.), has published a number of articles on Communist affairs. His special area of interest is communism in Western Europe.

The late Franz Borkenau back in 1951 predicted a rupture in relations between the Chinese and Soviet Communists before the end of the decade, basing this forecast on his firm belief that their totalitarian ideology and divergent national interests would make prolonged collaboration between them impossible. Ever since, history and historians seem to have been racing to catch up with Borkenau's prophecy. Not only were Sovietologists and Sino-Soviet experts effectively scooped by their late colleague, but they have been unable since to project much beyond Borkenau's earlier prediction, despite the wealth of material that has recently come to the fore. This is not to denigrate the efforts of scholars and research institutes, whose patient and exacting work has been of immense value in providing up-to-date knowledge of the momentous events affecting relations between the two principal Communist powers. Their problem is that so much has been happening so fast that they are kept busy simply collecting, sifting and reporting relevant information. In this situation there is little opportunity for the type of reflective thinking and imaginative theorizing that seem plainly called for at a time when relationships in the Communist world are in an unprecedented state of flux.

Notwithstanding the formidable difficulties involved, there is no dearth of publications for those desirous of learning more about the nature of the Sino-Soviet conflict, its origin, and possible outcome. In fact, rarely has the prospective reader enjoyed such a buyer's market on a topic of such comparative recentness. He may choose among paperbacks, massive tomes, slender volumes, exhaustive docu-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

mentary compilations, and documentary collections supplemented by analytical commentary. Among the latest crop of the more notable books on this topic are the four works under review, all written by long-time observers of Communist affairs: Klaus Mehnert's *Peking and Moscow,* a slightly revised and updated translation of his earlier German book,[1] Edward Crankshaw's *The New Cold War, Moscow v. Peking,* a paperback; David Floyd's *Mao against Khrushchev,* a brief, analytical account with a long documentary annex; and finally Günther Nollau's *Zerfall des Weltkommunismus,* a German paperback that analyzes the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the Communist world movement.

Of the first three works, Mehnert's book is much more ambitious in scope than either Crankshaw's or Floyd's brief interpretive commentaries. Nevertheless, there is substantial agreement among the three authors, particularly when they discuss the course of Sino-Soviet relations since 1960. All look with distinct skepticism on the chances that an ostensibly common ideology will prove stronger in the long run than the increasingly divergent national interests of the two Communist rivals. Mehnert reaches this conclusion after a long preliminary comparative analysis of the impact of communism on the culture, history, politics, and economics of the Chinese and Russians. Crankshaw and Floyd are less circumspect. They regard clashing national interests as the root cause of the dispute and ideological disputations between the two contestants as of only secondary importance.

This is not the place to rehearse the well-worn arguments regarding the relative importance of ideology and power in the Communist systems. Moreover, there is no disagreement on this reviewer's part with the contention that both the Soviets and the Chinese Communists have used ideology in a rather arbitrary and self-serving fashion. However, it still seems that Messrs. Floyd and Crankshaw underrate the importance of the ideological dispute as a key to the power struggle going on. It has long been obvious that any rigidly doctrinaire movement is highly sensitive to ideological challenges from within. In addition, ever since the Bolshevik revolution disputes in ideological matters have also been disputes over leadership, and hence over power. The effective leverage which arises from this circumstance has been well understood by the Chinese, who have defied the Russians on the correct interpretation of ideological principles and not in the arena of national power.

Mehnert makes the preceding and other worthwhile observations about the Sino-Soviet dispute in an almost offhand fashion, as if they were mere footnotes to his vast opus. His broader aim, it would appear, is to correct certain basic misconceptions about Communist China and Soviet Russia that have been perpetrated by well-meaning but uninformed and naive observers. Hence his decision to approach the Sino-Soviet dispute by way of an extended comparative analysis of the Russian and Chinese societies.

It is not possible here to take up the details of his synoptic cultural-anthropological analysis. Suffice it to note that he places particular stress on the uniquely "European" character of the Russians and the "Chinese-Asian" qualities of the Chinese that have affected the course of Marxism-Leninism in each country. The author chides those who regard the present Communist regimes in China and Soviet Russia as either the very antithesis of the "real" China and Russia or as the very embodiment of their basic value systems. Neither view, in Mehnert's eyes, comes to grips with what is a far more complex reality. As far as he is concerned, what is needed is a better understanding of those deeply ingrained differences in the two societies that have impeded the adoption of a purportedly common ideological outlook by their respective leaders.

Mehnert's emphasis on ethnocentric factors does not lead him to accept the thesis, so widespread a few years ago in Germany, of an inevitable "racial" clash between Communist China with its burgeoning population and the Soviet Union with its sparsely settled Far Eastern regions. While the author sees a considerable hardening of the frontier in that area—already confirmed by more recent incidents of all kinds—he disputes the likelihood of a head-on conflict, thereby deflating possibly premature hopes on the part of some Germans.

Once Mehnert's excursion into comparative *"Voelkerkunde"* comes to an end—and it comprises over half of his book—his, Crankshaw's, and Floyd's discussion of the more recent developments in Sino-Soviet relations go over the same ground, use some of the same source material, and are therefore, to some extent, repetitious. This is inevitable as all three works were written at about the same time. The question is whether these overlapping efforts have enriched our knowledge of the problem or provided us with new insights. In this reviewer's opinion, the answer is only a qualified "yes."

To take one example. All three authors devote a great deal of space to the problem of ascertaining the first discernible signs of Sino-Soviet tensions—other than those of a manifest character. Mehnert's more carefully researched discussion on this subject suggestively probes the interwar period but settles more

[1] *Peking und Moskau,* Stuttgart, Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

firmly on the immediate years after World War II as the harbinger of real differences. Crankshaw sees the seeds of conflict at first in the Korean war, but decides then to move away from this event, touches on the fateful 20th CPSU Congress in 1956, only to home in on the Lebanon crisis in 1958. Floyd also sees in the Korean war a clue to the emergence of important differences but ends by adopting a broader view of "a more fundamental rivalry existing between these two great nations."

However diligent their investigation, the authors' very effort in seeking to pinpoint the origin of the Sino-Soviet dispute raises serious questions. In the case of Mehnert such an approach is particularly surprising inasmuch as it seems to violate his own assumptions that the conflict is the product of many complex circumstances over a long period of history. Moreover, all three authors incur the unnecessary risk of having either party to the dispute controvert their findings at any time by simply announcing that some other event, not yet mentioned, triggered the dispute. As of now the Chinese find it convenient to date the trouble to 1956, but this is not necessarily the final word from either side.

It is not the risk of being wrong, however, that makes this entire search fruitless. Its more serious flaw is that such undue preoccupation with the precise causes of the rift seems to imply wonderment that it ever could have taken place —and thereby indirectly to support the untenable proposition, long fostered by the Communists, that "socialist regimes" are immune to the normal rivalries and difficulties afflicting "capitalist states." If anything has been demonstrated in the last few years to all but the most intransigent believers in continued "socialist monolithic unity," it is the fact that the Communist world is far from free of the fissures usually associated by them with "the decadent capitalist world."

If the search for the precise origin of the Sino-Soviet dispute seems to have taken all three authors on a merry chase, they show much greater circumspection in looking into the future. None of them regards the Sino-Soviet dispute as susceptible of a basic reversal, either through a solution of the major problems involved or through the future subordination of one power's policies to the other. Crankshaw suggests that a certain community of interest between Moscow and Peking might well continue to exist on a number of issues. While this seems to rule out any general war between the two disputants—unthinkable in an age of nuclear weapons—Crankshaw goes so far as to single out China as the common future threat to everyone, including the Russians. It would appear that his view of the future includes the Soviets in a kind of realigned world that separates the haves from the have-nots—the industrialized nations from the so-called underdeveloped areas.

Mehnert comes to somewhat different conclusions. He does not preclude a gradual Soviet rapprochement with the West, particularly in the event the Chinese acquire a nuclear capability. However, he still clings to the belief that the common aim and ultimate goal of the two chief contestants will remain the principal deterrent to any final breach between them. While the notion of a "final breach" is subject to many interpretations, Mehnert's conclusions seem somewhat inconsistent with his earlier observations regarding the relative importance of ideological factors in the determination of Communist policy.

Floyd casts his conclusions in the form of a summation of the issues presently dividing the two rivals. He also adds a few remarks about the advantages the Sino-Soviet dispute has had for the West in that the appeals of communism are now divided and competitive. Floyd makes another useful point in questioning whether non-Communist opinion has been too one-sided in regarding Communist China as the bête-noire in the dispute, the line that is of course advanced by the Soviets. The importance of this issue is whether Peking's intentions are quite as sinister as they sometimes sound, or as they are made out to be.

In spite of the reviewer's reservations about these works, the three authors should be commended for trying to shed some light on an immensely difficult problem that is still in evolution. If none of them has been able to add much to what has been known, their several efforts have certainly helped to bring the rapidly amassing material of the dispute before a wider public that would otherwise be the poorer in trying to understand one of the momentous issues of contemporary politics.

A separate word is in order concerning Günther Nollau's analysis of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the international Communist movement. This short work surveys the broad field of increasingly evident fissures in what has been overrated as the "monolithic bloc of socialist states and Communist parties." The author relies heavily on his earlier work on international communism for the historical part of his present analysis.[2] But he has also diligently combed the recent evidence of growing disarray in the world Communist movement and charted faithfully the Chinese Communist challenge

[2] *Die Internationale*, 2. Auflage, Köln, 1961. American edition titled *International Communism and World Revolution: History and Methods*, New York, Praeger, 1961.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

to Moscow's leadership in various parties. He carries his story through the fateful Communist party congresses of late 1962, when the hitherto relatively veiled dispute burst into the open.

Nollau is principally concerned with the future structure of the international Communist movement. He explores the various patterns that might evolve, but places particular emphasis on the notion of "polycentrism" as it was originally advanced by the Italian Communists. The author makes full use of the discussion that developed over this concept among its erstwhile proponents as well as its opponents. In the reviewer's opinion, however, his attempts to analyze "polycentrism" in terms of its literal, schematic implications has one serious drawback: he tends to lose sight of the fact that the meaning of the term and the motivations that originally inspired it have experienced considerable modification over the years. Thus his analysis suffers from a lack of historical perspective.

This shortcoming aside, there can be no disagreement with Nollau's prudent speculations concerning Moscow's continued ability to play a leading role in a highly diversified international movement. It remains to be seen whether this means, as Nollau seems to believe, that Moscow will be able to restore a measure of unity within such a structure by relying on its traditional ties with the European parties and its predominant influence over Eastern Europe. In any event, such a "rejuvenated" movement would bear little resemblance to the old conception of international communism at the beck and call of Moscow.

In the last analysis, and here the reviewer is in full agreement with Nollau, the old kind of monolithic unity in the international Communist movement is probably irrecoverable, largely because of the destruction of Moscow's traditional role as undisputed leader. And there can be no doubt that the Sino-Soviet dispute has had a lion's share in this development.

Communism in Western Europe

The Italian Labor Movement, *by Daniel L. Horowitz.*
Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1963.

Communism and the French Left, *by Charles A. Micaud.*
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Reviewed by William C. Gausmann

Mr. Gausmann is Labor and Minorities Adviser in the US Information Agency. He lived for many years in Britain and France and has written extensively for labor and socialist publications.

Well before 1914, European labor movements became divided into two quite different types. On the one hand, there were the movements of Marxist ideological origin but increasingly "reformist" predilection which prevailed in Northern and Central Europe, and whose operational ideas and institutional patterns pointed the direction in which the non-Marxist British labor movement also was tending. On the other, there were the movements of Latin Europe, where "reformist" temptations were lessened by the preference of significant numbers of trade union and political activists for revolutionary Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism.

Where the synthesis of social democracy *cum* business unionism reigned, urban industrial employment was the lot of most non-property owners, and democratic, or at least constitutional, government was firmly enough established to prompt hope that the capitalist social structure could be significantly modified via the ballot box and collective agreements. In France, Italy and Spain, on the other hand, industrialization was

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

so uneven, and government policy so unpredictable, that a climate favorable to doctrines of revolutionary "direct action" by urban and rural workers persisted.

These latter were countries from which Marx and his followers never quite succeeded in banishing the influence of Michael Bakunin and his disciples of the 1870's, despite conversions to Marxism in the following decade. Even after "pure" anarchism had been discredited by the assassinations of the early 1890's—and had in any event become outmoded in those sections of the Latin countries that were becoming industrialized—its anti-parliamentarianism and insurrectionism were incorporated into the mythology of revolutionary syndicalism, claimed by its protagonists to be adapted to the needs of an urban proletariat.

In France and Italy, where Marxism and anarcho-syndicalism competed until 1914, the antagonism between the two doctrines was not dispelled by the modifications each underwent. The minimal rapprochement achieved by the French Socialist Party (SFIO) with the syndicalist General Confederation of Labor (CGT) was based upon the unions' appreciation of the anti-war eloquence of Socialist leader Jean Jaurès and his acceptance of trade union claims of autonomy rather than upon agreement with his reformist political strategy. In Italy, when a "revolutionary Marxist" group set out to overthrow the moderate leadership of the Socialist Party (PSI), the spokesmen of the General Confederation of Labor (CGIL) were unable to assist their party friends; they were fully occupied defending themselves against the revolutionary syndicalists.

The First World War discredited governments, unions, parties, leaders, even slogans, among the "militants" of the French and Italian working classes. While most of the top leaders of prewar left-socialism and trade unionism sought new formulas within their traditions, many of the younger radical leaders and rank-and-file militants fell under the hypnotic spell of the Russian Revolution. One of them, the French syndicalist-turned-Communist, Gaston Monmousseau, later remarked: "If someone had said to us at that moment, 'You are blindly following Lenin,' he would only have been speaking the strict truth."

On the other hand, Alphonse Merrheim, the thoughtful and devoted leader of that wing of the CGT which had stood loyal to its prewar internationalism and had worked with the exiled Lenin and Trotsky in the 1915-16 anti-war movement, declared: "I do not claim the right to judge the acts of the dictatorship now existing in Russia. But I deny the right of Lenin to extend and impose that dictatorship on all parties, all nations." He predicted that the new Soviet regime could not maintain itself "at least for a generation without dictatorship," and warned that his quondam friends now sought to impose their policies upon European labor "under the surveillance of the Executive Committee of the Third International."

Just what that surveillance meant was revealed the following year (1921) in Italy. The whole of the PSI, led by its "maximalist" left wing, had adhered to the Communist International. The reformist parliamentarians in the party had loyally if reluctantly accepted this decision, just as they had bowed to Italian labor's rejection of the war. Like the "maximalists" they were willing to salute the Russian Revolution by joining the Comintern; but both groups remained dedicated to the party's democracy and autonomy. The Comintern had contrary ideas. To the PSI Congress in 1921 it sent as its representative the Hungarian Communist Matyas Rakosi (the same man whose Stalinist rule led to the Hungarian revolt in 1956) to demand that the "Maximalists" outlaw their reformist comrades. When the old Left refused, the Comintern ejected the PSI and sponsored the formation of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

At first uneasy coalitions of Marxist politicians, revolutionary syndicalists, faddists and opportunists, the Communist parties of France and Italy, like those of other countries, were transformed—under constant Russian pressure and their own compulsion to preserve the myth of the Revolution—into "Bolshevik" parties. Neither of the books under review describes this process, nor the stages by which the two Moscow-controlled parties captured the allegiance of the majority of organized French and Italian industrial workers. But they nevertheless contribute to an understanding of these important Communist parties, which polled nearly 22 percent of the total French vote in the autumn of 1962 and more than 25 percent of the ballots cast in the Italian elections of spring 1963.

Focusing on the Italian trade unions and their relations with the parties which compete for working-class support, Dr. Horowitz concludes that Communist predominance among the more militant workers and the myth of working-class unity, which keeps many non-Communist Italians from renouncing Communist leadership, are barriers to social progress. Similarly, Professor Micaud focusing on the ideas and organizations of the French political Left, finds that the existence of a mass Communist party which cannot be incorporated into normal democratic political life isolates the working class and so prevents the enactment of social and economic reforms that are necessary to bring about a weakening of the Communist apparatus.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Dr. Horowitz's book is valuable reading for students of the comparative development of labor movements, but it is not without a few minor deficiencies. The section on the pre-Communist disarray of Italian trade unionism and the Italian Socialist Party is, perhaps, too confined to the point of view of the reformist General Confederation of Labor. The CGL's rivals—the syndicalist unions and the revolutionary socialists—appear more as nuisances than as serious critics of the CGL and the reformist Socialists in a volatile but industrially underdeveloped society. Hence, the stage is not properly set for the post-Fascist emergence of the Communist Party as the principal force in the industrial and political life of the Italian working class. One also wishes that the author had provided more information about the overall activity and evolution (from 1919 to 1945) of the organization which he acknowledges to be the most important influence in Italian working-class life today: not the Communist-controlled CGIL (the former CGL), but the PCI itself.

Dr. Horowitz's account of the political role of Italian labor since 1945, and of the frustrations and minor successes of Italian trade unionism, is almost flawless, as is his historical treatment of Catholic trade unionism. For anyone seeking insight into the probable alternatives in Italian industrial and political life in the coming years, the book is indispensable.

In a provocative concluding chapter, Dr. Horowitz observes: "There existed a basic, generic control by the political party which had nothing to do with controlling the trade union machinery or dominating its leadership. It was actually not a control but a moral leadership and supremacy of the party in the allegiances of the members of the trade union movement, and to a certain lesser degree of the trade union leadership itself." He is speaking here of the pre-Fascist relations between the CGL and the PSI. Today, as the author shows, Communist Party control over the CGIL is rigidly mechanistic; but like the PSI before it, the PCI, too, relies ultimately—as does the French Communist Party in its relations with the CGT – upon the unreciprocated allegiance of the union members.

The problem of French and Italian democracy—and a vital factor in the future social balance within the Common Market—is not so much the predominance of Communist officials in the major French and Italian trade union federations as it is the meshed political and industrial strengths of the two Communist parties. The foundation upon which the political-industrial machines of the PCI and the PCF stand is the acceptance of Communist leadership by the majority of active workers in the two countries.

In both France and Italy, the economic prosperity born of the Marshall Plan and now bolstered by the Common Market has resulted in increases in real wages. Unemployment is nonexistent in France and has decreased in Italy. Yet, in spite of these improved conditions, the French Communist Party has recovered from the setbacks it suffered in the first elections under the Fifth Republic, and the migration of workers from Italy's still depressed southern regions has swollen the Communist vote in the industrial north.

The core of Professor Micaud's *Communism and the French Left* is found in its chapters on "French Workers" and "French Intellectuals," and three other excellent ones on the PCF—its organization its militants, and its electoral support. These latter explain how the PCF, despite its failure to make the CGT an effective bargaining agent for the workers and its inability to influence public policy, still manages to lure many working-class activists into the Communist quarantine ward.

The French Socialist Party (SFIC), still the principal direct competitor to the PCF, is also given a chapter by Professor Micaud, who treats it less superciliously than other commentators have. The author likewise discusses the left wing of the Confederation of Christian Workers (CFTC), which he rightly identifies as the CGT's most active rival among manual workers in industry, but his treatment of it lacks specific industrial materials. One also misses mention of civil service unionism, which is the keystone of the third French trade union federation, the Force Ouvrière, and of the independent union of foremen and technicians. These latter two, along with the SFIO and CFTC, have denied the Communists major strength among the growing salariat.

It is to be hoped that Professor Micaud's remarks will receive a hearing among the dissident Socialist and left-Catholic political groups which hover between the PCF and the non-Communist Left. He convincingly argues the thesis that any support given by these groups to the PCF, no matter how qualified, is self-defeating. That some of their adherents could assist in revitalizing French democracy is doubtless true—provided they would resolutely accept that goal. But, at least for the moment, the most striking fact about them is their complete failure to develop any electoral strength. In neither the 1958 nor the 1962 elections did the dissident Socialist party, which most of them support, garner quite 1.5 percent of the votes.

Not only have the French and Italian Communists created "new kinds" of leftist parties whose ac-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

tivities stultify social advance; but they have also, by capturing trade unionism, deprived it of its legitimate representational and economic functions. Communist trade unionism means the selection of union leadership, at all but the most elementary levels, by the party, and hence the subservience of the unions to party objectives. It is thus as different from the social democratic unionism of Northern Europe as it is from traditional Latin "direct action" unionism. In Northern Europe, the unions have the ultimate control—which they need rarely exercise—in the party-union coalition. They, and their members, expect their industrial autonomy to be respected by their political allies, and they expect it to be effectively exercised. Communist unionism *may* be responsive to rank-and-file needs where it is a minority tendency. But where it is based upon party domination of the working-class elite, its subservience to Communist policies and objectives is complete.

Since 1945-47, when the Communists established their hegemony over the French and Italian trade union federations, millions of ordinary workers in both countries have simply drifted out of the unions. If they are to participate in strike actions, they prefer that the strike calls be endorsed not by the Communists alone, but by the socialist and Catholic minority unions as well. Nevertheless, as their voting records indicate, they are unwilling to cut themselves off entirely from the Communists by joining the free unions. Hence, no matter how ineffective they are in promoting the interests of labor, the CGT and the CGIL still remain the dominant French and Italian trade union federations of manual workers.

It is significant that in the most important recent trade union campaigns in both countries—in the Italian metalworking industry in 1962 and the French coal fields in the spring of 1963—the initiative and strategy came from the minority unions, not from the Communists. But once the Communist federations, their ranks in order, entered the fray, they were able to usurp major credit for the joint action. This helps to explain why the masses of unorganized workers see no reason for paying dues to the smaller free unions, and why they go on letting the Communists deny them vigorous, continuing trade union representation. Politically, voting for the Communists seems to them today as good a way of protesting against the maldistribution of prosperity as it seemed fifteen years ago a valid means to protest against poverty. More than half a decade of Common Market prosperity will be needed to break this voting pattern.

The intriguing question in France and Italy today is whether or not the party cadres and the masses who vote Communist will continue to follow the party leaders in the new era of Sino-Soviet schism and the Soviet-American nuclear test ban treaty. Two myths have been shattered in the past year: world Communist unity and the alleged nuclear aggressiveness of the "capitalist" West.

It can hardly be doubted that the Italian Communist Party, which has said it is willing to collaborate in a "neutralist" government and (through the CGIL) in the mechanism of the Common Market, will continue to rid itself of youth elements susceptible to Peking's "direct actionism" and to give Moscow as much allegiance as its assessment of its own interests, which still includes protecting the Russian revolutionary myth, dictates. At the same time, as Mr. Richard Lowenthal suggested in the March-April 1963 issue of this journal, "the loosening of the dogmatic straitjacket is bound to raise the question whether the [Italian] party's ties to Russia and its undemocratic character are not the two main causes of its isolation from the mainstream of democratic development." But even if the question *is* raised, it does not follow that democratization of the party will result. The party leadership, no matter how "flexible," is still committed to maintaining "democratic centralism." It seems probable that the PCI will remain monolithic, even if "domesticated." This is, after all, the new Russian model. As for the French CP, Professor Micaud's chapter on the "Organization and Leadership of the Communist Party" makes it clear that its very dullness will probably keep it loyal to Moscow. Whether this loyalty will hold true for the younger recruits to the party—of which, interestingly enough, there have been few in recent years—remains to be seen.

Assuming a continuation of West European prosperity and of the concomitant tendency towards deprolitarization of the working force, both the French and Italian Communist Parties will, in the long run, have to choose between making major policy adjustments and declining to the status of what French political scientist Maurice Duverger calls "remnant parties." The process of deproletarization, already noticeable if not yet rapid, involves both modest general increases in real wage levels and a greater spread between the wages of skilled workers and of the less skilled. It also involves a shift in the composition of the labor force away from the manual categories to the new complex of salaried occupations. This may prove politically important. The salaried workers' unions in France and Italy have preserved their independence in the face of the Communist conquest of the manual workers' unions. Insofar as "white-collar" unionists can be politically identified, they are supporters of

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the social democratic and left-Catholic groups.

So, while the Communist Parties of France and Italy retain considerable strength thanks to their continued hold on the bulk of the radicalized manual workers in strategic industries, one need not doubt that in time the influence of Soviet-controlled communism in both countries will decline. Not even the Communists' remarkable accomplishment in gaining hegemony over the politically effective elements of the highly individualistic French and Italian working classes can indefinitely survive both the socio-economic changes now taking place in Western Europe and the dislocating effects of polycentrism in the Communist world. As Professor Micaud and Dr. Horowitz point out, however, the tragedy is that the strength of communism in the two countries continues to retard the progress of the very working classes for whom the French and Italian Communists pretend to speak.

Today the French and Italian Communist parties are still very far from being "remnant parties." Another decade or so of labor market evolution will lessen their electoral appeal, but meanwhile the PCI continues to threaten the democratic political stabilization that most Italians want, and the PCF's vote-getting machine looms large in the speculation of those Frenchmen who doubt General de Gaulle's immortality.

Struggle in the Himalayas

Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh,
By Margaret W. Fisher, Leo E. Rose and Robert A. Huttenback.
New York, Praeger, 1963

Peking Versus Delhi, *by George N. Patterson.*
New York, Praeger, 1963

Reviewed by Rhea C. Blue

Miss Blue is an American Orientalist who has a special interest in the Himalayan area.

The two books under review are welcome contributions to an understanding not only of Sino-Indian relations, but of the complexities of Central Asian politics. The authors have long had an interest in the Himalayas, and their familiarity with the recent developments is matched by their firm grasp of the history of that area. Each of the books, as the titles indicate, concentrates on the current Sino-Indian rivalry as seen from the viewpoint of New Delhi; the reader is left to judge the validity of Peking's claims on the basis of the relevant Chinese documents, cited *in extenso*. The aim of both books is to correct some of the popular misconceptions regarding China's and India's roles in the recent border clashes. Although their methods differ, the authors' conclusions and predictions are not too far apart.

Himalayan Battleground: Sino-Indian Rivalry in Ladakh is a scholarly, annotated study by three area specialists associated with the Center for South Asia Studies at the Institute of International Studies at Berkeley, California. Their penetrating conclusions and comprehensive documentation leave little doubt that the authors had examined all available sources. The history of Ladakh with its involved religious and trading relations with both Tibet and Kashmir is traced from the seventh century to the present. The writers also devote a separate chapter to the century (1845-1950) during which Ladakh was subject to the great power rivalry between Russia and England, and examine the impact upon Ladakh of the Chinese Communist takeover in Tibet. Thirty pages are then devoted to a careful analysis of the Sino-Indian border claims, which leads the authors

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

directly into their analysis of the emerging trends within that Central Asian triangle in which China, Russia, and India confront each other.

The authors of *Himalayan Battleground* turn their spotlight upon the Chinese Communist activities in the Ladakh area to refute the theory, held by some American scholars, that in 1962 Peking responded only when "attacked by India." In the preface of the book, the writers announce (p. vi) that they will "show in some detail how the Chinese Communists approach negotiation and what tactics they employ"; in the opinion of the reviewer, they fulfill their promise. For example, they show that the Chinese Communists, after by subterfuge seizing the Aksai Chin plateau, the strategic corridor between Tibet and Sinkiang, attempted to gain a "negotiated" Indian surrender of more strategic territory. "To that end," the authors state, "the Chinese employed a dual strategy directed on one level to confuse or deceive the rest of the world. For this purpose, they have made clever tactical use of deceptive propaganda of various kinds, including spurious documentation and the frequent reiteration of allegations that had already been refuted beyond any attempt at rebuttal."

The authors scrutinized the data submitted by both sides to support their respective claims, published in *The Report of the Officials of the Government of India and the People's Republic of China on the Boundary Question* (New Delhi, Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 1961). They conclude that "statements made by the Chinese could not be left to speak for themselves because they often misrepresented the cited sources." In their opinion—with which this reviewer agrees—Peking's flaunting of evidence was misunderstood by the Indians, who, "in their pleasure over the contrast between their own case and the near absence of genuine historical or legal documentation offered by the Chinese," lost sight of what was surely the major implication—namely, that such a fundamental contempt for evidence constituted in itself a warning of similar Chinese Communist actions in the future.

As further proof of the contempt with which the Chinese Communists have treated documentary evidence, the authors assert (p. vii) that the Ladakhi chronicles and the book entitled *Tibetan Memorials and Reports (Hsi-Tsang Tsou-shu)* compiled by the Manchu Dynasty's Imperial Resident at Lhasa from 1839 to 1844, contain authentic documentation which refutes some of the Chinese contentions about Ladakh's ties with Tibet. These two proofs are rejected and treated with disparagement by Peking so as "to reinterpret history to China's advantage."

The Chinese Communists, in contrast to many Western armchair strategists, were aware that the desolate Aksai Chin plateau had figured in strategic considerations throughout the centuries (p. 10), and they acted more quickly than the Indians in forcing a military decision in the area by a two-pronged attack along the entire Tibetan border. The authors point out that the Chinese needed to open the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) front in order to insure their own military success by splitting the Indian Army's defensive units.

The book further states (p. 135) that for political reasons "the Chinese were anxious to make it appear that their aggression—obviously under preparation for several months at least—had been provoked by Indian attacks on Chinese forces on their own side of the border." The chief reason for Peking's elaborate pretense of having acted in self-defense, write the authors (p. 144), "was presumably the Sino-Soviet mutual defense pact. If the Soviet Union could be prevailed upon to accept the Chinese version of events, further Russian military and economic aid to India, at the very least, would be precluded. The dilemma this development presented to the Soviet Government is underscored by the silence of the Soviet press on the outbreak of hostilities." In this maneuver, however, Peking failed.

The authors of *Himalayan Battleground* believe the Chinese Communists to be pursuing two major objectives in their conflict with India: the demolition of Indian prestige and the acquisition of complete control of Southern Asia. Since neither of these aims has been accomplished, the authors are of the opinion that new Chinese initiatives are to be expected.

The recent African trip of Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai and Peking's interest in a second Bandung Conference bear out the perceptiveness of the author's conclusion (pp. 145-146) that "India plays a vital role . . . as China's only major Asian rival in an expanding area of operations that promises to assume great importance in the next decade." Both Peking and New Delhi, the authors add, "not only act on the assumption of a wider power struggle but also speak more or less openly of the compulsions this situation forces on them. The area of open conflict is no longer confined to their common frontier but involves a competition for influence throughout the rest of Asia, with increasing repercussions in Africa."

Anyone who wishes to understand the significance of the Chinese Communist actions along the Tibetan border from 1950 to 1962 should not deny himself this most helpful guidebook.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George N. Patterson's *Peking Versus Delhi,* as the author writes in the preface, is "intended for the intelligent student of world events rather than for the scholar," and perhaps for that reason it does not provide footnotes or documentation. The author, a Britisher, who was in eastern Tibet from 1947 to 1950 and witnessed the initial Chinese Communist takeover of the area, wrote two earlier books on the fate of Tibet *(Tragic Destiny* and *Tibet in Revolt),* both based in part on his personal observations. Since then, as a free-lance journalist, he has closely followed the development of the Sino-Indian conflict.

Because of Patterson's personal involvement, his earlier books on Tibet understandably had a strong emotional overtone. This, however, is less true of the present volume, which achieves a relatively detached presentation, except in Chapter 15 (entitled "The Verdict, 1963"), where the author rather cursorily introduces raw data gathered in personal interviews, gives his personal evaluation of recent events, and takes a speculative leap into the future. Apart from this, the author's close personal contact with many of the events he describes, as well as with many of the principal Tibetan and Indian leaders, lends freshness and authenticity to his narrative.

In *Peking Versus Delhi,* the author refutes (p. 290) the argument frequently heard in the United States that the Chinese Communist incursion into the NEFA was only made to set up a claim to be traded against Indian recognition of the Chinese Communist ownership of the Aksai Chin plateau. He points out that this view fails "to take account either of the intensity of purpose of the present regime in China to take back everything to which it can make even the most shadowy historic claim or of the special Chinese jealousy of India as China's rival for influence and leadership in Asia."

Patterson stresses that the Indian leaders have failed to understand that the Chinese operated under an inherited political tradition diametrically opposed to their own. Statements made by the Chinese Communist leaders in 1949 against Nehru made it clear "that Communist China had no use for India's 'two-Great-Powers-in-Asia' theory, and saw herself as the only Great Power in Asia—or even in the world. . . . Chou En-lai is on record as stating blandly, 'when China speaks she speaks for Asia.' " (p. 20)

Carrying this line of argument further, Patterson states (pp. 21-22):

Russia, defeated in the attempt to contain China within her pre-1949 frontiers, and in her own attempts to acquire dominance in High Asia and so be in a position to encircle India on the east and reach into South-East Asia, has sought to recover the initiative by pointedly cultivating India's friendship. . . . To offset Russia's policy of friendship with India and aid to Afghanistan, China has intensified her efforts to isolate India in the minds of Asian countries by making agreements with and concessions to Burma, Indonesia and Nepal, by overtones to Bhutan and Sikkim, by cultivating friendly ties with Pakistan and, latterly, by a proposal for a "Confederation of Himalayan States."

With regard to the latter proposal, Patterson raises the interesting question later in his book why Nehru missed the opportunity to counter Mao's plan for banding the Himalayan states together under Chinese domination with an Indian proposal that would have included Tibet in the Confederation. (p. 291)[1] But while he offers some other useful points concerning the probable Chinese aim to federate the Himalayan states, he unfortunately never examines the problem from all angles or in terms of future implications. Perhaps some other student of the area will soon undertake such a task.

Patterson is critical of India and especially of Nehru for the subcontinent's moralizing neutralism and nonalignment policies. He feels that India's role as an effective critic has been reduced because of "her inability to reconcile her own much-compromised policies with her own much-vaunted standards, the suspiciously blinkered difficulty which she seemed to experience in applying her criticism equally to all nations." (p. 79) He apparently believes that India's inaction toward the Chinese Communist takeover in Tibet was due to the mischievous influence upon Nehru of Sardar K. M. Panikkar, the first Indian Ambassador to Peking. (p. 104) Panikkar, himself, admitted that "but for the sudden Korean flare-up . . . public reaction in India might have forced Nehru to take a stronger line in regard to Tibet." Other aspects of the problem—*e.g.,* Nehru's desire to build a strong economic base in India and the conscious risks that he took in his policy toward Communist China—are not examined by Patterson in this book.

The role of the Communist Party of India (CPI) is so entangled with the Sino-Soviet dispute that some treatment was necessary to convey the complexity of the forces involved in the Sino-Indian rivalry. Patterson devotes his 14th chapter to a general

[1] In his article entitled "Recent Chinese Policies in Tibet and Towards the Himalayan Border States" *(The China Quarterly,* No. 12 – October/December 1962), Patterson gives considerable detail, not found elsewhere, about the Chinese Communist proposal for this Confederation.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

resumé of the subject. Peking, he states, does not consider the CPI a true revolutionary Communist party and therefore denies any responsibility on its part for splitting the CPI (p. 269). Although he does not comment on the point, his evidence suggests that the Chinese Communists are supremely confident in their ability to provide the true Communist Party for India when the need arises according to their own time-table.

Patterson's look into the future of the Sino-Indian relationship is pessimistic. He predicts, without any supporting proofs, that Communist China is "preparing to deliver a coup de grâce" to India "by moving into and occupying Bhutan." (p. 290) He apparently believes that by means of this chessboard-type of move and by teaming up with East Pakistan and the Naga rebels, Peking can cut off effective Indian use of the NEFA and Assam. He gives no time-schedule for this prediction, nor does he indicate any possible countermove by India; neither does he take into consideration Peking's known cautious planning to guard itself against any head-on clash with the United States or the United Kingdom, such as would ensue under present defensive arrangements with India. Furthermore, his own discussion of the Confederation of Himalayan States tends to refute the possibility of this type of drastic move by the Chinese Communists.

Summing up, the two books under review provide a beginning body of data for other scholars interested in delving more deeply into the importance of the Sino-Indian rivalry in Asia. This clash of ancient empires, revived in changed form in the 20th century, deserves far more study directed to the full scope of its consequences for the peace of the world in the coming decades.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Notes and Views

The Polemics Seen by a Non-Polemicist

By Benjamin Schwartz

Mr. Schwartz is Professor of History and Government at the Center for East Asian Studies, Harvard University (Cambridge, Mass.). His latest published work is In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West *(Harvard University Press, 1964).*

Mao Tse-tung and his ideological experts are, as we know, earnest supporters of the Marxist-Leninist view that human nature "is determined by class origin." Indeed, one of the numerous and erroneous charges hurled from Peking at the Soviet leaders is that the latter have become partisans of the concept of a universal human nature. The Chinese, on the other hand, cling to the absolute metaphysical concept of class nature, which assigns to men of different classes entirely different characteristics. The Chinese Communist Party, however shaky its credentials, is presumably the embodiment of the class nature of the international proletariat.

It is noteworthy that in all the discussions on this subject, the Chinese always seem to assume that the universal human nature, if it existed, would be a good, an ideal human nature. This, of course, may be a tribute to the dominant role of Mencius in Chinese Confucianism. The thought that what men share in common might be their *misère*—their frailties, deceptions and vanities—as much as their *grandeur* does not seem to arise. Unfortunately for this dogma, the growing volume of Sino-Soviet polemic provides a mountain of evidence that if there is a common human nature, its denominator is man's wretchedness. The record of the dispute is *allzu menschlich*. The ploys, evasions, prevarications, distortions and self-pleading are quite comprehensible in terms of any heated argument between two "bourgeois" housewives screaming at each other over the back fence—in spite of the enormous machinery of Marxist-Leninist terminology.

In the following pages I should like to deal with certain developments in the polemic with a particular focus on the Chinese side. Somehow there is a general impression that the Chinese disputants are more "orthodox" and consistent, "purer," less "commonly human" in the various ways mentioned above than their Soviet antagonists. This impression is somewhat doubtful.

There is, to be sure, one issue on which the Chinese seem to be clearly on the side of orthodoxy, namely "the question of war and peace." Yet even here all is not so clear as it appears. It is true, of course, that the Soviet Union and Communist China have adopted different foreign policy postures vis-à-vis the United States, but when we consider the theoretical question of "coexistence" as understood by Lenin complications arise. There is one *locus classicus* for Lenin's views on coexistence and world war which runs:

The existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. . . . One must triumph in the end, and before that end supervenes, a series of frightful collisions

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states will be inevitable.[1]

Here we have an unqualified prediction of world wars. Most other pronouncements on coexistence can be reinterpreted to fit Soviet needs, but a statement of this kind from the Soviet point of view requires the application of "Marxist-Leninist creativity."

How have the Chinese interpreted this statement? They have occasionally cited it, as in the article on "Two Diametrically Opposed Policies of Coexistence,"[2] usually to project an image of the "imperialists" much like the one in Lenin's statement. The "imperialists," it is implied, are like lemmings rushing toward the sea. They cannot help but make war. In actuality, however, the Chinese do not seem to have accepted the clear meaning of Lenin's assertion. Mao has, to be sure, deprecated the horrors of a nuclear war and indulged in his ghastly "socialist optimism" concerning the glories of the postwar period. But the fact remains that the Chinese have retreated from adopting publicly the plain meaning of the Leninist formula for obvious reasons of public relations if not from a genuine desire to avoid the holocaust. Also, while their image of the "imperialists" seems to be that of the lemmings, it is in fact somewhat more complicated.

Why "war maniacs" with nuclear weapons in both hands should refrain from using them when threatened with extinction is somewhat of a puzzle. Yet the Chinese continue to insist that war is not inevitable, provided that the "correct" approach prevails. Even while minimizing the effects of a new World War, Mao is also quoted as saying in Moscow in 1957 that "the East Wind prevails over the West Wind and that war will not break out."[3] The Chinese view, therefore, is that if the "imperialists" can be intimidated and thrown off guard by a steady stream of "national liberation wars" and "people's revolutionary struggles," they will ignominiously shrink to nothingness without ever flinging their bombs. The "imperialists" are, after all, capable of being paralyzed with fear and vacillation, and this may be sufficient to inhibit the remorseless workings of the "imperialist system." All that the Soviet position adds to this is the notion that in addition to their capacity for fear, the "imperialists" may also be capable of sober calculation.

It is, of course, possible that this is merely a tactical exoteric doctrine, while the esoteric doctrine remains the one outlined in Lenin's statement. It is nevertheless the exoteric doctrine which is being paraded by the Chinese as genuine Marxism-Leninism, and as such it remains a retreat from Lenin's unqualified prediction. As Mencius pointed out long ago, he who retreats fifty paces has little cause to laugh at him who retreats one hundred.

The Soviet side freely admits that Khrushchev has modified Lenin's position on this matter and simply claims that it has creatively applied Leninism to a new unanticipated situation. Such "creative applications" of Marxism-Leninism have been the prerogative of the CPSU ever since Lenin began indulging in *his* "creative applications" of Marxism. We are all familiar by now with Mao Tse-tung's numerous claims to "creative applications" of Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist truth in all of which the same procedure is invariably involved. What had previously been considered a universal truth—a proposition applying to all places and all time in modern history—is suddenly relativized and limited in applicability to certain places and certain limited segments of time. Lenin's doctrines concerning the inevitability of world wars, state the Soviet theoreticians, were true only for the period of time preceding the emergence of nuclear military technology. According to China's ideological spokesman, Chou Yang, however:

the leaders of the CPSU who boast of having developed Marxism-Leninism in a creative manner permit themselves and their followers to revise Marxism-Leninism while they try to prevent others from developing it in a truly creative fashion. . . . Even while adulterating Marxism-Leninism at their own discretion, they demand that the other Communist parties follow their steps and repeat their words as if their adulteration were an imperial edict.[4]

The guileless Chou Yang is evidently unaware that during the long reign of Stalin Moscow's claims to creativity *were* "imperial edicts" based ultimately on an assumption of superior authority.

What, then, about Mao Tse-tung's claims to creativity? Can one really find in the copies of Lenin's and Stalin's writings proof texts for all of Mao's "innovations"? To take one of the most recent themes of Chinese propaganda, what would Lenin have made of a socialist world made up of sovereign nation-states, each developing its own economy in complete "self-reliance" and autarchy? The reasons for Peking's adoption of this

[1] Report of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party at the 8th Party Congress. V. I. Lenin, *Selected Works*, New York, International Publisher, p. 33.

[2] *Peking Review*, No. 22, Dec. 25, 1963.

[3] Statement by the spokesman of the Chinese Government, in *Peking Review*, No. 36, Sept. 6, 1963, p. 10.

[4] *Peking Review*, Jan. 3, 1964, p. 22.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

bit of "creativity" are obvious, but whether Lenin would have considered it more "creative" than Moscow's position on coexistence is open to question. Both the Chinese and Soviets, of course, appeal to "life" to verify their respective "creative applications" of Marxism-Leninism, and "life" obligingly tells both of them exactly what they want to hear.

Turning from "the question of peace and war" to the question of ideological policy vis-à-vis the non-aligned world, we find a very muddy-looking picture indeed. The notion of a consistent Chinese posture in this area will hardly bear close scrutiny. During the period of the Chinese rise to power—roughly from 1948 to 1954—both Moscow and Peking seemed to be equally hostile to the newly emerging "bourgeois nationalist" regimes in Asia and equally inclined to dismiss them as lackeys of imperialism. There was a similar tendency to favor only nationalist movements under Communist party control. Liu Shao-ch'i, now chief of state, proclaimed in his famous speech to the WFTU in 1949 the universal validity of the Chinese model with respect to seizure of power in colonial and semi-colonial areas, including all the specifications – the broad united front under "proletarian hegemony," the possession of a revolutionary army, armed revolution against armed counter-revolution, and so forth.[5] The Soviets, however, did not commit themselves to the particulars of the Chinese model and preferred to stress their own favorite category of "people's democracy." Peking's insinuation that China had a particular message for the Asian, African and Latin American world over and above the message of the October Revolution was never accepted. Nevertheless, both sides shared the doctrine that national liberation movements everywhere should be controlled by Communist parties.

In the period 1950-1955, however, we see on both sides a gradual drift from this approach to what became known as the Bandung line. With the death of Stalin, the end of the Korean war, the rapid unanticipated retreat of colonial power, and the rise of numerous non-Communist nation-states, both the new Soviet leadership and the Chinese found it in their interest to cultivate the new neutralist regimes and to acknowledge their independence in spite of the lack of "proletarian hegemony" anywhere in the ex-colonial world. To be sure, both Moscow and Peking continued to cherish the hope of "proletarian hegemony" in the future, but during the whole period from 1955 to 1959 Peking was quite willing to push its previous doctrine of the universal relevance of the Chinese model into the background and to indulge in ardent wooing of all the established regimes in Asia, Africa and elsewhere. Even at this time, incidentally, in spite of the common direction of Soviet and Chinese lines, there were numerous indications of tension between Peking and Moscow in the underdeveloped world. The famous trip of Bulganin and Khrushchev to Asia would seem to indicate that the Soviets were already deeply suspicious of what they now call Peking's "hegemonistic" pretentions in Asia, Africa and Latin America. Even at that point, a common ideological-strategic line was no guarantee against a silent struggle for authority and power.

Soviet policy, on the whole, has remained faithful to the Bandung line ever since, in spite of all the disappointments. It is this line which has come to be enshrined in the Soviet doctrine of "national democracy." Genuinely independent nationalist governments, we now learn, may be created by the nationalist bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the peasantry without the presence of the proletariat represented by the Communist Party. The conditions in such a "national democracy" are, however, invariably interpreted as favorable to the future advent of "socialism" and eventually "communism." Contrary to Chinese assertions, the Soviets are by no means indifferent to future "proletarian hegemony" and are rather constantly on the lookout—as one can readily attest in such Soviet journals as *Narody Azii i Afriki* (The Peoples of Asia and Africa)—for the emergence of Communist parties (faithful to Moscow) in these areas. There is indeed some evidence that in Guinea the Soviet Union took rather too much initiative in pushing the cause of "proletarian hegemony." Nevertheless, they have patiently continued to cultivate regimes, such as that of Abdul Nasser, which go on suppressing their own Communist movements and taking aid from neo-colonialists."

It is, indeed, the Chinese who began to depart from the Bandung line, particularly during 1959. Events on the Indian border, events in Iraq, and the policies of Nasser, as well as the atmosphere of Peking's internal policy, may all have played a part in this; whatever the reasons, the Chinese seemed to return to something like the pre-Bandung line. Presumably there was a renewed emphasis on proletarian hegemony within the national liberation movement, on broad united fronts of the "four classes" led by the Communists, on armed struggle, etc.

The word "presumably" must be stressed here, for in actuality Peking's ideological posture between 1959 and the end of 1963 remained

[5] New China News Agency, Nov. 23, 1949.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

somewhat muffled. It is true that in this period there were many treatises in Chinese journals dealing with the history of the CCP's rise to power and strongly implying the universal applicability of this experience to the whole non-Western world.[6] There is also considerable evidence that at the 1960 meeting of Communist parties in Moscow the Chinese strongly insisted on their own "principled" version of "national democracy," emphasizing the quick attainment of "proletarian hegemony," the turn away from the reactionary bourgeoisie in the new areas, and so on. Perhaps the clearest expression of the Chinese ideological posture in recent years was provided in the famous CCP letter of June 14, 1963, entitled "A Proposal Concerning the General Line of the International Communist Movement," which stated:

History has entrusted to the proletarian parties in these areas the glorious mission of holding high the banner of struggle against imperialism . . . of standing in the forefront of the national democratic revolutionary movement and striving for a socialist future.

The fact remains, however, that in many of the new countries no "proletarian parties" existed and that Peking continued throughout the period to cultivate relations with such countries. Not only did it continue to cultivate Ghana, Guinea and Mali, but also "feudal," royalist Yemen and Nepal. In the case of the Algerian revolt, Peking constantly stressed the "Chinese" nature of the strategy employed, in spite of the fact that the revolution was by no means "under proletarian hegemony." There were sound "raisons d'état" for these Chinese policies, but they by no means support Peking's claims of a "principled" ideological posture totally differing from that of the Soviets.

Finally, the most recent development in Chinese policy has been a second, quiet return to the Bandung line. Chou En-lai's recent trip to Africa has given evidence of this new shift in policy, not widely publicized abroad. Abdul Nasser, who for a long time had been discreetly assigned by Peking to the category of reactionary tools of imperialism, now found himself praised by Chou for "successes in the defense of his fatherland, state sovereignty, etc.,"[7] in spite of his continued suppression of the Egyptian Communist Party, continued acceptance of "neo-colonialist" aid, and continued cordial relations with Tito. Bourguiba and the King of Morocco were likewise congratulated on their genuine national independence. Peking is issuing invitations to a new "Bandung" conference of all Asian, African and Latin American countries without regard to polity. The only state which the Chinese now consider to have become a reactionary bourgeois puppet of imperialism is Nehru's India. Under these circumstances, it becomes increasingly difficult to define precisely what are the ideological differences between Moscow's conception of "national democracy" and Peking's. Their specific policies in specific areas (e.g., India) may differ widely, and the "hegemonistic" rivalry between them is obvious; but the question of ideological principle has become completely befogged.

The Chinese have, in fact, now launched a major campaign to "unite with whom one can unite" on a global basis. This motto is now meant to include not merely classes and political groupings within given states, but whole nation-states regardless of their political and social systems. It is to include not only the first "intermediate zone" of Africa, Asia and Latin America, but also, if possible, the "second intermediate zone" of the capitalist and even "imperialist" states of the West, excluding "US Imperialism" which is now defined as the exclusive enemy (perhaps the Soviet Union is also excluded).[8] All of these forces may conceivably be united against "US Imperialism"!

The Chinese motto of "uniting with whom one can unite" has always been coupled with the phrase "under the hegemony of the proletariat." It is only the combination of the two which constitutes Mao's "creative contribution to Marxism-Leninism." It is of course possible for the Chinese to believe that de Gaulle's recognition of Peking involves an acknowledgement of Peking's "proletarian hegemony," but it will hardly serve their purposes to inform the General of such a belief. And if they are attempting to stress a united front with Canada and France against the United States, they are not likely to press the issue. Such has been the "principled" history of Peking's ideological relations to the non-aligned world.

Unnoticed in the exchange of invective between Peking and Moscow, there has emerged yet one more creative addition to Marxism-Leninism which has quietly been accepted by both sides—probably in a more unqualified way by the Chinese than by the Soviets. It involves nothing

[6] For the most recent statement, see "The Victorious Road of National Liberation War," *Peking Review*, Nov. 15, 1963.

[7] The China-UAR Joint Communique, *ibid.*, No. 52, Dec. 27, 1963, p. 9.

[8] "All the World's Forces Opposing US Imperialism Unite," *ibid.*, No. 4, Jan. 24, 1964, pp. 6-8.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

less than a redefinition of the prerequisites for the existence of a Marxist-Leninist movement and is largely the result of Castro's self-definition as a Marxist-Leninist. When the famous credo of 1957 was drawn up—a credo to which both Moscow and Peking still fervently appeal—phrases such as "Marxist-Leninist parties," "Communist and workers' parties," "proletarian parties" were used interchangeably, and it would not have occurred to any of the signatories that these phrases might refer to different realities. Now we read the following in an interview granted by Chou En-lai to the Uruguayan journalist, Galeano, on December 13, 1963:

If a country wants to carry out a socialist revolution, it should accept the revolutionary principles of Marxism-Leninism, and Marxism-Leninism cannot be the monopoly of the Communist Party. Any revolutionary can use the weapon. When Fidel Castro achieved victory through armed combat, he was not a member of the Communist Party.[9]

In other words, we now learn that Marxism-Leninism is separable from those determined entities known as Communist parties, and that political groups and political leaders clearly not committed to Marxism-Leninism, and hence clearly not "proletarian" may, by a process of self-definition, become genuinely Marxist-Leninist. Further, since all political groups and parties by Communist definition represent classes, one must assume that political groups which do not represent the proletariat must obviously represent some non-proletarian class—*i.e.*, the national bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie, the peasantry, etc. Now, some of these political groups are informed that they may transform their "class nature" simply by a process of self-definition.

In his speech in Algeria, we find that Chou lavished extravagant praise on Algeria's "revolutionary" road to freedom, its "armed struggle," and the like:

The independence of Algeria in our era is a great event in the African national liberation movement. For the other African peoples it has set a brilliant example of daring to wage an armed struggle and daring to seize victory and indicates to the oppressed nations throughout the world the correct road to win independence and freedom.[10] *(Emphasis added.)*

I have emphasized the last phrase since it seems to be in flagrant contradiction to Chou's assurance to other nations in Africa which have won their independence by less spectacular methods that China fully accepts the reality of their national independence. But what is most remarkable in Chou's speech is the enormous emphasis placed on the parallels between the Chinese and Algerian revolutions. The only missing ingredient—an ingredient once considered the most essential of all—is the hegemony of a Marxist-Leninist party. The whole speech thus seems to represent a plea to Ben Bella to "do a Castro" and define his movement as a Marxist-Leninist movement. If Ben Bella makes the proper decision, his petty-bourgeois FLN will be transformed into the vanguard of the proletariat, while the CPSU, after forty years of Leninist steeling and tempering, sinks into bourgeois degeneration. Of course, the Marxism-Leninism to which "revolutionary groups" should commit themselves is only genuine Marxism-Leninism, and everyone knows that precious commodity is dispensed only in Peking.

Thus, the essence of the true proletarian class nature is now not only detached from the industrial proletariat, it is even detachable from constituted Communist parties. It is now a completely free-floating fluid which may find its embodiment where it listeth.

This article has focussed on Chinese manipulation of ideology because of the widespread impression that the Chinese have been less cavalier and more rigidly doctrinaire than the Soviets in their ideological stance. On the whole, it is true that they have attempted to give an impression of greater toughness, but toughness has no necessary relationship to rigidity. In none of this do I mean to imply that the Soviet side of the controversy will bear close scrutiny.

Contrary to Soviet assertions, as already pointed out, the Chinese have not clearly committed themselves to world war, nor have they in any of their public statements emphasized color or race. The Chinese also seem quite correct, it seems to me, in their claim that the Soviets still clearly aspire to "wave the baton" in the Communist world in spite of their frequent protestations that there is no longer any "center" in that world. The Soviet claim to ascendancy now simply takes the form of alleging the "unanimity" of all Communist parties in accepting the decisions of all recent Soviet party congresses as binding upon all of them. It is precisely the Chinese refusal to accept the binding nature of these decisions that has shaken the whole structure of authority in the Communist world to its very foundations.

[9] JPRS Translations on International Communist Developments, Washington, D. C. No. 552, Jan. 20, 1964.

[10] *Peking Review*, No. 1, Jan. 3, 1964, p. 34.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

IN FUTURE ISSUES

Articles on recent developments in Czechoslovakia (by Edward Taborsky), in Rumania (by Randolph L. Braham), and Hungary (by Laszlo M. Tikos).
Military and Political Establishments in the USSR, by Mathew Gallagher and Thomas Wolfe.
China's Economic Perspectives, by Edwin P. Jones.
The Soviet Consumer: A Discussion.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED